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THE 



POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY 






CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO; 

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF 

GENERAL BARON DE "jOMINI, 

BY CAPT. S. V. BENET, 

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, U. S. ARMY. 



SECOND EDITION, 



NEW YORK: 

D. VAN NOSTRAND, 192 BROADWAY. 

1862. 






\%& &S 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year eighteen hundred 
and fiftv-three. by J. S. KEDFIELD, in the Clerk's Office of the 
District Court or the United States, tor the Southern District of New 
York. 



1 



TO THE GRADUATES 

OF 

THE UNITED STATES MILITAEY ACADEMY 

OF 1849 
THIS TRANSLATION IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED 

BY THEIR CLASSMATE. 



PREFACE. 



This volume* was the last of a work, published some twelve years 
since ; but as the manuscript of this campaign had unfortunately been 
mislaid, the editor was compelled to supply its place hastily and 
Bomewhat incompletely. Having, by an unforeseen event, recovered 
the original manuscript, I hasten to restore it in its integrity, with 
this difference, that I present it in my name, instead of causing the 
recital to be made by Napoleon. A powerful motive has induced me 
to act thus, and change the form employed in the rest of the work : it 
is, that the rapidity of the emperor's fall, and his exile, preventing 
him from procuring accurate information of what had occurred, not 
only in his army, but also in that of his adversaries, he had at St. 
Helena composed narratives, with which a disinterested historian could 
not entirely concur, so that it would have been necessary to make him 
utter things, of which he had judged altogether differently. 

The censures that Napoleon has cast on Ney and Grouchy, and which 
these have returned with interest, have all, more or less, something 
specious in them. I have sought to be impartial in presenting them. 
Napoleon did not always give his orders in an irreproachable manner ; 
these orders were not always well executed or properly interpreted, 
and his lieutenants knew not how to supply the deficiency in what 
they had received incompletely and vaguely. If I reproach Napoleon 
for any faults on the mornings of the 16th and 17th June, no one would 

* General Jomini calls this, the 22d chapter of his great work enti- 
tled " Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon," though it is an unit in 
itself, and forms a complete summary of the campaign of 1815. — Tub 
Translator. 



O PKEFAGE. 

suspect me, of wishing to cast the slightest cloud over his immense 
genius and glor y, which, more loudly than any other, I have proclaimed 
in all my works. But the more laurels he has gathered, the less should 
his brow be adorned at the expense of his lieutenants. 

As regards his political course, it is not so easy to judge between 
his system and that of his detractors ; in the first rank of these, figured 
all the ultra-liberal utopianists, professing the strange doctrine that 
power in a government and despotism are the same thing, and that, 
under pretence of producing liberalism, it was necessary, at any price, 
to curb the authority charged with directing the destinies of a nation. 
It is evident that Napoleon thought otherwise, and the belief is admis- 
sible, that in principle he was right ; "perhaps he erred in exaggerating 
his doctrine of power ; but it is very difficult to establish the just me- 
dium between nullity of power and the slightly arbitrary. The future 
will undoubtedly prove, that between two dangers, the emperor de- 
sired to choose the lesser, because the abasement of executive power, 
will always be the least equivocal signal of the decay of a nation ; 
this decay, indeed, may not always be sudden, and sensible to the eyes 
of the vulgar, but will be the work of time, unless a powerful hand 
applies a prompt remedy in seizing the helm. As for the rest, my task 
is not to condemn or absolve : posterity will decide. 

I will close by observing, that the ideas which prevail in this little 
work, being those recognized in all the acts of Napoleon, the Author 
found himself under the double necessity of adopting them and writing 
on the side of his interests, that is to say, by placing himself at the 
head-quarters of the hero of this history, and not at that of his 
antagonists. J. 

1838. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 



Condition of France after the departure of Napoleon for the Island of 
Elba ; he decides on returning ; descends to Cannes with a thousand 
men, marches in triumph to Paris, and remounts the throne. Gen- 
eral coalition of Europe against him. Campaign of 1815. Battles of 
Ligny and Waterloo. Second abdication. End of Napoleon's career. 

Filled for twenty years with the victories and 
gigantic enterprises of Napoleon, all Europe still 
gazed with astonishment at the sudden fall of an em- 
pire, whose power, till recently, menaced universal 
independence. It could not be conceived that six 
months had sufficed, for leading the allies from the 
Elbe to the Seine, and dictating to France the terri- 
ble treaties of Paris. The congress of all the powers, 
assembled at Yienna, was endeavoring to conciliate 
the numerous claims arriving from all parts, for shares 
of the spoils of this audacious conqueror who, two 
years previously, had dared to place one foot on Cadiz, 
the other on Moscow. The task was a difficult one, 
because this grand diplomatic act should accomplish 
the double purpose, of establishing the political equi- 
librium so severely shaken, and regulating for the 



8 POLITICAL AOT> MILITARY HISTORY OF 

future the European public right, utterly overthrown, 
by the storms of the revolution. 

Fallen from the throne of the most powerful em- 
pire to the ridiculous sovereignty of the Isle of Elba, 
by reason of his abdication at Fontainbleau ; separated 
from his wife and son in an almost humiliating manner, 
and for which history will one day justly reproach his 
enemies ; Napoleon retired to Porto-Ferrajo, like Sci- 
pio in his retreat at Liternum, to some degree exiled, 
and more discontented at the desertion of his compa- 
triots than the persecution of his adversaries. 

Condemned by destiny to be but a passive spectator 
of the grand affairs of the world, which for fifteen 
years, he had directed by the ascendency of his genius, 
he yet bore within himself the secret presentiment of 
being called, soon or late, to reappear on the scene. 
He was too familiar with men and affairs, to feign ig- 
norance of the full extent of the difficulties that would 
harass the Bourbons, in the governing of a country that 
had become changed since their departure, and felt 
profoundly humiliated by the disastrous circumstances 
that had brought them back. Napoleon was then well 
aware that, after the first infatuation occasioned by the 
general'peace, immense interests and violent passions 
would come in conflict, so that the most energetic por- 
tion of the French nation would soon regret the ter- 
mination of his reign and desire his return. 

However, the uncertainty as to the time when this 
would take place, and his inability to give birth to the 
occasion, preventing him from forming his plans, the 
ex-emperor found comfort in the occupation of tracing 
the history of his life, and feeding the sacred flame in 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO* 9 

the bosoms of his partisans; while the progress of 
events was precipitated to such a point, that he was 
torn from his retreat much earlier than he anticipated. 

Independent of the special advices he received from 
Queen Ilortense and some faithful friends, the jour- 
nals would have sufficiently instructed him in the state 
of affairs ; for, notwithstanding the censure that weigh- 
ed upon them, and notwithstanding their falsehoods, 
the divers passions they interpreted were visible to the 
least clear-sighted, and exposed the agitation that 
reigned throughout the kingdom. 

Indeed, Louis XVIII. seemed at first to have per- 
fectly appreciated the spirit of the age, in the convic- 
tion, that the majority of France desired to consolidate 
the results of the revolution. After twenty years of 
experience, this prince had concluded, that his party 
was too weak to resist the wishes of the immense ma- 
jority of the middle classes, who, in a country stripped 
of aristocratic institutions, always finally dictated the 
law.* He felt that to maintain himself on the throne, 
it was necessary to reign with this majority, that is, 
with the interests of the revolution. Henry IV. had 

* The opinion here expressed appears to have suggested to Napoleon 
Lis famous decrees from Lyons ; but throughout the rest of his career, he 
seems to have labored under the conviction, that if it be always well to act 
on the spirit of the masses, it is no less true, that majorities, or masses 
are rather disposed to be constrained and led, than to influence the direc- 
tion of affairs. On great political questions votes should be weighed, not 
counted ; because we know how ignorant the masses are upon such sub- 
jects, even among people who pretend to the highest civilization. 

What can be expected from the political ability of the multitude, when 
in an assembly of four or five hundred deputies representing the notables 
of a country, it is nigh impossible to find fifty statesmen worthy the name 
— happy, indeed, if among them there be two or three politicians of the 
first order. 

i* 



10 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

said that Paris was well worth a mass, — Louis XVIII. 
thought that the crown of France was well worth a 
constitution. 

It was evident he could not govern through the an- 
cient magistracy of the kingdom, of which not a ves- 
tige remained ; nor was it with the deceased states of 
Brittany, nor with those of Languedoc and Burgundy, 
that it would be possible to lead the France of 1814. 
It w r as necessary then, to re-create the entire machine 
on new base&, and in order not to submit to the revo- 
lutionary principles, it behooved the king to revive the 
work of the revolution by virtue of the divine right, 
upon which he founded his own ; he, therefore, grant- 
ed a charter.* 

Many publicists have blamed Louis XVIII. for 
this important measure ; and in judging it by the 
results it produced, we are constrained to admit that 
it accomplished its end badly. If it had been possible 
to seize the dictatorship with a vigorous hand, and 
govern through royal ordinances, it is incontestable 
that this had been the surest plan ; but we are led 
to the belief that it was impracticable ; the king had 
then but to decide, what governmental machine would 

* Many writers have affirmed that Louis XVIII. only concluded on giving 
a charter, at the reiterated instances of the Emperor Alexander. We are 
certain that theEussian Monarch did, indeed, give this advice to the French 
King at Compiegne ; but it is not very probable that the charter of 1814 
was the improvisation of a few days ; every thing leads to the presumption, 
that the opinions of the two sovereigns accorded on this occasion, and 
that the king had meditated on his course while in exile. 

However, his declaration from St. Ouen of the 2d May, was followed 
by a compact, the provisions of which, agreed upon by Ferrand, Montes- 
quieu and Dambray, were drawn up by Beugnot, and afterwards discussed 
with. a commission taken from among the authorities established by the 
Empire. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 11 

be a proper substitute for that, which had just sunk 
under the blows of the allied powers. To reestablish 
the Assemblies or the states of the provinces, had 
been impossible, as we have just remarked; this had, 
moreover, clashed with too many long-lived interests 
and opinions to make the attempt possible. To sub- 
stitute for the glorious and energetic empire of 
Napoleon, the absolute power of a camarilla of emi- 
grants, was the dream of a visionary : if acted upon, 
the restoration had not lasted six months. 

A woman, endowed with a superior mind when she 
spoke not of politics, has pretended, that the Bourbons 
ought to have taken the empire as they found it: — 
" The bed was so well made" she said, " that they had 
but to lie in it" This phrase of Madame de Stael, 
that met with so much success in the frivolous saloons 
of Paris, was but nonsense. How would the brother 
and successor of Louis XVI. have been able to recog- 
nize a Senate, that no people in Europe had acknowl- 
edged, after the conduct it had held towards its founder, 
and which, twice in ten years, had disposed of the 
throne ? 

As to the mute legislative body which has subjected 
the Emperor to so much censure, which had not dared 
to raise its voice, but at the moment when a million of 
enemies were on the point of invading France, that 
is to say, at the moment when it was necessary to be 
silent and rally around the Chief of the State, and 
which had thus forced Napoleon to dissolve it ; — it is 
certain, that it would have favored the recstablishment 
of the royal authority better than the public tribune, 
which is ever ready to serve as an arena for the pas- 



12 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

sions. But it is doubtful whether it would have been 
welcome to France. Moreover, the imperial institu- 
tions favored the opinions of liberalism so little, that 
the leading doctrinaires of the senate, who had over- 
thrown Napoleon, were eager to frame a charter to 
please themselves and to be imposed on the Bourbons ; 
but Louis XVIII., decided in repelling this illegal act, 
should, according to the prevailing opinion, have pro- 
mulgated another, reassuring the threatened interests. 

The kins; had then but the choice of two courses : 
the first was to grant a charter, as he did ; the second 
was to govern provisionally as dictator, while convok- 
ing a constitutional assembly to w T ork in concert with 
his ministers, in the framing of a national compact 
which, sanctioned by the notables of France, would 
become irrevocable, and thus offer the double advan- 
tage of guaranteeing the interests of the throne, as 
well as those of the nation. 

The first of these appeared to him the most pru- 
dent : first, because it was a voluntary concession, and 
did not implicate the recognition of the principle of 
national sovereignty, as the second would have done : 
Louis XYIII. should, therefore oppose all his power 
to this principle, so specious in theory, as it might 
easily degenerate into a system of elective monarchy. 
Then, it was at least doubtful whether a well finished, 
well matured and very solid compact, could emanate 
from a constituent assembly, however restricted might 
be the number of its members. And if instead of 
an elective assembly, they were satisfied with a com- 
mission of forty or fifty members appointed by the 
provisional government, to which would be given the 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 13 

initiative in all the combinations of the compact, as 
was done after the 18th Brumaire, what guaranty- 
had such authority presented ? What power would 
a compact thus fabricated have had ? A king has 
always the right to establish institutions where none 
exist ; but by what right would an assembly of fifty 
counsellors stripped of all legitimate power, impose 
a contract on royalty on the one side, and on the 
entire nation on the other, without submitting it, if 
not to the primary assemblies, at least to those of the 
notables specially nominated for this purpose by the 
country ? But these two means were equally incom- 
patible with the antecedents of the monarch and the 
true interests of his crown.* 

The formality of submitting constitutions to the so- 
called popular voice, had actually become, since the re- 
volution, a veritable comedy ; for, from the famous 
ochlocratical constitution of Heraut de Sechelles in 
1793, to the vote on the hereditary empire of 1815, 
every compact, however worthless, had received from 
two to three millions of votes : — all know of what 
value are the suffrages of the multitude in such mat- 
ters, which the loftiest minds have such difficulty in 
understanding. The institutions of a great country 
should emanate from her chiefs, or, in their failing, 
from her notables; and if these are not capable of 
digesting them properly, the masses, far from im- 
proving them, would be incompetent to judge of 

* I should state in this place, once for al' , that the principles put forth 
in this volume, apply only to France and other so called constitutional mon- 
archies ; these forms of government would not suit all countries — no more 
imit the United States of America than Kussia or Austria. 



14 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

their merits ; as a consequence, would not be qualified 
to approve or reject them. If Napoleon had often re- 
course to it himself, it was because he held all his 
power by election, and was unable to give it any 
other basis. 

Finally, the most important of all problems of high 
internal politics will always be, the proper determina- 
tion of the kind and limits of a national intervention 
in monarchical institutions : the intervention of the 
country in the administration of ordinary affairs, is a 
point which it would be unreasonable to contest, 
though to render it useful, it must be wisely regulated ; 
but with respect to fundamental laws above all, the 
initiative should not appertain to it ; for if ever the 
deputies have the right to patch up charters and elect 
kings, then the monarchy becomes purely elective, 
and the fate of all states governed by this deplorable 
system, is sufficiently well known. 

Louis XYIII. was too well convinced of these truths, 
not to deem a charter carefully drawn up by the coun- 
sellors of the throne as the wisest course, since he 
would equally avoid the danger to which he would be 
exposed in wishing to govern through royal ordinances, 
and the still more serious one, of abandoning the forma- 
tion of this compact to an assembly of legislators, ani- 
mated with the most hostile passions and doctrines. 

Placed thus with the alternative, of disregarding all 
the traditions of a monarchy of fourteen centuries, by 
renouncing all the rights which constituted at once the 
splendor and the solidity of the throne, and in per- 
mitting troublesome laws to be imposed upon him, or 
• of displeasing the nation, by acting according to his 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 15 

own good pleasure without consulting the country, 
Louis XVIII. sought to conciliate as much as possible 
the rights of the past and the opinions of the present, 
with a proper foresight to the future. He flattered 
himself to attain this end, by having his compact sanc- 
tioned by a commission, composed of an equal number 
of senators and members of the legislative body, 
chosen from those who had acquired an ephemeral 
popularity, by the loudest declamations against the 
imperial power. This measure with its good intention, 
served, however, but to introduce two or three deplor- 
able amendments in the royal project, and did not 
prevent the Utopianists of all shades from proclaim- 
ing the scandal, because, said they, the fundamental 
law being the work of a small number of the prince's 
favorites, can only be an act outrageous to the sov- 
ereignty of the people or the nation. 

As the personal position of Napoleon placed him 
under the necessity of making frequent allusions to 
this sovereignty, which was really the only founda- 
tion of his right to exercise the supreme authority, it 
will not be out of place here to expose the manner in 
which all wise statesmen should regard it, and in 
which without doubt he also viewed it.* 

Now-a-days, speculative politics have produced a 
veritable confusion of tongues, and to make myself 
properly understood, I feel the necessity of renewing 
here a species of profession of faith. In internal poli- 

* There are contradictions between these principles and many acts of 
Napoleon ; but it must not be forgotten, that his position imposed upon him 
many deviations from his true principles, which otherwise, manifest them- 
selves in all the grand measures of his government. 



16 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

tics there are four things essentially different : theory 
and practice, men and systems. I will forbear from 
speaking of the different species of men thinking 
themselves political, and I will treat only of things, 
that is to say, of systems and doctrines. I will only 
observe, in passing, that the men called on to govern 
a state, are often under the necessity of adopting sys- 
tems, which are not according to their principles : a 
legislator and a publicist are, on this account, in a 
more independent situation ; but a prince, a chief of 
state, a prime minister, being obliged to put into opera- 
tion the elements they have at their disposal, find 
themselves thus acting according to certain dogmas 
not their own; and this was especially Napoleon's 
case in 1815. 

Some very ingenuous publicists have imagined in 
good faith, that in point of political combinations, 
all was new under the sun since 1789. However, 
to my knowledge, there are but five forms of gov- 
ernment that ever existed, and to which little has been 
added in our day ; these are : absolute hereditary 
monarchy ; hereditary monarchy limited by institu- 
tions ; elective monarchy; aristocratic republic or 
oligarchy ; lastly, democratic republic. I have been 
explicit on these different forms of government (chap. 
YIL, vol. II). Some have many advantages, mixed 
with some defects ; others have grave defects, tem- 
pered by feeble advantages. I have described both. 

When we attempt to give a government to a coun- 
try, that finds itself momentarily deprived of the same 
through certain catastrophes, it is necessary to choose 
aright one of the five forms indicated. "Whichever 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 17 

be our choice, we should be deeply impressed with 
the fact — that no nation is strong, puissant and formida- 
ble, without a government that is vigorous and re- 
spected at home. — That no government is capable of 
leading a people to high destinies, when the authority 
is humiliated by those, who should make it their duty 
to elevate it to the highest degree of consideration. — - 
Finally, that liberty and order are impossible, without 
due respect for the princes, the chiefs, or the magis- 
trates. 

If it be acknowledged that in our day, republican- 
ism would be an absurdity in a great European state, 
with old communities scarcely free from the swaddling 
clothes of feudalism ; if monarchy be the only form 
that can be proposed, then a choice must be had be- 
tween the elective and the hereditary, between the 
absolute and the limited. 

Though I have already commented on the dangers 
of all elective governments, especially when applied 
to monarchy, I must recall here what I have said con- 
cerning it. In consulting appearances only, this sys- 
tem would undoubtedly seem the most founded in 
reason ; still nothing is more opposed to the solidity, 
grandeur, and even the preservation of states, for it is 
little else than anarchy and civil war legally intro- 
duced into the country at the death of each king. The 
visionaries who extol it unceasingly, are unaware, that 
no elective monarchy would exist a century in the 
midst of powerful neighbors, jealous and interested in 
intervening at each succession to the throne, in order 
to excite a civil war, or cause the election of a kin<r 
suited to their wishes. They forget that Poland per- 



18 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

ished, solely because she was an elective monarchy, 
endowed with citizen-Icings • that Hungary and Bohe- 
mia have been swallowed up for the same reason. 
We know what ruptures the federative and elective 
empire has produced in Germany. The Grand-dukes 
of Moscow, and the Arch-dukes of Austria, heredi- 
tary possessors of feeble provinces, have, on the con- 
trary, founded the two most powerful monarchies of 
modern times, at the expense of the republics and 
elective monarchies by which they were surrounded. 
If France, when tired of the despotism of Louis XI., 
(which nevertheless gained her so much power,) had 
thought of seeking for a remedy in an elective govern- 
ment, she would have long ago been effaced from the 
map of Europe as a political power. The greatest 
service Napoleon has rendered her, is most certainly 
that of having abolished her elective government, to 
lead her back to wiser institutions. 

It was after having recognized these incontestible 
facts, that all wise legislators adopted, from age to 
age, the principle of legitimacy, or the order of he- 
reditary succession, as the true safeguard of monarchi- 
cal states.* But, one fact that has been too much 
forgotten by our modern Solons is, that the principle 
was established much more for the interest of the state 
than for that of any one dynasty whatever ; and that 
consequently, the slightest blow given to its funda- 
mental laws would lead to great future disorders. 

* The good is often confounded with the bad, legitimacy with absolute 
government ; the liberals honor them with one and the same anathema, 
and nothing is more absurd, because, since the law of the country estab- 
lishes hereditary monarchy, each one should be a legitimist as a matter of 
duty, which does not at all prevent his being a constitutionalist. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 19 

An elective monarchy not being then more suita- 
ble than a republic, there remains but to choose 
between an absolute hereditary monarchy and one 
limited by institutions : each has its good features as 
well as its inconveniences. If the prince was always 
a just, firm man, and a great statesman, or if deficient 
in either of these qualities, was always surrounded 
by honest and able ministers, an absolute monarchy 
would certainly be the government par excellence. 
If the chambers of a constitutional country were all 
composed of true statesmen, incorruptible and impar- 
tial, without vanity or ambition, without spirit of 
party or association, dreaming but of the country's 
grandeur and of respect for the dynasty ; in one 
word, sacrificing but to one divinity, the public good, 
they might perhaps be able to dispute the palm with 
a wise absolute royalty, and offer the perfection of 
social institutions. But it is impossible to find such 
chambers in any country. Thus, every system having 
its inconveniences and its dangers, the aim and end 
of all fundamental law should be to diminish them 
as much as possible, and the institutions that will 
permit the least to exist, will evidently be the best. 

In order to compensate for the dangerous acci- 
dents which the exclusive principle of legitimacy 
and inheritance offers in sometimes leading bad 
princes to the throne, some have imagined a constitu- 
tional government, others the principle of national 
sovereignty ; high-sounding terms, that often conceal 
many deceptions, and the meaning and application of 
which are not often well defined or well established. 
To this system some legislators of great foresight have 



20 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

preferred the divine right, seeing that all power hav- 
ing necessarily a source and origin, it was very neces- 
sary to ascribe one to royalty ; but, if national sov- 
ereignty is cast aside as evidently dangerous, nothing 
is more rational than the recognition of royalty as 
coming from God, since his providence guides the 
destinies of nations as well as of individuals. 

Between these two systems that appear reciprocally 
to exclude each other, there perhaps exists a middle 
course "; undoubtedly sought for but not yet found, or 
at least it still remains unfixed. Little has resulted 
from this attempt, but an unconnected system, with 
which they have thought to reconcile the elective 
principle to the hereditary, by uniting them under 
the head of national sovereignty, a kind of bastard 
legitimacy, consisting of an order of succession without 
strength, as it would be actually revocable by a vote 
of the country more or less properly ascertained. 
Others, more bold, or less satisfied with this vague 
sovereignty, have believed it possible to appeal to that 
of the people as the most positive and most powerful. 

These terms, sovereignty of the people and national 
sovereignty, have unfortunately been very often con- 
founded, though they signify very different things. 
The sovereignty of the people or of the multitude, is 
an absurdity that no reasonable man can sustain, un- 
less a totally different signification is given to it from 
that which it is generally supposed to have. If it is 
imagined that the multitude reigns because it nomi- 
nates delegates direct, as it was pretended to establish 
under the natipnal convention, a great mistake is com- 
mitted, because the people never were less the sover- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 21 

eign than under this deplorable system. If classes 
of notables are created, and the right of choosing 
delegates conferred upon them, the people, no longer 
nominating their proxy, are then no longer the sover- 
eign. Besides, did there ever exist a people truly 
capable of exercising even the most indirect sover- 
eignty ? This has never occurred even in the small 
cantons of Switzerland. 

Under all constitutional monarchies, national sover- 
eignty expresses, according to all reasonable statesmen, 
the sovereignty of three powers, that have authority to 
govern the affairs of the country : one only of these 
powers, then, is never but a fraction of the sovereignty. 
Now, a nation delegating but one of these powers, is 
not, properly speaking, sovereign, because if so, the 
power of its delegates would rule alone, and would 
annihilate the other two. 

"We see by this expose, that national sovereignty has 
not yet been generally well defined nor well understood. 
The intervention of a nation iri the administration of 
public affairs, is not only a desirable fact, as has been al- 
ready stated, but is a universal fact that exists even 
in absolute monarchies, as the sovereign cannot govern 
without being surrounded with men of merit designated 
by public opinion, and who, under some title or other, 
frame into ordinances the wishes of the nation, indi- 
cated by the provincial states or the municipal admin- 
istrations. This intervention of the country in the 
management of affairs, is naturally clearer and stronger 
under a constitutional government, where there exists 
an elective chamber called to discuss and approve the 
laws: bid there is an immense distance between this 



22 POLITICAL A]*TD MILITARY HISTORY OF 

intervention in affairs, and the sovereignty. And it is 
very necessary that it should be so, for it would be a 
strange play upon words, to pretend to establish an 
hereditary monarchy side by side with a national sov- 
ereignty, so understood, that the nation being sovereign, 
her delegates would have the right to make and to 
destroy the government. 

It is true, that after the grand political deluges that 
have occasionally engulfed some old, rotten, and 
powerless governments, or after the total extinction 
of some dynasty, it has been very necessary that the 
notables of a nation should provide for the rebuilding 
of the state, by confiding the reins to the prince judged 
most worthy and apt, or to him who had the most di- 
rect right. But this act of election being an exception 
to the fundamental principles of inheritance, and not 
being justifiable but under imperious circumstances, 
is far from constituting a sovereign right ; it should be 
considered only as a revolution, and the compact re- 
sulting from it proclaiming the heirship to the throne, 
becomes by this fact a distinct reparation of the vio- 
lation of the principle, and a positive abdication of this 
pretended right of national sovereignty. If it were 
otherwise, a monarchy would be only elective, as has 
been already stated. 

It results from this, that in a hereditary monarchy, 
not absolute, but limited by fundamental laws, the 
throne is the legitimate property of the dynasty, the same 
as that the portion of sovereignty that consists in taking 
part in the framing of laws, is the imprescriptible 
property of the nation. The nation should then be 
powerless in disposing of the throne as long as there 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATEELOO. 23 

is an heir direct or indirect to it, as the throne cannot 
deprive the nation from participating in the adminis- 
tration of affairs ; a concurrence that it exercises not 
only through an elective chamber, but also through a 
chamber of peers or senate chosen from the notabilites 
of the country, and which, although nominated by the 
king, would not the less represent an active and power- 
ful fraction of the general interest^ of the country. 

The equilibrium of, and the putting in practice these 
two portions of sovereignty, is the delicate problem 
that all wise statesmen should seek to reduce to a fun- 
damental law. There are but few of our modern legis- 
lators who have properly comprehended this problem, 
or at least, who have given it a satisfactory solution. 

If they have not perfectly understood national sov- 
ereignty, neither have they properly appreciated and 
defined divine right. The most ardent innovators have 
endeavored to exhibit it as a right at once obscure and 
arbitrary, which in distant times, some sovereign fami- 
lies had arrogated to themselves, over the property of 
a country. Louis XIV. especially, in his strange in- 
structions to his grandson, had in some manner given 
the weight of authority to this erroneous opinion. But 
far from its being an abuse sanctioned by time, the 
divine right had a more noble and more solemn origin, 
because it was indisputably the most sublime institution 
that legislators could devise, for giving to a state the 
stability which constitutes strength, power, and pros- 
perity, and delivering it from civil discord, by having 
the throne protected from ambitious individuals. 

It thus became an article of faith, among learned men 
through profound reasoning, and among the masses 



24 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

through tradition, not for the interest of one family, 
but for the very safety of the state and the greatest 
advantage to national power. Happy the people who 
are sufficiently wise to know how to enjoy the benefits 
of an advanced civilization, by appreciating the ad- 
vantages of such an institution, and seeking to fulfil 
the duties it imposes. 

After the English and French revolutions, the di- 
vine right was exposed to the attacks of that multitude 
of writers who thought themselves born to shape the 
destiny of nations. Even among statesmen of sufficient 
learning to discern all its merits, there were found some 
who considered its action insufficient for a society 
shaken to its foundation, and in which religious belief 
had given place to a spirit of skepticism and contro- 
versy that pretended to make every thing pass through 
the crucible of philosophy. These bold writers thought 
that a right which latitudinarians and even all the in- 
telligent classes called a precedent, a right, according 
to them, that lost itself 'mid the clouds of fanaticism, 
could not have as solid an origin as one proclaimed 
and consecrated by the interests of all, one, in a word, 
founded on the institutions judged to be indispensable 
by the most eminent men, and upheld by the experi- 
ence of fifty centuries. In their opinion, the question, 
in point, was to draw up the fundamental law in such 
a manner as to place legitimacy under protection 
from all storms. 

To this reasoning, not devoid of some justice, the 
defenders of the divine right answer, that human in- 
stitutions being unstable by their nature, and sanc- 
tioned by men only, can of course be revoked by men, 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 25 

so that they would be necessarily subjected to all the 
storms of an elective monarchy, from which the di- 
vine right alone could entirely exempt them. 

We have not decided here between the two systems 
of legitimacy, which will be equally indispensable ac- 
cording to the country where they are to be applied, 
and which at bottom rest on the same thought, be- 
cause in either, the throne and the supreme power 
properly appertains by right to the family in the es- 
tablished order of succession ; the only difference ex- 
isting between them is, that in the latter the necessity 
of this order, that cannot be at all assailed, is recog- 
nized by human laws, which can be applied equally 
to an absolute as to a limited monarchy. 

This human institution of legitimacy is the more 
admirable, as it has been necessarily sanctioned in its 
origin by the proudest families of a country, by those 
even who, having the chance of reaching the throne 
in their turn, would be supposed inimical to a stable 
institution that interdicted their ever having access to 
it. Well, by a very extraordinary conversion, those 
who have shown the greatest attachment to legiti- 
macy, are the haughtiest families of England and 
France, while it has been the object of the sarcasm 
and hate of all demagogues who have nothing to gaii 
by an elective system of monarchy. 

Be that as it may, Louis XVIII. and his ministers, 
could with difficulty change of their own free will, 
the essence of this right, placed above mortal combi- 
nations, which had given fourteen centuries of con- 
tinued existence to the monarchy of the Franks ; they 

should naturally have made it the lever of the new 

2 



26 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

public right, that dating from 1814, was to constitute 
for the future, that of the throne and of France, by 
binding them together in an indissoluble manner. All 
that could be demanded of them was, to establish for 
ever, this alliance of divine inheritance with human 
institutions : the one deciding on the ownership of the 
crown, the other admitting and limiting at the same 
time, the rights of the nation, thus rendering this 
double basis unassailable, as well on the part of the 
throne as of its adversaries. 

If the entire ancient nobility and all the members 
of the royal family had shared these sentiments, that 
were certainly entertained by the King personally, and 
his ministers, we must admit that the charter would 
have given satisfaction ; because, if it imposed some 
slight trammels on monarchy, it shackled anarchy so 
much the more ; but we should not ignore the fact 
that the successors of Louis XYIII. did not consider 
themselves at all bound by this contract, and claimed 
the divine right to the fullest extent, under the idea 
that it was attributed to them of old, especially under 
Louis XIY. Moreover, if the intimate counsellors of 
the King, Ferrand, Dambray, Montesquieu, Beugnot, 
had exhibited an enlarged sagacity in the framing 
and the discussion of this charter, the first two es- 
pecially would have abolished from emigration, the 
exaggerated prejudices on the means of applying 
their doctrines to the French nation, usually little dis- 
posed to comprehend their abstractions ; besides, the 
reactionary passions of some of these ministers and of 
other confidants of the monarch, were more dreadful 
even than their dogmas. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 27 

Their task was the more difficult from having to 
struggle against the Utopias of Benjamin Constant, 
Lanjuinais and Lafayette, and there was none, even to 
Beige Lanbrechts, appointed senator by Napoleon, 
who did not consider himself as well qualified as Louis 
XVIII. to give France a charter of his own fashioning. 
lie deigned his consent to call this prince and his 
dynasty to the throne they had occupied for ten cen- 
turies, on condition that he should resume all the 
chains imposed by the National Assembly on Louis 
XVI. This flaming legist pushed his monomania so 
far, as to insert an article in his compact, prohibiting 
the king from making propositions under the form of 
laws, permitting him solely to pray the chambers for 
the passage of a law on a subject, upon which the 
prince would be satisfied in submitting an abstract. 
What perfect folly to put the base of the edifice at 
the summit, and the summit at the base, and which 
gave ample reason, why the King should refuse to 
such minds, the initiative of the compact. 

After having demonstrated that the granted charter 
had a double necessity, I should remark that its 
arrangements were not faultless. As it was a sort of 
indissoluble contract, binding at the same time the 
throne and the nation, it should have been as brief as 
possible, and should have contained but one species 
of declaration of rights. Exception then can be 
taken, to its extending with too much complaisance 
over certain details of legislation, which it had been 
more proper to deliberate upon and modify afterwards 
with the aid of the chambers and the sanction of ex- 
perience ; the prerogatives conferred on the elective 



28 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

chamber were not so stipulated, that the equilibrium 
of the three powers so much desired, could never be 
broken by this last, and not become a vain word 
through its encroachments ; by permitting an absolute 
liberty to the press, it left an opening to its misrule. 
I am ever ready to avow, that this last fault was the 
work of the legislative commission associated in the 
discussion of the charter, and not an act of the king, 
who had wisely stipulated, that the laws upon this sub- 
ject should have the power to prevent the often dan- 
gerous errors of the journals, which by exciting the 
worse passions would be itself capable of shaking the 
most strongly constituted governments. Finally, the 
most grave fault with which it can be charged is, that 
it was accompanied by circumstances and restrictions 
that caused its sincerity, and, consequently, its duration, 
to be doubted. 

If Louis XVIII. had not, with some reason, feared 
to establish grievous precedents in admitting dogmas, 
that might insensibly lead to the elective system, it is 
certain that he would have given more stability to his 
new edifice, by securing it at least the sanction of the 
new chambers if not of the country. It would have 
sufficed for this to have ordered a royal sitting, at 
which he had declared the compact obligatory on 
himself and his descendants, as well as on the nation 
and its deputies, each within the limits fixed by the 
charter. After which declaration, himself and all the 
members of his family, as well as all the deputies and 
peers, should have sworn to maintain in its integrity, a 
charter that was henceforth a contract binding on all, 
and the basis of an entirely new public right. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 29 

Far from acting with this frankness and this pro- 
found consciousness of the general interest of parties, 
they affected to permit the belief that they submitted 
to a necessity, but that this course would not be long 
followed. To this error the restoration added the no 
less grave one of changing the flag, and proscribing 
that which had been, during twenty years of triumphs, 
the pride of the present generation, instead of unre- 
servedly adopting the national colors, which Louis 
XYI. and Louis XVIII. himself, had borne for two 
years. The white flag not only humiliated the army, 
but also became the emblem of a reactionary will that 
alarmed the best minds. Even Count Montlosier, 
whose pure royalty was well tested, protested, by his 
wise counsels, against an imprudence that placed the 
throne at the mercy of a banner. The king yielded 
to the excitations of his orthodox advisers, and be- 
lieved he had accomplished sufficient in giving such 
liberal institutions, the principles of which, were far 
from obtaining the assent of the ultra-royalist party 
that surrounded him. 

Be that as it may, Louis XVIII. hoped to be able, 
through this grand act, to bring together the Bour- 
bons and the party that repulsed them, and render the 
revolutionists partisans of royalty, by maintaining their 
interests and admitting a portion of their system. 

They imagined then, that there was but one heart 
and one mind in the entire nation ; they affected to 
repeat it, but this was not true. There was, however, 
so much felicity in this combination, that under this 
regime France would have flourished in a few years, 
if parties would have reasoned : if pride, interest and 



30 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

the passions could have been annulled by some statute : 
lastly, if the errors we have just pointed out had not 
rekindled all the most opposite political passions. The 
king, by a dash of his pen, should have solved the 
problem struggled for, for twenty years, since he had 
established the new political doctrine in France, and 
caused it to be recognized without dispute by entire 
Europe. To succeed, it was only necessary for him 
to know how to be master at home ; but this was the 
difficult point. 

In fact, no chief magistrate was ever placed in a 
more vexatious position. Surrounded by twenty 
thousand emigrants who wanted situations, old impe- 
rial employes who wished to preserve theirs, Jacobins 
who also demanded a share of them, theorists who 
pretended to be alone capable of conducting a consti- 
tutional state, ancient royalists and a haughty clergy, 
who wished neither a constitution nor those charged 
with executing its requirements ; Louis XVIII. had 
been an angel, a genius, to have succeeded in uniting 
the parties. This truth once acknowledged, he should, 
at least, have striven to fix insuperable bounds, and 
walked through these dangers with a free and firm 
step. 

A prince who disposes of a thousand millions a year, 
besides all the employments in the administration and 
the army, eventually succeeds in every thing, when he 
has exclusively the initiative of the laws, and knows 
how to employ wisdom and vigor by turns. To place 
the moderate royalists side by side with the constitu- 
tionalists and the statesmen moulded under the empire, 
to reject the ultras of all classes, to express his 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 31 

wishes haughtily and frankly, was the only course to 
be pursued ; perhaps it had not sufficed to consolidate 
a- restoration, following immediately a foreign invasion 
and the military humiliation of the country ; but at 
last, this was the only means of maintaining his posi- 
tion ; vigor founded on justice, is the best subtlety 
of kings. 

Louis XVIII. wished it too well done ; he flattered 
the two factions too much, hoping to attach their 
chiefs to himself ; he favored Carnot and Fouche 
while protecting those who treated them as brigands ; 
at the instigation of his counsellors, he promised the 
emigrants what the charter never allowed them. In- 
stead of being the sole and vigorous chief of the state, 
he seemed but as the victim offered as a sacrifice to 
the animosity of both parties ; a secret power protected 
by his brother, and which pretended to more royalism 
than the king, had established itself at his very side in 
the palace of the Tuileries. To increase his misfor- 
tune, authority was given to disreputable ministers, 
who were influenced by the coteries that disquieted 
the court. From that time there was nothing but in- 
consistency and contradiction in the system of govern- 
ment ; words were never followed by deeds, as at 
heart they desired something different from what was 
promised in writing. 

Louis XVIII. had given the charter to prevent any 
other from being thrust upon him ; but it was evident 
that, the first moment passed, the orthodox royalists 
expected it t<> be withdrawn piece-meal, as the com- 
pacl did not suitthem. They openly proclaimed that 
this was but an act of transition between the revolu- 



32 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

tion and legitimacy. The emigrants wanted an easy- 
master, as was asked by the Spanish priest, one who 
would permit them to govern without contradiction. 
They saw in the return of the Bourbons, but a means 
of indemnifying themselves for their losses and recov- 
ering their privileges. They had caused their own 
ruin, and presented themselves as victims of their de- 
votion to the royal family. They boldly asked if 
there was but one legitimacy, and if the rights of the 
nobility were not as sacred as those of the house of 
Bourbon. 

To calm these pretensions, they promised to satisfy 
them in the course of time ; but the charter was far 
from furnishing the means. In fact, the nobility was 
established, but it had neither prerogative nor power ; 
it was not democratic, as it had exclusive pretensions ; 
it was not aristocratic, as it did not constitute a body 
in the state, and to which the peerage itself was not 
exclusively reserved. 

The clergy also preached against the charter, be- 
cause they expected to reclaim their property and re- 
sume their ancient influence, which was positively 
impossible under the empire of the constitution. Rome 
also urged them in this course through an interest 
that had nothing in common with christian morals, or 
with the well-being of the French church. 

It was then evident that the entire structure reposed 
on insecure foundations. To consolidate it, required 
the strong will of Richelieu, joined to the principles 
of Henry IV. to put in practice what had been so 
wisely promised : Union and oblivion. Everything 
leads to the belief that this was the design of the princes ; 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 33 

but as each one arrives, after protracted discords, 
nothing is thought of till interest and self-love have 
been extinguished or satisfied. 

Instead of proceeding with this end in view, they 
did as in 1780, placed their self-love and interest at 
variance ; those who had delivered Toulon to the Eng- 
lish, appeared at the Tuileries side by side with those 
who had retaken it, and even dared to brave them with 
their raileries. The king should have sent them en 
sv/rvi iliance, a hundred leagues from the capital.* To 
gain the general confidence, it was indispensable to 
expose, in a solemn proclamation, the principles of his 
government, and to assure their triumph in spite of all 
petty resistance. 

Far from strengthening ail acquired rights, and 
crushing all pretensions, the reverse was done, preten- 
sions were caressed, and interests were injured. Al- 
ready alarming reports, threatened all purchasers of 
national property with j^rojects of restitution ; pamph- 
lets attributed to Chancellor Dambray, attacked the 
legality of the sales, and demonstrated the justice of 
restitution. 

The soldiers of the empire were kept because feared, 
or rather because there were none others ; and in re- 
viewing them they affected to enhance the glory of 
their enemies. Crowds of emigrant or Vendean offi- 
cers claimed, with perhaps some justice, the confir- 
mation of their grades, thus encumbering the rolls 
of the army and stall", and depriving the officers, 

* We do not here mean that the king should prove ungrateful 
bis faithful servitors. He oughl to provide for and employ tho.se who 
were moderate and wise; and exile from the court the over-excited and 
tin; firebrands who preached hut. reaction. 



34 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

already too numerous for the army, reduced three- 
fourths, of all hopes of advancement. As a conse- 
quence, many military conspiracies had burst forth in 
the army through dissatisfaction. 

Under the sway of circumstances such as these, no 
one could feel a confidence in the existing state of 
things, as they saw no point of support anywhere, 
and, at the head of affairs, neither power or will. 
Carnot, whose rough character w r as ever consistent, 
dared to weigh the weakness of this government in 
addressing the king ; he afterwards published a me- 
moir, in which, amid many truths, he feared not to 
apologize for the regicides, as well as for the sover- 
eignty of the people. By the side of this memoir, the 
emigrants published pamphlets no less threatening. 

They had not delayed till then, their conviction, that 
the establishment of a rostrum and the liberty of the 
press, were sad means for operating the fusion of par- 
ties, as these institutions would be more effectual in 
dividing the most united nation, than in rallying those 
who were divided and irritated by the most violent 
revolution recorded in history. In fact, interest and 
self-love, wounded by the discourses from the tribune, 
as by the virulent polemics and personal attacks of 
the journals, revived all the passions, excited the hate 
that time and forgetfulness might have extinguished, 
and thus succeeded in creating factions even where 
none existed. It was indeed with this object — to al- 
lay all party feeling of resentment, and to merge all 
in the same interest for his empire, and not for the 
interest of his personal power, that Napoleon had 
established a censorship, whose unsatisfactory results 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 35 

were caused by deficient regulations. As the ministry 
of Louis XVIII. had felt, from the beginning, the ne- 
cessity of establishing it over all works under twenty 
printed sheets, and especially over daily and periodi- 
cal journals : this was one of the first laws submitted 
to the newly instituted chambers; and as it appeared 
to be contrary to the promises of the declaration of 
Saint Ouen and to the spirit of the modified charter, 
the liberals, republicans and doctrinaires raised inces- 
sant clamors : they shouted despotism ! deception !* 

To these general causes of agitation, it is necessary 
still to add, the dissatisfaction which the onerous 
treaties entered into with foreigners had produced. 
All who bore a true French heart, all who had a spark 
of national pride and patriotism, were indignant at 

* In the project of the charter emanating from the king's council, free- 
dom of the press was declared, in conforming to the laws which would be 
restored for 'preventing or restraining its abase ; the legislative commission 
had objected to the word preventing and had obtained its erasure; the 
ministers afterwards decided that for restraining this abuse, it was neces- 
sary not to wait until the evil was without remedy and all its bad effects 
produced. Besides, all former censorship had been more or less illy-con- 
trived. That of the empire confided solely to two or three mercenary 
censors, and extending to the most voluminous scientific works, was 
abused ; years would be required to cull from the manuscripts accumula- 
ted there : the works in one volume, even the periodical reviews and 
pamphlets of ten sheets, should never be subjected but to good repressive 
laws clearly expressed. As regards the daily press, whose action is such 
as to be able to subvert the best constituted state, it should be subjected 
to a previous censorship, but instead of confiding this to complaisant 
clerks, it would be necessary, as 1 have stated in a previous volume, to in- 
Btitute a special tribunal <>/ irremovable judges, that would both decide on 
offences committed by uncensured works and regulate the censorship of 
the daily }>rc>+. This was the only mode; admissible in France, where 
the press has become a power sufficiently formidable to require particular 
judges, impartial by their position and capable of appreciating the i, r "<>l 
AS well us the bad. 



36 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

the ease with which the Count d'Artois had signed 
the order for restoring a hundred fortified places still 
occupied by French troops, before having even stipu- 
lated for any of the conditions for peace. The trea- 
ties of Paris traced out at the point of the sword with 
a rigor, undoubtedly justifiable as reprisals, but per- 
haps imprudent for the interest even of some of the 
powers that imposed them, — these treaties, I say, had 
left a deep-seated rancor in the hearts of all the par- 
tisans of the empire and revolution. Each one per- 
suaded himself, right or wrong, that the Bourbons 
could have preserved at least a portion of Belgium 
and the line of the Rhine as far as Coblentz, as well 
as Savoy, if they had not been so eager to occupy 
the Tuileries. We do not intend to discuss here the 
validity of these censures, nor the possibility there 
may have existed on the part of the ministry of Louis 
XVIII. to obtain less harsh conditions; we only state 
the moral effect their eagerness had produced. 

The result of so much conflict could not be long 
awaited. An absurd discourse of the minister Fer- 
rand increased the irritation to the utmost, by classing 
all the French people in two categories : those who 
had followed the right line * that is to say, who had 
struggled in connection with the Bourbons or in la 
Vendee ; and those who had pursued the crooked line, 
or who had admitted the Revolution and the Empire. 
A strange apostrophe to the entire nation, and a sin- 
gular means of supporting a projected law, tending to 
the restitution of all the property of emigrants, not dis- 
posed of. Henceforth the parties, daily, appeared 
more hostile, and this shock might yet render Napo 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 37 

leon once more the arbiter of the destinies of 
France. 

If the state of affairs in this country were of a na- 
ture to inspire him with the hope and the desire of 
returning, he was not the less stimulated by the intelli- 
gence of what was being enacted at the Congress of 
Vienna, where the division of the spoils had led to great 
dissensions. Already, were Austria, France and Eng- 
land bound by eventual treaties, to guarantee Saxony 
against the pretensions of Prussia backed by Russia, so 
that the not-over-satisfied sovereigns of these two coun- 
tries, spoke of returning to their capitals that demanded 
their presence. Their reported departure was fixed 
for the 5th March. 

As a compensation for the support that the Bour- 
bons promised to Austria and England, they demanded 
the expulsion of Murat from the throne of Naples, to 
be replaced by that branch of their family that for- 
merly reigned there ; a very natural step, truly, as it 
was a means of leading the peninsular to the interest 
of France. Besides, the venal and interested heart of 
Talleyrand attached a double importance to this pro- 
ject ; since, to secure the preservation of his princi- 
pality of Benevento and the revenues attached thereto, 
it behooved him to have it recognized by the legiti- 
mate government of the two Sicilies, to the restoration 
of which he inserted this condition. The Bourbons 
proposed to take upon themselves the expulsion of 
Murat, and with this object the assembling of troops 
in Dauphiny was taking place. 

From anot hoi" quarter Napoleon was timely informed 
that the ministers of Louis XVIII. wore proposing to 
the Congress his removal from Elba, to exile hiin to 



38 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

another hemisphere ; this was a gratuitous violation 
of the treaty of Fontainbleau, as up to this time he 
was chargeable with nothing that could provoke the 
anger of the sovereigns.* 

Unable to resist such an attempt, because of his 
limited means of defence, and determined not to await 
the event, Napoleon conceived the audacious design 
of re-mounting the French throne. Though his forces 
consisted but of a thousand soldiers, they were, never- 
theless, superior to those of the Bourbons, allied, as 
he was, to the honor of the country, which some- 
times slumbers, but never dies in the heart of a war- 
like nation. Full of confidence in this support, he 
passed in review the small band, which w r as to second 
him in so hazardous an enterprise. These soldiers 
were ill equipped, but their martial forms denoted in- 
trepid spirits. The preparations were not long, as these 
brave men carried nothing but their swords. Favored 
by the fortuitous absence of the English commissioner 
and the vessels that watched over the Island of Elba, 
the small flotilla that bore them, met with no accident, 
and crossed over in three days. Napoleon again beheld 
the coast of France at Cannes on the 1st of March, 
near the very shore of Frejus where he had landed 
fifteen years before, on his return from Egypt. For- 
tune seemed as then to smile upon him, as he returned 
to this land, again to unfurl her standards, and restore 
her independence. 

* The French government did not pay the two millions granted annu- 
ally by the treaty of Fontainbleau, and, it is said, inserted the condition 
that Bonaparte should be exiled out of Europe. Napoleon was informed 
of this fact by the Empress Maria-Louisa"; and this circumstance, together 
with the false report of the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna, decided 
his return. « 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 39 

The landing was effected without opposition, but in 
finding himself once more on the soil of France, Na- 
poleon must have experienced the liveliest emotions, 
for the nature of this enterprise might hold in reserve 
for him a most deplorable end. It appeared difficult 
to form a well digested plan, because of the want of 
information sufficiently detailed on the state of affairs 
in the south, all knowledge being gathered from the 
reports of prejudiced agents; he must have been 
satisfied with deciding on a course answering to the 
most probable case. 

One of the first steps taken, to secure Antibe, failed 
completely, as General Corsin, who commanded, refu- 
sed to receive the imperial troops. This first check 
seemed to augur badly, and it was the more grievous, 
being the act of a captain of the guard, who had taken 
the responsibility of trying this plan without orders. 
On the other hand, Toulon and Marseilles were not too 
well disposed. However, as it was important to strike 
with promptness, Napoleon was not long doubtful as 
to the course to be pursued, because a point d'appui 
in the interior was indispensable, and Grenoble was 
the nearest stronghold. He therefore inarched upon 
tliis city as speedily as possible, the success of the en- 
terprise depending on its occupation. The slender 
column that he called his army, arrived after having 
travelled eighty-four leagues in six days. 

The welcome received from the population on the 
route, responded to his wishes, and doubled his chances 
of success, as he was satisfied that the portion of the 
people who were not corrupted by passion or interest, 
preserved a manly character, that the national huniili- 



40 POLITICAL, A^D MILITARY HISTORY OF 

ation had wounded. Reaching Vizille on the 6th of 
March, Napoleon at last met the first body of troops 
sent to oppose him, and who refused to parley with his 
officers. Aware that everything depended on the first 
rencontre, and accustomed to resolve with rapidity and 
decision, he fearlessly advanced to meet them, his 
breast laid bare, confident that they would not fire 
upon him. They were deeply affected by this act of 
recklessness and confidence ; far from seeing in him 
an audacious promoter of civil w T ar, as he was described, 
they recognized but their emperor marching at the 
head of his old warriors, who had so often led them on 
the road to victory ; their hesitation was not of long 
duration. This was a detachment of the fifth regi- 
ment of infantry, soon followed by the entire seventh, 
under Labedoyfere, who voluntarily hurried to Siis 
presence. The people and the soldiers having received 
him with similar exclamations of joy, Grenoble open- 
ed her gates, and he advanced upon Lyons with five 
thousand men. 

At the news of his landing, the Bourbons, though 
struck with astonishment, yet flattered themselves 
with resistance. They put a price upon his head, and 
ordered him to be hunted down as an adventurer who, 
by force of arms, was attempting the well-being of the 
State. The Count d'Artois departed for Lyons with 
.Macdonald ; the Duke d'AngoulSme, who was at 
Bordeaux, hastened into Languedoc, to establish the 
centre of a royal authority at Toulouse ; Ney, summon- 
ed to Paris, was sent to the East ; finally, an extra ses- 
sion of the chambers was called in all haste. Some 
have even pretended that the most fiery of the minis- 



TJIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 41 

ters of the restoration, M. de Blacas, wished to have 
recourse to a surer means than that of the sword, and 
charged a man named B " :: * * * to assassinate the em- 
peror.* Though an individual of this name has 
boasted, in a pamphlet, of having accepted this mis- 
sion, we prefer suspecting this miserable man of mad- 
ness, to giving credit to such an assertion. However, 
Napoleon affected the greatest tranquillity, feeling 
that he had glory and France on his side. 

( )n the loth March, and at the gates of Lyons, the 
royal troops were no sooner in the presence of his 
own, than they mingled with and embraced each 
other with cries of Vive VEmpereur. Macdonald 
barely escaped, and the Count d'Artois had just time 
to take post and return to Paris. 

The Lyonese received the happy conqueror with 
still more enthusiasm than on his return from Ma- 
rengo. This welcome, that deeply moved him, was 
an apology for his enterprise, and at once redou- 
bled his courage and confidence in the future. 

Although quite certain of the reception awaiting 
him at the capital, Napoleon issued many decrees at 
Lyons tending to affect public opinion. The greatest 
censures cast upon him by the ambitious party of the 
tiers-etat, were for having re-established the nobility, 
enchained the press, and rendered the tribune mute. 
Notwithstanding he had acted only for the interest of 
public tranquillity, and in consequence of the grave 
circumstances under which an unexampled revolution 
had placed the country, he did not hesitate in retra- 

* Sec the pamphlel published by Moronval, quai des Auguntins, in 1S1G, 
in v. bich til is ]> * * * gives an account of his exploits. 



42 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOKY OF 

cing his steps, proclaiming the abolition of all privi- 
leged nobility, promising to govern conjointly with 
the deputies of the nation, and decreeing the re-esta- 
blishment of the liberty of the press.* 

The two chambers which Louis XVIII. had con- 
ferred on France, found generally more partisans than 
the mute legislative body instituted in the year VIII. 
Athenians in more than one point of resemblance, the 
French wished, at any price, to shine in the tribune, 
not dreaming that Demosthenes' are rare, and that 
for one statesman, a hundred ambitious, indifferent 
as well as interested declaimers, are found. Napoleon 
appreciated the advantages of the tribune, but w r as 
always aware of its disadvantages and dangers, and 
must have had at heart that France should enjoy the 
one without falling into the other. He however sac- 
rificed his principles to the spirit of the age, well 
convinced that after the storm, they would feel the 
necessity of modifying anew, institutions that suited 
neither every circumstance nor every people ; but the 
elements of which it is, however, proper that an en- 
lightened nation should preserve, to be put into 
action, when a weak and incapable government 
or a dangerous minority set adrift the vessel of 
state.f 

* The re-establishment of the unlimited liberty of the daily press was 
an error of which Napoleon became the first victim. The periodical press 
and works, may be exempt from censure, but the daily journals cannot be 
with impunity, at least during political storms. 

+ This phrase will perhaps be thought ambiguous and little conclusive. 
It should be thus interpreted. Napoleon was convinced that the govern- 
ment with two chambers and a public tribune, offered real advantages in 
peaceable times, when the wheels of government are well established by wise 
fundamental laws, and ^especially when there exists but one interest, that 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. ±6 

It would have been very remarkable, bad Napoleon 
been able to forget the unheard of advantages that 
legitimacy gives, and the extreme facility with which 
Louis XVIII. had installed himself in his place in 
1814 ; but being unable to invoke this principle in favor 
of his return, lie was forced to oppose it with the prin- 
ciple of national sovereignty through its whole extent, 
as the best means of flattering the opinion. Persua- 
ded, also, that in order to act sensibly on the impres- 
sible spirit of the French, it was necessary to refrain 
from following in the usual routine of the assemblies, 
with which the country had been disgusted, under 
every denomination, from that of the notables to the 
factious Senate he had dethroned, Napoleon conceived 
the idea of re-uniting all the electors, not in their de- 
partments for the election of deputies, but at Paris, to 
form, under the solemn title of the Assembly of the 
champ de Mai, an actual re-union of all the national 
notabiliteS) who would nominate commissioners to 
consult with him in the reconstruction of the State on 
future immovable bases. This august assembly, which 
would recall to mind the epoch when the Franks 
themselves raised their kings on the shield, also re- 
called the first federation of 1790, which, from its 

of the state, closely bound to that of its chief, or, as well, under a feeble 
government whose chief is himself little capable of piloting the vessel of 
state. But ho, thought that after a revolution that lias divided the nation 
into two hostile masses, when great interests, both injured and acquired, 
arc atixprises, when there exists one government de facto and another de 
jure supported by foreigners, to deliver elements s<> combustible to public 
discussion, was to expose himself to inevitable troubles. This opinion 
can be Bhared with him without, a9 a consequence, being an apostle of 
despotism. 1 say farther, no one can think otherwise and be a statesman. 



44 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

having been followed by the bloodiest catastrophies, 
was not the less one of the most imposing ceremonies 
to which history points. This Assembly of the Champ 
de Mai would charm, because of ancient and illustrious 
souvenirs ; it would offer, he thought, a striking con- 
trast to the manner in which the Bourbons had im- 
posed a charter on the French, wounding the pride of 
the constitutional party, while the emperor strove to 
flatter the nation by affecting to render homage to her 
rights and her notables, with whom he was to confer 
respecting the new institutions to be given to the em- 
pire, for securing her internal happiness, consolidating 
her glory, and protecting her institutions from fac- 
tions. 

Napoleon did not entirely conceal from himself the 
danger that might some day result from such a pre- 
cedent and the embarrassments under which his suc- 
cessors would labor, to whom he would bequeath all 
the vicissitudes of an elective monarchy. But having 
nothing upon which to act but the elective principle, 
it behooved him to make use of it for drawing to- 
gether the greatest possible party, against the legiti- 
macy of his enemies and the foolish pretensions of the 
Jacobins. Besides, he understood very well how, in 
time, to render all possible aid to the principle of he- 
reditary succession ; because this principle forming 
in fact the basis of the new public right, to secure its 
maintenance would be included in his duties. 

Preceded by these memorable decrees, Napoleon 
continued his advance upon Chalons, where he was 
joined by the troops that Ney had at first assembled 
with the intention to combat him. This marshal was 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 45 

no statesman, and the sum of his political creed con- 
sisted in not causing civil war for • private interests. 
This was the motive that guided him at Fontainbleau, 
when he contributed to promoting the first abdication. 
" Nothing for one man — all for France" was his 
motto ; a very respectable dogma, apparently, but 
which, when pushed too far, might cause the commis- 
sion of grave errors, and lead to the forgetfulness of 
the most sacred duties. 

At the report of the Emperor's return, Ney at first 
only saw the injury he had done him at Fontainbleau, 
and the dangers of a civil war with which his return 
menaced the country. He accepted in good faith the 
mission to repulse him by force of arms, and even 
gave vent to imprudent and improper threats against 
his ancient chief. But soon convinced, in his journey 
through Burgundy and Franche-Comte, of the una- 
nimity of feeling among the people, and his very 
soldiers, who raised the national colors in his presence, 
and influenced by two officers who had been secretly 
sent him from Lyons, to guaranty to him oblivion of 
the past, the marshal repented of his first reso- 
lution, and trembled at the idea of giving the signal 
for civil war which he detested. 

Placed in the same alternative as Marlborough be- 
tween James II. and "William, he did not hesitate to 
throw himself in the ranks he had rendered illustrious 
by so many brilliant feats of arms. lie acted by im- 
pulse, and yielded to the idea that governed him, 
without reflecting that he offended against sacred 
propriety, which he could have easily avoided by re- 



46 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

tiring to Besan<jon until the entrance of Napoleon 
into the capital. 

The contrast between his proclamation from Lonsle- 
Saulnier, and his promises to Louis XYIIL, will re- 
main an unfortunate stain in the history of his glorious 
career, because it gives a false idea of his character, 
by offering all the appearances of premeditated trea- 
son, of which he was incapable. 

After his junction, nothing could arrest the happy 
conqueror, who pursued his triumphal march at the 
head of ten thousand men. He left to his adversaries 
but the resource of a camp, hastily assembled at Me- 
lun ; but the soldiers of this camp, brothers to those of 
Grenoble, Lyons and Chalons, were more disposed to 
join their eagles than oppose them. 

Stupefied by the rapidity of his progress, the royal 
government knew not where to show front ; it would 
be difficult to picture the agitation and confusion that 
reigned at the palace of the Tuileries, as well as in 
Paris. Louis XYIIL had alone preserved that calm 
and that resignation that had never abandoned him. 
Yielding however to the unreasonableness of those 
around him, he permitted himself to adopt the most 
opposite resolutions. On the one side, he threw himself 
into the arms of publicistes doctrinaires, and confided 
to Benjamin Constant the drafting of proclamations 
that were to gain him the confidence and love of the 
French. He placed himself under the segis of the 
national guards, and of the partisans of revolutions, 
while on the other hand he appealed to all the loyal 
royalists, and to the fidelity of the military, whom he 
had so seriously injured. Fouche was at one time at 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 47 

the point of being sent for at the palace and consulted, 
then they decided to arrest him; but the crafty syco- 
phant decamped from his hotel in time, and found 
refuge in that of Queen Hortense, which he reached 
through a garden. 

A few changes in the ministry ; the police entrusted 
to Bourienne, who, from being Napoleon's confidential 
secretary and his friend from infancy, had become his 
open enemy ; caresses and promises to all parties ; ap- 
peals to the national guards and the royal volunteers; 
such were the sad measures with which Messrs. de 
Blacas, Ferrand, and Dambray counted upon fright- 
ening or capturing the conqueror of so many nations. 

The chambers that had been so suddenly convoked, 
succeeded only in giving to the world the spectacle of 
nought from a deliberative assembly in presence of a 
real danger, and proved to entire Europe that the time 
when senators awaited death in their seats, had passed 
away forever. Moreover, this meeting resulted but 
in allowing some orators the pleasure of repeating the 
declamations inserted by Benjamin Constant in the 
Journal des Debats against the imperial despotism, in 
furnishing the ministry a pretext for avowing that 
errors had been committed ; lastly, in giving the king 
an opportunity for appearing with solemnity before 
the chambers, accompanied by his brother and nephew, 
in order to take the oath of fidelity to the charter, 
which had been in better taste at the time of its pro- 
mulgation ; an oath, which on the part of the Count 
d'Artois, was ever suspected of little sincerity. Two 
days after this sentimental but tardy homily, the troops 
of the camp of Melun went over en masse t<> those 



48 POLITICAL A1STD MILITARY HISTORY OF 

of the Emperor, who the next day, March 20th, made 
his entree at the Tuileries. The Bourbons had but 
time to take shelter in Belgium ; the Duke d'Angou- 
leme alone, skirmished a few days in the South. Never 
had such an apparently reckless enterprise cost less in 
its execution. As an explanation, some have pretend- 
ed that it was conformable to general opinion, which 
renders all things easy when floating with it. If the 
principle is true, its application in this case is at least 
doubtful ; because, if we reflect on the state of opinion 
at the time of Napoleon's first abdication, the belief 
is permissible, that France # was much divided in feeling 
towards him, and that the number of his enemies 
equalled that of his partisans. In fact the former 
composed the most energetic portion of the nation. 
Besides, if it is certain that popular opinion be the 
most powerful of levers and supports, it is also neces- 
sary to keep in mind that it is no less fickle in its na- 
ture than difficult to establish, and that it is much more 
profitable to be its arbiter and director than be led a 
slave in its train ; finally, if it be prudent at times to 
submit to its demands, it is well at a later period to 
get the mastery of it. 

Be that as it may, this astounding revolution was 
terminated in twenty days without costing a single 
drop of blood ; France had changed her aspect, the 
nation restored to herself, recovered her pride ; she was 
free from the yoke imposed by strangers, having 
accomplished the greatest act of free-will of which a 
people are susceptible. The grandeur of the enterprise 
effaced the recollection of defeat, and Napoleon was 
again the man of her choice. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 49 

While awaiting the definitive institutions he had 
promised the country, the Emperor's first care was 
naturally to organize a temporary administration, and 
to place capable men in charge of the different offi- 
ces. — That of war was given to Davoust, of the navy 
to Deserts, of finance to Gaudin : the port-folio of 
foreign affairs was restored to Caulincourt, whose 
pacific dispositions were known to the allies ; Camba- 
ceres accepted the seals after reiterated instances; 
Fouche took the ministry of the police, which was his 
element. Lastly, Napoleon confided that of the in- 
terior to that haughty republican, Carnot, who had re- 
fused to award him the Empire, in 1804, and who ac- 
cepted the title of Count from that very Empire in 1811. 

The choice of these two old adepts of Jacobinism, 
was at once, a pledge the Emperor intended giving 
to the public, against the errors of his so-called des- 
potism, and a means of uniting in his defence that 
energetic portion of the people who served under their 
banners. He thoroughly appreciated the compass of 
Carnot's military genius, who, after having by instinct 
ordered certain passable operations in 1793 and 1794, 
had ordered very defective ones in 1796. But he had 
an energetic will and supported popular Utopias ; he 
might be very useful in the ministry of the in- 
terior, to which appertained the duty of exciting 
the masses for the national defence, and organ- 
izing them accordingly. His character though much 
extolled, was impressed with a kind of probity 
and uprightness that had survived the revolution- 
ary turmoils ; this character, joined to talents for 
defending the country, we will admit, had made 



50 POLITICAL ASTD MILITARY HISTORY OF 

him a modern Cato in the eyes of the multitude : they 
thought, and with truth, that he would never be a 
servile agent of the imperial will ; but they knew not 
how much good his inflexibility and his inclination to 
opposition might prevent. 

As to Fouche, his character for intrigue is so well 
known that I can dispense with enlarging upon it. 
This man, who had a vast mind, though often false, con- 
sidered cunning and actions of a roue, as the true 
genius for affairs. His great experience, while de- 
monstrating to him the emptiness of the Utopias of dem- 
agogues, had not however succeeded in eradicating 
his doctrinaire ideas of 1791. He wanted strength in 
the administrative measures of the government, with- 
out comprehending that before every thing else, this 
was necessary in the institutions. 

Napoleon knew Fouche too well to confide in him ; 
but if the latter treasured any resentment for the hon- 
orable exile the Emperor had imposed upon him in 
1810, he had also to dread the Bourbons, who wished 
him arrested four days previous to his entrance into 
Paris, and who had great wrongs to complain of 
against him. A man of such a stamp, who had been 
stranger to no plot since 1792, who had planned, pro- 
tected, or baffled them, could not stand with folded 
arms 'midst the grand conflict that was brewing. 
They had to resolve on using him by flattering his 
ambition, or placing him where he could do no injury. 
To confine him at Yincennes, or exile him without trial, 
would have caused much scandal at a time when they 
loudly exclaimed against arbitrary power. Napoleon 
preferred to employ him at all hazards, and paid dearly 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 51 

for this error. The numerous and audacious depend- 
ants who were grouped about these two ex-conven- 
tionals, and those ranged under the banners of La- 
fayette, Lanjuinais, and Benjamin Constant, signalized 
but too well the rude assaults which the new chief of 
the government would have to sustain unless he bound 
them to his cause. Experience had not as yet shown 
that they were no less dangerous as friends than as 
enemies. 

Having thus attended to the formation of his cabinet, 
Napoleon felt it incumbent upon him to turn his at- 
tention towards Europe : the great Captain had refu- 
sed the peace offered him at Chatillon, with the boun- 
daries of 1792, because he then found himself on the 
throne of France, and it would have been too much 
condescension ; but nothing prevented him from ac- 
cepting the one imposed on the Bourbons, because he 
came from the Isle of Elba, and the responsibility did 
not weigh much upon him, neither in the eyes of 
France, nor in the eyes of posterity. While fore- 
warning Murat of his departure, the Emperor had 
charged him to dispatch a courier to Vienna, bearing 
his pledge to adhere to the treaties of Paris, with the 
promise to confine his exertions to the internal happi- 
ness of France. Unfortunately he had not a man of 
sufficient skill about him whom he might send to the 
Emperor Alexander, to demonstrate to this prince how 
much English rivalry would one day bear upon him, 
and how much value Eussia should attach to the fact 
that France had a strong and national government, 
inimical to England. As his ancient projects on the 
Vistula could not again recur, and as from this time 



52 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

no rivalry ought to exist between the two countries, it 
would be very difficult to affirm what effect such a 
mission would have produced on the mind of this 
monarch ; but unfortunately this attempt could not 
be made. 

In either case it was natural to believe that the posi- 
tive assurances given by Napoleon to the sovereigns, 
would have had their due effect ; because Europe, as- 
tounded by his return, and by the energy of the French 
people, must have dreaded the repetition of the scenes 
of the revolution, by provoking the display of all the 
resources of propagandism. The success of this step 
would not have been doubtful, if the Congress had 
been dissolved, as was assured him, and if the Em- 
peror had treated with the cabinets singly.* 

But the sovereigns being present, their pride was 
roused ; their interests, divided since the fall of the 
Empire, to a degree difficult to reconcile through ne- 
gotiations, could in twenty-four hours be rallied with 
a common object, that of consolidating the division 
of the rich spoils which Napoleon's return had. ren- 
dered problematical. It was useless to protest his ad- 
hesion to the treaties, they wished to believe nothing ; 
the coalition was renewed even before his protesta- 
tions reached Vienna. All the governments that had 
placed arms in the hands of their people, only saw in 
his return a military revolt, capable of reviving the 
deplorable epochs when the Roman legions disposed 

* This was written in 1828, and the conduct of Europe in 1830, proves 
the truth of the assertion. Napoleon departed, believing in the truth of 
the articles written from Vienna by Latour Dupin, and inserted in the 
Journal dies Debats. They announced the departure of the king of Prussia 
and the Emperor Alexander as certain. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 53 

of the Empire at the will of their ambitious com- 
manders; each of the sovereigns was fearful then, 
right or wrong, of seeing his throne exposed to the 
same dangers. Moreover, Austria trembled lest Italy 
should be snatched from her, forgetting altogether the 
ties which the events of 1814 had broken asunder. 
Russia, convinced that she could not preserve Warsaw, 
but in allying with her most natural rivals, sacrificed 
everything to this end. Prussia, that solicited at "Vi- 
enna for the dependency of Saxony, accepted the 
other enlargements that were assured her, fearful of 
not getting either. England, led by inferior men, 
thought she foresaw a second time the imperial eagles 
floating at Boulogne, at Antwerp, and in Egypt, and 
lavished her subsidies to escape an imaginary danger, 
or at least, one very exaggerated. 

Thus were all interests at variance with the existence 
of Napoleon. The declaration of the 13th March, 
which placed him in a certain manner without the 
pale of the laws of nations, sufficiently proves the 
fears he inspired. If to all these motives, we add the 
dread felt by Talleyrand of this return, the result of 
which was to sequestrate the ten millions of bernois 
funds he had in England, at the same time that his 
fortune would be compromised in France through his 
banishment, the violence of this famous declaration 
will be easily understood, as the wording of the same 
has been generally attributed to him. 

In order to appease the powers, it would have been 
necessary for the Emperor to have time to ensure 
the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia, and the cession of 
Italy to Austria. It would perhaps have been attended 



54 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

with success, had the negotiations been transl erred 
singly to St. Petersburg and Vienna. But the decla- 
ration of the 13 March, made at an European Congress, 
left but little hope of success to these propositions for 
preserving peace. 

However, Napoleon at first thought that this decla- 
ration had been prompted by the desire to second the 
resistance which the Bourbons might oppose to him, 
as well as by an exaggerated distrust of his ulterior 
projects towards Europe. Nothing was more natural 
than that the monarchs whose victories had reseated 
Louis XYIII. upon his throne, should seek to maintain 
him there ; but when the prince had been so easily 
forced to another emigration, the question changed 
its aspect. The Emperor had then reason to flatter 
himself that the cabinets would retrace their steps, 
when informed of the rapidity of his triumph, and of 
the unheard of success of his enterprise, as well as of* 
his pacific intentions. Unfortunately, the treaty of 
alliance, offensive and defensive, signed the 25th March 
between the great powers, very soon destroyed this 
illusion.* 

We are not certain that this resolution of the sov- 
ereigns was really suggested by the general interest 
of thrones, and that under this supposition it was best 
because more expedient. The dynasty of Napoleon 
had been gloriously inaugurated by victory, into the 

* Some rather credulous publicists have attributed an essential part in 
these important resolutions of Congress, to the intrigues of Fauche Borel, 
a secret agent of the Bourbons ; it requires an astonishing quantity of 
simplicity to believe that the cabinets of the great powers could listen to 
the insinuations of such agents, in order to regulate their conduct under 
such grave and important circumstances. 



TTIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 55 

number of those who reigned in Europe, and his 
alliance with the (laughter of the Caesars had doubly 
enfeoffed him. Besides, it had perhaps been wiser to 
have left him on the throne, than have him re- 
placed by a government which being imposed through 
violence, could with difficulty secure the repose of 
France and of Europe. 

It can scarcely be credited, that the fear of behold- 
ing in this country the triumph of the elective prin- 
ciple and that of national sovereignty, a sufficient 
motive for so extraordinary a coalition; because this 
solutive principle could not gain ground in Europe 
through its partial application in any one country 
whatever ; and if the ambition of France was dreaded, 
nothing better could be done, than endowing her with 
future ruptures by permitting her this elective gov- 
ernment. Besides, when a principle is considered 
fatal to states, it should not be resisted with cannon, 
but by sage discussions, with experience and in time. 
Napoleon, by accepting the treaties of Paris, and 
maintained on his throne, would have strengthened 
the governments generally, suppressed revolutionary 
ideas and averted the crisis which has well nigh over* 
thrown Europe two or three times since his fall ; the 
volcano that still smokes more threateningly than we 
imagine, had been extinct or smothered for an indefi- 
nite period, and the European equilibrium had been 
more firmly reestablished. 

In fact, it was difficult to suppose that Napoleon 
Would long maintain the stipulations of the treaties of 
Paris ; the indignation excited throughout the country 
bv these treaties had been one of the causes of the ex- 



56 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

pulsion of the Bourbons. Would lie have dared to 
regard them as an eternal engagement ? The nation, 
above all the army, whose strength placed on a war 
footing had roused ambition, would they not have 
impelled the Chief of State to seize the first occasion 
to recover, at least, the line of the Rhine and the 
Alps? 

In weighing these divers considerations we can 
easily conceive the double perplexity in which his 
return had plunged the coalesced pow T ers, and the res- 
olutions that were the natural consequences of it. The 
conviction that the army alone had caused this revolu- 
tion, and the fear of seeing the thrones at the mercy 
of military chieftains, joined to a desire of consolida- 
ting the shares of the conquests made from the 
empire ; such were certainly the true incentives of 
the monarchs ; either was sufficiently powerful to 
determine them ; but it appeared very difficult to 
decide, whether the danger of substituting for Napo- 
leon a government feeble in itself, and imposed upon 
them, w^as not greater than the ill effects of his return 
in assuring new revolutions. 

The external embarrassments resulting from the 
acts of the Congress of Vienna, were not the only ones 
felt by Napoleon, because the Duke d'Angouleme 
being at Bordeaux at the time of his landing, had 
taken immediate measures for disputing the empire 
with him. Louis XVIII. had ordered this prince to 
establish at Toulouse the seat of a royal govern- 
ment, and had appointed him his Lieutenant in the 
south of France. From Toulouse, where he had 
rapidly organized resistance in concert with M. de Vi- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 57 

trolles and the Count de Damas, the Duke had repair- 
ed to Marseilles, where he had met with similar ova- 
tions on the part of this parasitical population, whose 
first wishes are mercantile wealth and substantial in- 
terest. Through the aid of a few regiments that 
remained faithful, and especially of the fanatical in- 
habitants of Languedoc, where religious dissensions 
were blended with the political quarrels, the Duke 
organized three columns with which he ascended the 
Rhone to retake Lyons and Grenoble ; but defection 
also began in this body ; two regiments declared for 
Napoleon, and the 10th of the line alone preserved a 
thousand soldiers for the prince, who here joined from 
six to seven thousands national guards. After having 
beaten General Debelle at Loriol on the Drome, he 
advanced on Yalence ; but the imperial officers sent 
to Toulouse and Montpelier, had succeeded in having 
the tri-colored flag displayed in these two cities, and 
their garrisons, to declare for the Emperor. Mean- 
while, Dauphiny also pronounced against the Bour- 
bons, and Grouchy, ordered to Lyons, was preparing 
the means for smothering this feeble spark of civil 
war, by sending many small columns on Valence. 
The prince, closely pressed by General Gilley, and 
learning that the departments in his rear had recog- 
nized the imperial government, signed on the 9th 
April, at Pont-Saint-Esprit, a convention by which he 
consented to evacuate France and embark. Grouchy, 
in obedience to his orders, refused at first to rat- 
ify this act, which Napoleon however hastened to 
sanction. 

Meanwhile, vexatious troubles breaking out in 

3* 



58 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOBY OF 

la Vendee, had forced fifteen thousand veterans to be 
detached thither under General Lamarque ; this offi- 
cer, previously distinguished for his activity, together 
with that of General Fravot, had suppressed the fire 
of civil war, the more formidable in this section of the 
country than in the rest of France, as much because 
of its locality as of the obstinate and devoted charac- 
ter of the inhabitants. Notwithstanding, however, 
the death of Larochejacquelin, killed in the battle of 
Mathes, and the successes obtained at Saint-Giles and 
Roche-Servieres, hostilities did not actually cease till 
after the battle of Waterloo. 

While these things were happening in France, and 
at the Congress of Yienna, Murat still chanced to 
complicate his brother-in-law's position, by rising in 
arms in a way well w T orthy his eccentric and adven- 
turous character. Informed of the negotiations that 
had taken place betw r een France and Austria to depose 
him, he demanded of the latter a passage into Italy to 
reap vengeance for the threats of the ministry of Louis 
XVIII. : he might have well known that this w^ould 
be refused him. At the news of Napoleon's landing, 
Murat at once hoped to make amends for his defection 
in 1814. He was persuaded that the time had arriv- 
ed for him to play a grand part, and that in promising 
the people of Italy a national insurrection, he might 
yet render himself the arbiter of great events. On the 
22d of March, he debouched from Ancona with forty 
thousand men, drove the Austrians from Ces&ne, and 
favored by the population of Bologna and Modena, 
rapidly invaded the states situated on the Po, up to 
the gates of Placentia, while another column invaded 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 59 

the Eoman states and Tuscany. He everywhere circu- 
lated proclamations announcing that his object was to 
reunite the Italians under one banner, and in its name 
to take possession of the provinces he traversed : he even 
meditated the invasion of Lombardy through Pied- 
mont, when his progress was arrested by the declarations 
of the English minister who menaced him with war. 
The Austrians soon reassembled and hurled against 
him General Bianchi, with twenty-five or thirty thou- 
sand men. Leaving Florence with a majority of his 
forces, this general marched by Foligno, so as to cut 
off Murat's retreat, while Neipperg threatened him by 
the route of Ancona. The king of Naples was obliged 
to retire precipitately to avoid this untoward result ; 
the decisive rencontre took place at Tolentino, on the 
2d of May ; the Neapolitans, completely routed, dis- 
persed in all directions. Murat, who has regained his 
capital with a slender escort, abandoned even by his 
warmest partisans, is constrained to fly from Naples 
and seek refuge in France ; he lands at Toulon. A 
compact signed at Capua, by his Lieutenants, on the 
20th of May, leads back Ferdinand IV. to the throne 
of the two Sicilies. 

Nothing was ever more ill-timed than this affray. 
If Austria had had the least inclination to retrace her 
steps regarding the declarations of the 13th of March, 
this rendered it impossible ; and in even supposing 
that the cabinet of Vienna was resolved to persist, 
everything should be avoided that tended to bind 
closer the ties of the coalition. In a military point of 
view, this was taking the initiative much too soon, 
because hostilities were commenced even before 



60 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

Napoleon's entree into Paris was known, so that lie 
was far from being able to second him. As a diver- 
sion, the king of Naples could do much, but the desire 
to act a principal part in the war was an absurdity. *' 

Thus, on two occasions did Murat compromise the 
Empire, the first by declaring for its enemies ; the 
second in arming himself mal a propos. He expiated 
by a chivalric death, the two faults that had precipi- 
tated him from his throne ; as a soldier, his will be a 
glorious memory. 

Meanwhile, the sad result of this strange attempt, 
the success of the Austrians, and the advices that 
reached France of what was happening at "Vi- 
enna, and in all the rest of Europe, was of a 
nature to inspire just fears in the least prejudiced 
minds. A formidable war threatened anew the na- 
tional existence, and all hope of diverting the storm 
by concessions had vanished ; Napoleon had to decide 
either to brave it, or to shun it most cowardly : be- 
tween two such resolutions could a man of his charac- 
ter hesitate ? If his personal honor had alone been at 
stake, he had had the power to sacrifice it to the fu- 
ture of France ; but was not the honor of the nation 
more involved even than his own ? A population of 
thirty millions, who had just elevated the greatest 
citizen to the throne, could not, because of a diplomatic 
declaration emanating from a foreign congress, drive 

* Many persons think that Murat was prompted by Napoleon to invade 
Italy, thus facilitating his enterprise by giving occupation to the Austrians. 
This had been well after he saw the impossibility of maintaining peace ; 
but if he nourished a hope, this was most imprudent, and in either case the 
time was very ill chosen. It is then more than probable, that he was ex- 
ceedingly annoyed by it. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 6l 

away tins adopted chief, and submit to the yoke they 
wished to impose ! 

Some mighty voices have however been raised, re- 
proaching Napoleon for having continued on the 
throne after the reception of these declarations from 
Vienna. According to their views, he should have 
frankly exposed to the French people the position he 
held in the eyes of Europe, now alarmed and in arms 
against him, then have proposed to the nation the 
three following propositions for its decision : 

1st, To place itself without delay at the mercy of 
Louis XYIII. 

2d, To proclaim on the contrary Napoleon II., with 
a regency, or any other government that seemed 
preferable. 

3d or lastly, To declare the nullity of the abdication 
at Fontainbleau, in again awarding the Empire to Na- 
poleon himself. 

If the nation had adopted this last, then the fate of 
France had been irrevocably bound to his own, and 
any abandonment^had been cowardice and felony. 

The fervent and thoughtless apostles of national 
sovereignty might find something specious in these 
ideas, but at bottom they were devoid of all wisdom. 
In the first place, Napoleon did not immediately des- 
pair of leading Austria, and perhaps Russia, to more 
favorable views of his cause ; he renewed his attempts, 
and even sent General Flahaut to A r ienna with this 
intention. Subsequently, he had too much pride to 
submitthus to a sorl of proscription that would have 
wounded a prince leasl capableof reigning, and which 
must have seemed doubly humiliating to a Captain as 



62 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

illustrious as himself. Finally, it is probable that he 
still loved power too much, to follow the example of 
Charles V. and Victor Armedee, and seek repose in a 
cloister. Besides, could he entertain the idea of flying 
from France as proscribed; where Louis XVIII. had 
not failed to return, accompanied by a portion of the 
coalition ? "Would this not be delivering all those who 
were devoted to his cause, to the fury of a re-action? 

Moreover, in abdicating early in April, to whom 
would he have intrusted his power, there being 
then no constituted authority % A beautiful conception 
truly, that of leaving France for three months without 
a government, at a time when eight hundred thousand 
men were bursting in upon her ! There was no choice 
in the case ; he had to fly while supplicating Louis 
XVIII. to re-enter his capital, or he had to fight. The 
alternative was a painful one, the chances wxre fright- 
ful, but alas! he had none other: and if well seconded, 
Napoleon felt the deep conviction of triumphing over 
his enemies. 

Other Aristarchus', as reckless as those were timid, 
have pretended that far from yielding to the storm, 
the Emperor should have anticipated it, and at once 
availing himself of the first enthusiasm of the people, 
had shown to what extent he was yet formidable, by 
invading Belgium, and proclaiming liberty throughout 
Europe ; whereas his pacific attitude lulled the nation 
into fancied security. Pitiable declamation ! A people 
in blouses, and armed with pikes, cannot be hurled 
against the warlike legions of entire Europe. A grand 
army was necessary, and to obtain one, it was all im- 
portant sacredly to preserve the nucleus that existed, 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 63 

to be increased by means of this very population that 
was being levied and organized. To this end, nothing 
had been effected, and the pacific attitude charged to 
Napoleon, consisted in sixteen hours daily labor for 
three months, to create this army. He increased the 
regiments of the line from two to five battalions, and 
reinforced those of cavalry with two squadrons ; he 
ordered the organizing of 200 battalions of national 
gardes mobiles, 40 battalions of the old and new guard, 
and 20 regiments of marines. The old disbanded sol- 
diers were all recalled to their standards, the con- 
scriptions of 1814 and 1815 were levied ; even the re- 
tired officers and soldiers were induced to join. By 
the 1st of June, that is, in two months, the effective 
strength of the French army had been augmented 
from 200,000 to 414,000 : by the month of September, 
he could have counted on 700,000 men, but time failed 
him. 

It would be absurd to believe that in the midst of 
these preparations Napoleon had not thought of the 
invasion of Belgium, to secure the defensive line of 
the Rhine. From the day after his arrival at Paris, 
this question had been debated, but more than one 
obstacle had to be surmounted. 

At first, there were in hand but 40,000 men, la Yen- 
dee had revolted, the Duke of Angouleme was march- 
ing on Lyons, and the Marseillese on Grenoble. It 
behoved him to be master at home before wishing to 
be master abroad. A still stronger reason hindered this 
invasion. How was such a step to be reconciled to 
the letter, in which the Emperor offered the sovereigns 
a sincere and durable peace ? If he had been rash in 



64 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

calculating on the friendliness of all, there were still 
some motives for relying on the good- will of his father- 
in-law. The Emperor of Austria had sought to pre- 
vent his dethronement in 1814 ; at the time of his re- 
turn, the discussion with Russia grew warm respecting 
the division of Gallicia, and the fate of Saxony. There 
was every reason to hope that the cabinet of Yienna 
would consent in 1815, to what its negotiator had 
himself proposed in 1811: to uphold the Emperor on 
the throne, if he consented to abandon Italy. Napoleon 
made this proposition, and notwithstanding the famous 
declaration of the 13th March, they still hoped to see 
the father of Maria Louisa returu to his first views. 
Nevertheless, the French have censured Napoleon 
with an inclination for war ; public opinion having 
declared for peace, repelled all idea of aggression^ be- 
fore knowing whether the maintenance of this peace 
was possible. 

Even admitting that it was easy to foresee the issue 
of these pacific measures, little could be gained by 
hastening to Brussels, yet guarded by an army of occu- 
pation of the Germanic Confederation : Luxemburg 
and Mentz no longer belonged to France, and these 
places, as well as Holland, giving the allies many de- 
bouches on the left of the Rhine, it is not certain that 
any benefit had accrued from this invasion ; the fight- 
ing would have commenced on the Meuse and Moselle, 
instead of on the Sambre, that is all. Taking the least 
probable supposition, their succeeding in subjecting 
Antwerp and Luxemburg without a siege, it would be 
necessary to throw into them strong garrisons, and the 
French were not at all in condition to do so. If, on 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 65 

the contrary, these important places continued in the 
power of the enemy, of what use was Brussels, sur- 
rounded by Maestricht, Luxemburg, Bergen-on-Zoom, 
and Antwerp ? Was it not wiser to hold the skeletons 
of the old regi :nents in hand, in order to double the 
number of effectives by a new organization^ than to 
scatter them through Belgium ? 

It has been said that it would have been necessary 
for him to commence anew a complete revolution, ta- 
king advantage of all the arbitrary resources d cre- 
ates, and to rouse all the passions, profiting by their 
blind devotion, as without it France could not be 
saved. This was Fouche's advice, and especially Car- 
not's, who remained a thorough Jacobin under the 
cloak of Count. Many causes prevented Napoleon 
from having recourse to these means ; the first was 
that he dreaded popular commotions, and with reason 
too, as he had no rein by which to guide them, and 
they consume those by whom excited ; the second was 
that he was not at all convinced that anarchy and the 
overthrow of all social order were infallible means of 
saving a nation : these succeeded in 1793, through a 
concurrence of unexampled circumstances, that will 
probably never again recur. 

Besides, whatever fear the Emperor had of these 
popular storms, he believed it necessary to excite 
the masses to a certain degree, not however without 
fixing it within certain limits ; the task is difficult 
and the path a slippery one. To unchain the revo- 
lutionary tiger with a deliberate purpose, comes 
within the province only of such madmen as Marat 
and Robespierre, or of extravagant men devoid of 



66 POLITICAL AOT MILITARY HISTORY OF 

all experience. After having authorized federated 
societies, destined to rouse the public mind for the 
defence of the country, he was active in preventing 
them from extending their action to affect the so- 
cial order ; to accomplish this, a suitable strength in 
the administration, and forecast in the institutions, were 
requisite; but it was very difficult to sustain this 
double-faced performance. 

Because of the new elections, Napoleon was actu- 
ally to find himself in presence of republicans con- 
quered the 18th Brumaire, of royalists who did not 
desire his empire, and of anarchists who wanted no 
government at all. But by flattering the hopes of the 
first two, and the follies of the last, he counted on 
their influence and patriotic declamations to excite 
the people to arms. While setting at work these 
revolutionary elements, the chief of State hoped to 
direct the employment of a power sufficiently firm to 
repress anarchy. Unfortunately, those over-excited 
soon perceived that the reign of clubs had passed 
forever, and held forth his caution as a proof of his 
thirst for power, while they constituted the sole guar- 
anty for social order and for those who were to guide 
the vessel of State amidst the frightful tempests by 
which it was threatened. 

The assembly of the Champ de Mai was at hand ; 
it was necessary at once, to explain frankly the 
changes that should be made in the institutions of the 
empire. Napoleon had announced his intention of 
concerting these changes with the deputies of the na- 
tion which would be delegated for this purpose ; but 
the declarations of the Congress of Vienna, and the 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 67 

preparations of the new coalition leaving little doubt 
of an impending war, he had to choose between the 
necessity of sending the electors back to their homes, 
so as to seize an indefinite dictatorial power, or to 
present, himself, the modifications which he was dis- 
posed to make in the exercise of this power, knowing 
that it would be imprudent to depart for the army, 
leaving France without a legal government, a prey 
to dogmatical disputes, and to the shocks of factions. 
It is probable, however, that Napoleon was not sorry 
in having this plausible pretext for consolidating his 
power ; because, if dogmatical discussions on consti- 
tutions are always stormy in an assembly of four or 
five hundred persons, and usually result in the tri- 
umph of doctrines the least calculated for securing 
the necessary strength and stability to the govern- 
ment, how could such a discussion be carried on, even 
through delegates, in the presence of a hundred thou- 
sand electors ? 

The emperor judged it, then, indispensable to take 
the initiative, in the modifications necessary for 
blending harmoniously the ancient institutions of the 
empire, with the liberal opinions with which they 
had clashed. These modifications were discussed in 
a council composed of ministers and the council of 
state, to which was invited Benjamin Constant, the 
most influential of those theoretical publicists, who 
were so noisy in the tribune and such poor actors 
when governing. 

Desirous of gaining over the ex-tribune, who was 
constantly at the head of all the doctrinaires opposi- 
tion, Napoleon had him called the 14th April, for 



68 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

particular consultation on these important measures, 
before submitting them to the council. He exposed 
his views with & frankness, a coolness, and an impar- 
tiality, for w T hich Benjamin Constant had the kind- 
ness seriously to reproach him after his fall ; as if 
such questions should ever be treated w^ith passion, 
impulse or dissimulation. His letters on the hundred 
days in which he gives an account of this interview, 
are not the least curious among the writings published 
by Napoleon's adversaries for their own justification ! 

" The nation," said he to him, " has reposed free 
from all political agitation for twelve years ; the past 
year she has been without war ; this double repose 
has rendered her in need of activity. She wishes or 
believes she wishes a public tribune and assemblies : 
she has not always wanted them / she cast herself at 
my feet when I reached the capital. You, who at- 
tempted an opposition, should remember it : where 
was your support, your strength ? Nowhere. I have 
taken less authority than I have been invited to as- 
sume. 

u Now, everything is changed ; the taste for consti- 
tutions, debates and harangues appear to have re- 
turned. Nevertheless, be not deceived, it is but the 
minority who wish it. The people only want me : 
have you not seen them, pressing upon my steps, pre- 
cipitating themselves from the mountains, seeking 
me, saluting me But a signal from me is ne- 
cessary, for them to fall upon the royalists and nobles. 
.... But I do not wish to be the king of a Jacquerie. 

... If there be a means of governing with a con- 
stitution, at the proper time I demand nothing better, 



TIIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 69 

though this be not so easy as it is thought I 

have desired the empire of the world, and to secure 
it unlimited power was necessary; solely to govern 

France, a constitution may do better Although 

this is still a problem, it can be tried. I have wished 
the empire of the world : who, in my place, had not 

wished it ? The world invited me to govern it 

people and governors, in emulation of each other, 
cast themselves under my sceptre. . . Let me then see 
the system that will seem to you possible ; give me 
your thoughts. Public discussions, free elections, re- 
sponsible ministers, liberty of the press — I am willing 
for all this ; I am convinced on this subject.* 

" I am the man of the people : if they really wish 
liberty, I owe it to them I have never dream- 
ed of oppressing them to please myself I had 

grand designs, fate has decided upon them. I am no 

longer a conqueror, I can no longer be one I 

have but one mission, that of lifting up France and 
giving her a suitable government. I am not willing 
to raise false hopes. I permit it to be said that nego- 
tiations are pending, there are none. I foresee a diffi- 
cult struggle, a protracted war ; though I desire peace 
I will be unable to obtain it but by force of victories ; 
the nation must support me. In exchange she will 
want liberty : she has as much of it as it is possible to 
give her without falling into anarchy. The situation 
is a new one ; I demand but to be enlightened. I am 

* Napoleon might have told tho truth when he expressed this idea; 
but he was soon convinced that he had erred, or at least that he inter dod 
this liberty with all the means for repressing license. 



70 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

growing old ; the repose of a constitutional king 
might suit me ; it will suit my son still better." 

We perceive from these words, that Napoleon felt 
the delicacy of the task imposed on him. Those, in- 
imical to all power, who have accused him of dupli- 
city during this short reign of a hundred days, because 
he did not wish a return of the regime of 1793 or 
1799, can rest assured on the very assertions of Benj. 
Constant, that he frankly adopted the deliberative 
assemblies and the public tribune, as a necessity of 
the epoch, while far from partaking of the universal 
infatuation on the subject. Nevertheless, they sus- 
pect and accuse him, as they did Louis XVIII., of in- 
sincerity in this species of political conversion. If the 
principles that were in full force at the establishment 
of the empire, proved that experience in affairs had 
very much modified the liberal ideas he had professed 
during the first years of the revolution, everything 
bears us out in the belief that he would have respect- 
ed the new institutions promised, had the other estab- 
lished powers sincerely desired to remain within their 
limits, and been well satisfied that their true constitu- 
tional mission is to second the government and not to 
restrain or annul its action. 

We have already stated, that Napoleon did not fail 
to recognize the advantages that might be expected 
from assemblies ; but he also appreciated the immense 
dangers they present, when prudent and strong insti- 
tutions do not sufficiently regulate their influence and 
procedure : he thought that modern charters and 
the political education of the French had not as yet 
reached this point. Experience will prove if he was 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 71 

wrong : meanwhile, I will be permitted to present 
some observations drawn from more recent events, 
and which, on the contrary, bear us out in believing 
that he was perfectly right. 

The dogmas on liberty that have created so much 
sensation in our day, and which he, with many others, 
had professed in good faith, are certainly of the most 
alluring nature if applied to man individually ; but 
when, applied collectively, to societies called nations, 
and to governmental ideas, we acknowledge that this 
term is often greatly abused. The result is a sort of 
confusion in constitutional language, an obscure meta- 
physics that have produced the strangest political 
creeds. 

Men of weight and learning have laid down as a 
principle, that authority, that is to say government, 
being an encroacher by nature, finds itself as a conse- 
quence the natural enemy of liberty. With such a 
beautiful system as a starting point, it is very plain 
that all men calling themselves friends of liberty, must 
be regarded as born enemies to authority, whether 
it emanates from a consul, a prefect, an emperor, or a 
king. Thus has it resulted that administrations, 
whether public, royal, imperial, or otherwise, estab- 
lished for the protection of public interests and private 
rights ; functionaries who should administer justice, 
protect the lives and property of the citizens, organize 
fleets and armies, promote and regulate public instruc- 
tion, conduct wars, deliberate upon and conclude 
alliances, negotiate treaties, dig canals, construct for- 
tresses, prepare and develop the national strength : 
these authorities in a word, who should be the pride 



72 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

of every well-organized nation, have been transformed 
by these strange doctrines into public enemies . . . . , 
into objects of suspicion and hate. 

Let me not be accused of exaggeration : I appeal to 
all those who have occupied a position of any emi- 
nence in France ; there is not one of them who does 
not to-day include a good portion of those he govern- 
ed, among the number of his adversaries or detractors. 
It is necessary to state that the apostles of these sin- 
gular maxims, have not always been hair-brained 
youths just from college, or proletarians without name, 
and without existence. The most ardent have been 
found among the writers who have acquired celebrity 
or popularity ; among grave magistrates; in the high- 
est grades of the army ; finally, among the legislators 
who have reechoed them from the tribune, amid the 
acclamations of all the adepts ; so that a good number 
of deputies, led by these utopianists, were persuaded 
that the chambers also were in duty bound to enchain 
and obstruct authority, whenever an occasion offered. 

With such ideas a nation becomes ungovernable 
and rushes to inevitable ruin, unless a violent catas- 
trophe, or a great man gives renewed vigor to social 
order by placing it on surer bases ; the bloody lessons 
of experience are the sole remedies lot an evil so 
deeply rooted. Struck with these inconveniences, 
Napoleon was convinced that to govern well with 
such elements, there was no institution that could give 
too much strength to the public administration, and it 
should be acknowledged to his glory that all he did 
in a contrary sense w r as forced upon him by circum- 
stances. It should also be acknowledged that he 



TIIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 73 

always rendered justice to those estimable men, free 
from all feeling of personal ambition, who in good 
faith professed these exaggerated doctrines of liberty, 
such as Lanjuinais, Benj. Constant, Lafayette, &c, &c. 
As private individuals, or as philosophers, civic crowns 
perhaps should be awarded them ; but as politicians 
and founders of fundamental institutions, they were 
in his eyes, but apostles of crude theories, more fatal 
than useful ; because, by substituting unceasingly 
declamations and phrases in place of true genius and 
the art of governing, they will always put a nation at 
the mercy of the most rash and most crafty rhetori- 
cian, and lead to eternal conflicts between the execu- 
tive power and those by whom it is so much coveted. 
Undoubtedly, what is called public liberty, — consti- 
tutional government, — equilibrium of the three powers 
are very beautiful things, seductive theories, perhaps 
very good with the counterpoise of a powerful aristo- 
cracy.* I think, too, that they might agree with 
absolute democracy in a new and isolated nation like 
the United States of America, in the midst of a vast 
continent, with no neighbors but settlements of sav- 
ages without power, or without ambition, because in 
such a case internal commotions would be devoid of 
danger to the political powers of the country ; but 
with a nation surrounded by formidable and jealous 
neighbors, with a nation whose old social body is 
composed of ancient feudal nobility, young war-like 

* If by public liberty, we understand individual liberty, equality in the 
eye of the law, and the concurrence of the nation, to a rational extent, in 
the framing of laws, nothing mdoubtedly is more desirable. Even the 
liberty of the press confined within just bounds, may also be added. 
Everything beyond this, leads to license and anarchy. 

4 



74 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

nobility, proud and turbulent tiers etat and inflamma- 
ble minds, it is altogether otherwise, or it would at 
least be necessary to rest the institutions on more solid 
bases than our modern charters have done. 

So far, we will be permitted to believe with Napo- 
leon, that positively the institution of three powers in 
equilibrio, has been but a beautiful fiction, the appli- 
cation of which does not correspond with the seductive 
theory. To be as admirable as it is thought, this polit- 
ical trinity should have that unity of faith and action 
belonging to the religious trinity ; for say and do what 
we may, the action of a government should never be 
but one and indivisible. "Whether it represents the 
nation among strangers, or dispenses justice at home, 
or organizes and disposes of the land and naval forces, 
which are the symbols of national power, its system 
and its progress should be uniform ; there cannot be 
two in one state. Now, if three independent powers, 
ever jealous of their influence and authority, are 
established, what means will you have of establishing 
this unity, indispensable in the direction of the grand 
affairs of the country ? All assemblies in the world 
when adorned, right or wrong, with the title of repre- 
sentatives of the nation,* will be cavilling and usurp- 
ing by their nature, especially if they have the initia- 
tive in the laws ; because with this initiative they will 
be able to guide the vessel of state if they will, and 
they will wish it whenever they can. The evil would 
be without danger, if it were possible for an assembly, 

* Elective chambers are far from being always the faithful representa- 
tions of the interests and wishes of the country : they often represent but 
a small fraction, perhaps, the most selfish and the least national. 



TIIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. T5 

composed of small specialties meeting now and then, 
to be qualified of itself to rule a great nation ; but as 
the impossibility of it is acknowledged, it forcibly 
results therefrom, that by according the initiative to 
this assembly, you give it all the means of perplexing 
the administration and rendering the same impossible, 
without giving it the means of governing, 

Nothing could flow from such a state of things but 
endless uncertainty, an unheard-of distress in the 
direction of affairs, and the impossibility of the gov- 
ernment's determining on a stable system of foreign 
policy, that which is always the most decisive for the 
maintenance of a country's greatness. To this impos- 
sibility should be added that of fixing on a good sys- 
tem of military organization, from nothing previously 
prepared, for the contingent events that menaced the 
most important future interests of the state. 

This perpetual clashing of the government and the 
elective chambers, deprived of an aristocratic counter- 
poise, will be not only difficult to avoid or modify, — a 
dreadful instability in the personnel of the ministry will 
also result as a consequence ; an inconsistency not the 
less hurtful to a state than the most threatening inva- 
sion, in producing but a phantasmagorical magistracy, 
to which might be applied the famous verse of Cor- 
neille : 

" Ces petits souverains qu'oh fait pour une annee, 
Voyant d'un temps si court leur puissance bornee, 
Des plus heureux desseins font avorter le fruit, 
De peur de le iaisser a celui qui les suit: 
Comme ile out peu de part au bien dont ils ordonnent, 
Dans le champ du public largemerjt ils moissonnent, 
Assures que chacun leur pardonne aisement, 
Esperant a bod tour un pareil traitement." — China. 



76 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

In fact, what country could prosper, at home or 
abroad, with apprenticed ministers, succeeding each 
other every six months, and who are superseded before 
concluding their novitiate ? 

A man may be endowed with brilliant genius, and 
still require time in which to learn the duties of his 
department, and reflect on systems that might ame- 
liorate its progress ; and in foreign policy especially, 
what confidence can be inspired in her neighbors, — 
her natural allies, — by such instability ? It were bet- 
ter if each minister were allowed a permanent under- 
secretary of state, who would at least preserve the 
tradition of all that would be beneficial and useful to 
the department ; but far from recurring to these wise 
means, these innovators have labored to abolish a por- 
tion of those that existed. Such a state of things, 
deplorable under an able king, would become mortal 
under a feeble prince or during a minority. 

It will be said that the enmity of one of the three 
powers could be counterbalanced by the united will 
of the other two. This would be true, if we enter- 
tained at least the thought of establishing, in the 
fundamental law, that the union of two of these pow- 
ers, twice ascertained, and in two different sessions, 
would suffice to sanction a law or any act whatever, 
notwithstanding the opposition of the third ; but it 
has never been done ; and this may perchance be un- 
wise, because, since you desire an equilibrium between 
three authorities, it would be well to admit that two 
of them represent the majority, and that it is absurd 
to desire that one alone have the power of annihilating 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 77 

the wishes of the other two : in such a case, the mi- 
nority makes the law. 

It will be answered that the charter might provide 
for this, in giving royalty the right of dissolution, and 
that of nominating new peers, and giving the cham- 
bers the right of rejecting proposed laws and refusing 
taxation. These means are at once violent and in- 
efficacious remedies, because, in order that the disso- 
lution of the chambers be of any service, it would be 
necessary to admit that all the electors were consum- 
mate politicians, and capable of deciding on the dif- 
ferences that had caused it. But such electors will 
never exist. In fact, if it be true that this measure is 
often the result of miserable personal intrigues and 
of a deplorable party spirit, on the merits of which 
an elector would be much perplexed to pass any judg- 
ment whatever, how can a favorable result be ex- 
pected? How would a new election condemn an 
intrigue, the plot of which had been contrived by the 
very men who declare themselves the directors of 
public opinion ? 

Let us even take things like true optimists, and 
suppose, as these things should be, that the dissolution 
was only the result of a serious struggle between two 
systems of politics strongly opposed to each other, 
and not that of ambitious individuals. In this case, 
is it not evident that the electors would be unable to 
decide which of the two systems would best suit the 
country ? Questions present themselves, not only in 
internal politics, but still more in foreign policy, which, 
though enveloped in appearances the most seductive, 
contain elements of life and death to the power of a 



78 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

state. Will these questions be wisely settled by the 
licensed dealers and small land-holders, when the 
greatest intellects of the nation are perplexed and di- 
vided as to the system to be followed ? And then, is 
it not known how electors choose their local deputies, 
who perhaps represent very well their arrondisse- 
ments, but often ill-understand the general interests of 
France? Is it not known, what part intrigue and 
camaraderie play in this choice ? Are we ignortat of 
the influence exercised by the journals at the capital, 
and of the spirit in which they are edited ; what their 
candor, their impartiality, their wisdom, the profun- 
dity of their views, their pretended patriotism ? With 
such elements, what can be the result of a dissolution ? 
Will they dare say that the re-election will present 
the real wishes of France, when twenty or thirty votes, 
perhaps the most indifferent in the country, exacted 
through intrigue and party spirit, will have been ac- 
quired by the opposition and secured its triumph ? 
Is it not frightful to think, that^by the aid of a facti- 
tious majority, certain ambitious men, without pru- 
dence or depth of thought, will be able to secure the 
adoption of a principle anarchical in its character 
and destructive of all national greatness ; a principle 
which would not only disturb the state internally, 
but would remove the means of waging war at once 
useful and of a result almost certain, to be followed 
by foolish and desperate struggles, to sustain Utopian 
ideas and flatter popular passions ? A singular equi- 
librium this, that will give to twenty deputies the 
power of annulling a good system, adopted by the 
king, the ministers, the chamber of peers, the council 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 79 

of state, and even half of the elective chamber, less 
these twenty votes ! And such institutions will be 
called the perfectibility of the human mind, the 
chef-d'oeuvre of a progressive age ! ! 

The appointment of the new peers, conceded to roy- 
alty, has not, perhaps, the same inconveniences as the 
dissolution, but it has some others. When made in 
small numbers, the spirit of the chamber may not be 
changed ; made inconsiderately, and in larger num- 
bers, it debases this precious institution, the sole bar- 
rier against levelling demagogism. A wise govern- 
ment should not have recourse to such measures 
merely to maintain a ministry, but only when the ves- 
sel of state is in imminent danger. 

We thus see that the trinitarian system actually of- 
fers more chances of rupture, than of efficacious 
means for securing a useful and advantageous equili- 
brium ; since royalty, in striking the elective cham- 
bers, strikes falsely, and nothing usually remains but 
wounds. 

The means possessed by the elective chambers for 
opposing a project or a system approved by royalty 
and the peers, are still worse, because the refusal of 
any particular law would be insignificant if it was 
not at times a question of existence ; the refusal of 
the budget alone, could overthrow the ministry. This 
presents the gravest of constitutional questions. To 
what extent would an assembly actually in a minority 
in the trinitarian government, have the right to disor- 
ganize the state throughout, by refusing to levy the 
necessary taxes for settling the accounts of the army 
and navy, and securing the payment of magistrates 



80 POLITICAL AOT MILITARY HISTORY OF 

and the public debt ? And this, perhaps, to gratify 
a miserable party rancor, a rancor actually arising 
from the fact, that the monarch or the ministry enjoy 
a transcendent capacity of which the proud medioc- 
rity are jealous.* No, such a charter is not perfec- 
tion ; as it gives all power for evil without giving an 
equal measure of power for good. 

I do not pretend to deduce from this that all consti- 
tutional charters are deceptions, and that all govern- 
ments with chambers are impossible ; I only wish to 
say, that the combinations adopted up to this time 
have not fulfilled the object for which they were in- 
tended, and that to be successful, recourse to other 
methods is necessary. 

The proposition is a simple one ; for a representa- 
tive government to be a good one, and able to proceed 
successfully, the constitution must be a good one : 
when the institutions are perverted, the representative 
government is the most deplorable of all. Now, to 
base a constitutional monarchy on proper foundations 
and to frame a good charter, it is necessary, above all 
things, firmly to establish the fundamental truths upon 
which it should rest, namely : 

1st. That the popular masses are, by their nature, 
called upon to be governed, not to govern ; that it is 
the province of the middle classes to represent the 
democratic interests of the country, and to discharge 

* If a refusal of the budget was voted by a majority of twenty votes, the 
consequence would be, that twenty deputies would have had a power su- 
perior to that of the king, peers, ministers, and two hundred deputies 
who voted with the government. These twenty men would proclaim 
themselves the voice of France, and would, through self-love or ambition, 
disorganize the country. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 81 

the duties appertaining thereto in a just and equita- 
ble manner. 

2d. That the chamber of peers should represent the 
national notabilites of all kinds that exist, and the in- 
terests connected with them. 

3d. That the executive power, that is, the throne, 
represents the nation and all its interests among for- 
eign powers ; it also represents the interests of all 
classes of citizens among each other, since it is by na- 
ture, as it is its duty to conciliate the interests of all, 
not desiring the good of one to the detriment of 
others, except in a very few cases where the general 
interest of the country imperiously demands this ex- 
ception. 

4th. That the democratic elective chamber, not 
representing the entire nation, but only a portion of 
the middle classes, will be powerless in any case to 
arrogate to itself the sovereignty, without committing 
a signal and criminal usurpation. 

These are grand and incontestible truths, — though 
sad prejudices, bad passions, and sometimes bad gov- 
ernments, appear at times to have given them the lie. 

When perfectly convinced of these truths, which 
will not be the less real for having remained unac- 
knowledged by the present generation, then you may 
perhaps be able to establish good institutions ; but as 
long as you proclaim popular sovereignty, the sover- 
eignty of an elective chamber; as long as you boldly 
profess dogmas tending to treat as an enemy this exe- 
cutive power, designed to conciliate, defend, and unite 
into one, these interests of your different classes and 
different localities ; finally, as long as your laws and 



82 POLITICAL ASTD MILITARY HISTORY OF 

your discourses tend to debase and annul this power 
which is the true guaranty of national greatness, then 
you may attempt a thousand theories, establish a thou- 
sand charters : they will always prove to be works of 
deception, without consistency, and fatal to the 
country. 

If a purely democratic elective chamber without an 
aristocratic counterpoise, and in session only during 
certain months of the year, wishes to rule the state, 
anarchy is inevitable ; because, in order that the 
wheels of government possess the necessary action, it 
is indispensable that the elective chamber be an in- 
strument and not an obstacle. In a word, it is neces- 
sary in a monarchy that the king be king and the 
deputies be his best counsellors. ... If you insist on 
being governed by chambers, or by one chamber, then 
have a senate for life, which is recruited through its 
own proper choice, and not by department elections, 
— an aristocratic senate, like that of Rome and Berne ; 
otherwise, every act will be of short duration, and 
the state becoming the prey of intrigue, will be con- 
sumed or fall into endless revolutions. 

We can conclude from the preceding : — 

1st. That if the equilibrium of the constitutional 
powers is the most important and most desirable end 
to which a fundamental charter can aspire, this equi- 
librium must be real and perfectly poised, or the 
entire governmental edifice will be found falsified and 
compromised. 

2d. That it is dangerous to accord the initiative of 
the laws to the chambers, it being sufficient to give 
them the right of demanding from the ministry, a 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 83 

law on a determined object that these may have lost 
sight of. 

3d. That the pure and simple dissolution of the 
elective chambers is a work of deception, of which 
intrigue will generally gather all the fruits, if an 
appeal can be had to the electors themselves, or if 
the law does not interdict the re-election of the 
same deputies ; because, to make a true appeal to 
the French nation, it would be necessary to appoint 
beforehand a certain number of extra deputies, or 
require the election of an entirely new deputation, 
to ascertain the opinion of the electoral body on the 
system that may have led to the dissolution.* 

4th. That the usual budget should be voted at 
least for three or four years, and that extraordinary 
expenses or additional taxes should alone be voted 
annually. 

5th. Lastly, that it would be necessary to find 
means for preventing party intrigues from paralyzing 
two of the powers, and a large portion of the third, 
otherwise, the equilibrium of the powers and the 
government of the majority will be a double illusion. 

Without these precautions, the governing of a great 
nation through elective assemblies, meeting tempora- 
rily, and composed of purely democratic elements, will 
be as painful a task as that of rolling the rock of 
Sisyphus. If examples from the Romans be cited in 
opposition, I will answer those who understand the 

* The extra deputies could be appointed beforehand, bo that in case 
of a dissolution, there would be a new vote more generally authenticated. 
This is merely indicating a delect in the equilibrium of the powers, with- 
out pretending to state the means of correcting it. 



84 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

institutions of this great people so superficially, that 
their government was not an elective democracy, 
and that the aristocratic senate appointed for life, or 
hereditary patricians, are the only assemblies that 
have ever properly directed the policy of a country ; 
again, those which history recalls, were always forced 
to recognize the supremacy of an executive power, 
either under the name of consul or under the title of 
Doge and the council of ten, whose powers were any- 
thing but liberal. Not that I prefer aristocratic or 
patrician republics, they are the most exclusive and 
most tyrannical governments. I have already given 
my views in a previous volume,— where I have proved 
that hereditary monarchy ', tempered by wise laws, and 
not a debased and impotent monarchy, was the most 
rational form for a great civilized nation. 

I perceive that I am led away by my theme, and 
that it is time to return to Napoleon, whose views 
rather than mine own must be explained. Whatever 
might be his maxims on the inconveniences of assem- 
blies, the circumstances under which he found him- 
self were still of a nature to double his fears, and the 
following passage that we borrow from one of his 
addresses, leaves no doubt as to his views on this sub- 
ject : " In time of war, if you succeed in electrifying 
deliberative assemblies, they may become centres of en- 
thusiasm and of devotion to the country, but they 
have also more than one dangerous aspect. If a divi- 
sion takes place between them and the executive 
power, then the government is impossible, there is no 
longer strength in the conduct of affairs ; victory is 
necessary to them at any cost ; because, at the least 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 85 

reverse, terror takes possession of the timid and mod- 
erate, who ordinarily constitute the greatest number ; 
we do not always find assemblies as furious as the 
convention, placed by the regicide between victory 
and the scaffold, and forced to conquer or display a 
frightful energy. These examples are exceptions. 
Under ordinary circumstances, and especially in as- 
semblies of peaceable proprietors, the least reverse 
strikes the timid with fear of perils, and awakens all 
pretensions in the breast of the ambitious. Those 
eager for celebrity, popularity and domination, set 
themselves up from their proper sphere into counsel- 
lors to the prince ; they pretend to know and decide 
all things ; if their advice is rejected, from counsellors 
they become factious ; then, finally, after having un- 
dermined all the elements of confidence and power, 
they preach a revolt in the name of a public good of 
their own fashioning, the source of which is entirely 
in their imaginations. Then the prince must submit 
to their yoke or break it ; and in either case, he is 
obliged to peril the government and the state, at a 
moment when he should triple his force to resist the 
foreigner." 

Napoleon performed, then, a great act of self-de- 
nial, in deciding to proclaim the establishment of two 
chambers, with public tribunes ; still he preferred 
this course to the chance of a single constituent as- 
sembly, that had raised controversies in the presence 
of formidable enemies, and whose powers being al- 
most unlimited, had entirely annulled his own. More- 
over, by reserving to himself the initiative of the 
laws, after the example of Louis XVIII., he calculated 



86 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

on confining their action within just bounds. Such 
was the dominant idea while drawing up the addi- 
tional act. 

Benjamin Constant was charged with draughting 
the imperial thoughts, modified by some of his own ; 
this work, submitted to the council composed of the 
ministers and the council of state, did not fail to find 
censors; the majority of the members would have 
preferred an entirely new constitution, deliberated 
upon by a national assembly, not only because for- 
mally announced in the decrees of Lyons, but it being 
important not to expose it to the same reflections that 
had destroyed the granted charter. 

Fouche himself raised many other objections to 
the debated project. This political Proteus, ever ready 
to embrace the opinion he judged to be in the ascen- 
dant, wished to give the chambers the initiative of 
the laws, and to make Napoleon a veto hmg like that 
0/1791.* 

He also wished the different statutes of the empire, 
that would remain in the new fundamental law, to be 
discussed by the chambers, and disposed of according 
to their good pleasure. Lastly, he demanded a new 
assembly of the Champ de Mai for the following year, 
that the same deputies might return to discuss the 
proposed compact, and again surrender everything in 
question. 

* We are aware that the populace gave no other name to Louis XVI. 
than Monsieur Veto, because he was only invested with the power of op- 
posing everything, while the first attribute of the administration that 
knows the wants of the country, is to prepare and contrive everything and 
submit the same to the chambers. This was reversing the governmental 
edifice. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 87 

From the principles I have frequently exposed, it 
was difficult for the objections of the members of the 
council to shake the emperor's convictions ; on the 
contrary, he depicted his fears so eloquently, that he 
succeeded in pursuading them that the supreme law 
of threatened public safety, and the possibility of 
modifying the institutions at a later period, with the 
legal concurrence of the two chambers, militated 
strongly in favor of his project. 

He consequently proclaimed, on the 22d April, an 
additional act to the constitutions of the empire. This 
act established a chamber of hereditary peers, a cham- 
ber of elective deputies of six hundred and twenty- 
nine members ; granted a special deputation to com- 
merce and industry ; proclaimed the liberty of the 
press, the responsibility of ministers, the independence 
and irremovability of judges, trial by jury, even for 
offences by the press, and personal and religious 
liberty.* 

However, to relieve this act from the semblance of 
illegality that might be alleged against it, it should 
have been sent to the departments, as well as to the 
army and navy, for the sanction of a national vote, 
the result of which would be proclaimed to the as- 
sembly of the Champ de Mai, whose meeting was ad- 
journed for this purpose, to the 1st June. 

Such institutions were certainly more than sufficient 

* Each arrondissement had a deputy direct, but in addition, the depart- 
ments had also their deputies ; so that there were 238 deputies of depart- 
ments, 3G8 of arrondissements, and 23 of manufactures and commerce. In 
1830, the department deputies were suppressed, leaving but those of the 
irrondissements, and this is the greatest error that has been committed. 



88 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

for governing a nation the most sensitive on the sub- 
ject of its liberties, especially after the decree of 
Lyons abolishing the feudal and privileged nobility. 
And, in fact, liberty was so enlarged, that Chateau- 
briand, with a correctness of judgment that was not 
always his most characteristic trait, thus wrote to 
Louis XVIII. : " Napoleon is caught in his own net ; 
the additional act will be fatal to him ; if observed, 
there is in the main sufficient liberty to overthrow 
the usurper." And Benjamin Constant himself boast- 
ed of this decision, to prove the excellence of the 
doctrines introduced by himself and friends ! Sin- 
gular eulogy to deliver on these doctrines, that of 
proving that they could destroy the political edifice, 
whose stability and solidity should have been their 
work ! 

However, though this compact was adopted by two 
millions of voters, it became the subject of all criti- 
cism — all parties judged it most unmercifully through 
the medium of their passions and interests. The in- 
corrigible speculators of republican theories censured 
Napoleon for not having been satisfied with the con- 
sulate for life, and attributed to a miserable spirit of 
nepotism, the wise foresight which had decided him 
in re-establishing hereditary succession in the supreme 
magistracy, as being theonly safeguard for the exist- 
ence of great nations. 

Other ideologists, less insane, however, than the re- 
publicans, wished to accord the initiative of the laws 
to the chambers, a dogma incompatible with the 
interests of the state, and with the regular functions 
of the wheels of government. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 89 

Demagogues wanted the regime of the forum or of 
popular societies. The royalists were dissatisfied with 
the abolition of feudal distinctions ; the levellers, with 
their having preserved the titles given under the em- 
pire as a recompense for signal services, and more 
so with their having maintained a chamber of he- 
reditary peers that wounded their pride or their fool- 
ish pretensions, and which Napoleon wished to up- 
hold, precisely with the hope of leading, in time, to 
a non-feudal aristocracy, sufficiently powerful to serve 
as an equilibrium to royalty, on the one hand, and 
the multitude on the other. 

Finally, a last class of opponents to the additional 
act, without blaming its source, presented it as a 
capital blunder, an act of deception the more deplora- 
ble, as it would offend all the electors of the nation 
and the deputies of the land and naval forces, con- 
voked at Paris to effect, through their delegates, these 
very changes, in which Napoleon had singly taken 
the initiative. They pretended, moreover, that the 
time was not opportune for such a measure, when 
even the institutions promulgated were indispensa- 
ble for preserving to the throne the strength that 
constituted its eclat as well as its guaranty, or giving 
the state that vigor, without which it could not attain 
its highest destiny. But none of these critics wished 
to take into consideration, the imperious circumstances 
under which France was to be thrown, by reason of 
the general league that menaced her, and this act, 
far from having been violent, was actually justified 
by the necessities of the times. 

Fouche himself did not spare him his censure: 



90 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

covetous of power and influence, lie was prompted 
on one side by what remained him of revolutionary 
doctrines, on the other by the desire of fixing bounds 
to the imperial power, either to render his own more 
necessary or prevent the emperor from ordering him 
into a species of exile, as in 1810, as soon as he could 
dispense with his services. At the news of the de 
claration of the 13th March, he judged, from all ap- 
pearances, that the new throne was not the most 
stable, and with his habitual cunning, he in a measure 
intrigued at Vienna, to secure a reconciliation with 
the allies, and render himself useful to the govern- 
ment that would succeed Napoleon, should he be 
overcome.'* 

The services that this minister of police had ren- 



* There are different versions of this subject. The memoirs of General 
Lamarque, and the History of the Restoration, by C. . . have formally 
accused Fouehe of having betrayed Napoleon. . . . Lucien Bonaparte 
seeks to justify him, at least as to his connexion with Austria. It seems 
certain that the declaration of the Congress of Vienna unsettled Fouche" 
exceedingly, and that he conceived, from that time, that the emperor's 
power was unsteady ; he judged, that he would either be forced to recur 
to the revolutionary propaganda of 1793, or would fall. Anxious to ac- 
quire sufficient influence on the future of France, to prevent the return of 
the Bourbons, or at least to render himself necessary to a second con- 
ditional restoration, he was no longer a devoted minister, and while 
rendering to Napoleon an account of his relations with Metternich, he 
could very well give them a clandestine turn that would eventually 
serve other ends. 

The additional act displeased him the more as Napoleon took no no- 
tice of his objections : hence everything bears us out in the belief that 
he served him indifferently, and we are even assured that he corres- 
ponded with Wellington before the battle of Waterloo. However, it is 
certain, that immediately after this battle, he assumed an attitude for 
throwing off Napoleon, if not by a crime, at least by a forced abdica- 
tion, and even by an exile concerted with the allies. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 91 

dered Metternicli in 1809, facilitated tlie establish- 
ment of these clandestine connexions, of which he 
was too crafty to make a mystery, firmly convinced, 
moreover, of giving them the direction that would 
best answer his views. Now, these views consisted 
either in restraining the emperor's authority by means 
of powerful assemblies, influenced by himself and 
friends, or even in replacing his government by that 
of his son, the regency to be directed by himself; 
finally, as a last resource, he hoped to become the in- 
strument and arbiter of a second restoration. Napo- 
leon was on the eve of discovering these plots, when 
Fouche adroitly submitted to him the communications 
he had just received from the allies through the me- 
diation of the Austrian minister, and the answer he 
thought of returning. 

Excited by the astonishing success of the new revo- 
lution that had just taken place, and by the prepara- 
tions ordered for arming the nation, the sovereigns 
had no doubt purposely decided to separate the cause 
of Napoleon from that of France, so as to effect a di- 
vision between the nation and his partisans, or even 
to obtain his voluntary retirement, by allowing him 
to conceive the possibility of placing his son on the 
throne with a regency. They consequently declared 
that they did not desire to interfere in the internal 
affairs of France, provided she procured another 
chief. They left to the nation the choice of a form 
of government, even a republic ; but did not wish the 
emperor at any price. Either he had provoked these 
measures by his first overtures, or Metternicli had 
himself taken the initiative. Fouche had not dared to 



92 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

conceal such an incident. He knew that to quiet Na- 
poleon, it was easy for him to make an ostensible 
answer, so disposed by devious ways, as to be the 
means of entering into other combinations. 

This ostensible answer, given the 8th May, could 
not be doubted. " In endeavoring to review all the 
expedients upon which the country could rest, Fouche 
sought to demonstrate that the maintenance of the 
emperer offered the greatest security to Europe. The 
restoration of Louis XVIII. would be an act of hu- 
miliation to France, and would never be upheld even 
with the aid of foreign bayonets. His being replaced 
by the younger branch of the family presented but 
little more stability, because the Duke d'Orleans would 
always have arrayed against him the royalists, repub- 
licans, and the party still more to be dreaded, the Bo- 
napartists.* The prince offering a guaranty only to 
the doctrinaires of the revolution, would be forced to 
submit to their laws, which would insensibly lead to 
anarchy, confusion, and finally another revolution. 
The regency of Maria-Louisa with Napoleon II. would 
have the inconvenience of being influenced by Napo- 
leon in the important foreign policy, without having 
those elements of internal strength which his single 
name would have secured against demagogues. The 
maintenance of his authority, tempered by constitu- 
tions that would prevent wars of ambition, and those 
gigantic levies of men that had rendered him so terri- 
ble to his neighbors, was then the sole means of se- 

* It must not be forgotten that Fouche wrote this in 1815, Napoleon 
being not only alive but in power. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 93 

curing to Europe the repose of which she stood so 
much in need." 

Moreover, Fouche was right, in pointing out the 
unusual manner of proclaiming the intention not to 
dictate laws to France, while imposing upon her the 
formal exclusion of the chief of her choice. He de- 
monstrated that the independence of a great nation 
is one and indivisible, that it exists absolute and intact 
or does not exist at all ; in a word, that it was no 
more a disgrace to have a government imposed than 
permitting a prohibition in the choice determined on. 

In fact, the recent publication of the additional 
act, did no longer permit either France or Napoleon 
to return a different answer to the course of the cabi- 
net at Vienna and of the allies; if this course had 
been taken at the place and time of the famous decla- 
ration of the 13th March, the emperor might have 
decided in favor of his son and of France, a sacrifice 
claimed by the sovereigns ; it would have given it 
the appearance of a voluntary and spontaneous initia- 
tive in a generous action ;* but after this solemn 
declaration, and after the additional act, nothing was 
left him but to reign and fight, or seek a coward's 
safety in flight. Convinced that the national honor 
was closely bound to his own, he redoubled his prepa- 
rations to wage the war thrust upon him to the death, 
and all his efforts were exerted in exciting 'the same 
devotion and energy in the new authorities who were 

* This sacrifice was not at all to his character, and we doubt if h€ 
would have submitted to it; but after all, this was only feasible pre- 
vious to the declaration. But in the month of May, after the addi 
tional act, it was impossible. 



94 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

to sfrare with him the burden of the government, and 
among the deputies of the Champ de Mai, convoked 
for the end of this month : perfectly persuaded that 
if he found this support, the legions of Europe would 
be crushed in their attacks upon France. 

It must be acknowledged that the nation was too 
divided in opinion to permit Napoleon to rally it, en 
tire ; it was broken up into four portions of very dif- 
ferent strengths : 

1st. The partisans of fallen royalty, who were still 
numerous, and counted in their ranks the greater por- 
tion of the constitutional doctrinaires. 

2d. The revolutionists, more formidable through 
their audacity and passions than by their numbers. 

3d. The imperialists or Bonapartists, numbering all 
those who had borne arms or held offices during 
twenty years. 

4th. The indifferent, who asked but for peace, and 
formed the great mass of the middle classes ; these 
constitute the most considerable portion of the nation. 

The facility of Napoleon's triumph arose from the 
fact, that the last three classes had declared in his fa- 
vor ; but the masses only act through passion or inter- 
est : as soon as it was evident that the sole fact of his 
presence was to lead to a general war, the numerous 
classes of the indifferent rose up against him, while 
political acts cooled the energetic party of the revolu- 
tion : henceforward the chances were not the same. 
He did every thing in his power in the position where 
fate had placed him. Convinced that a Cincinnatus 
or a Washington could not conduct France, and fully 
decided on reconstituting a strong and durable gov- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 95 

ernment, he displeased the aspirants for the tribune 
and the clubs, and through them the revolutionary 
masses. The royalist party, increased by many of the 
partisans for peace at any price ; and his, diminished 
daily by these defections. 

The only resource left to the emperor, was to per- 
suade the patriots and authorities that their cause was 
inseparable from his own. He could boldly tell them 
so, for if the nation had thought otherwise, she should 
have rejected the new institutions awarding him the 
empire, and have openly treated with Europe for the 
recognition of his son, or for any other government. 
This was the end he struggled to attain at the Champ 
de Mai. The solemn acts published at this epoch, 
and at the opening of the chambers, are effectively 
the best answers that his partisans can make to his 
detractors : and although details of this nature enter 
but little in the course of this summary, we will give 
a few words. 

The convocation of the Champ de Mai, awaited 
with so much impatience, had certainly lost a portion 
of the charm with which imagination clothed it, since 
the additional act had provided, in rather an unex- 
pected manner, for the most important object of this 
reunion. Up to that time, a semi-mythologic cere- 
mony was anticipated, the result of which would be 
a return of the golden age. The multitude undoubt- 
edly thought, that each one would have the power to 
furnish his article to the compact thus fabricated in 
open air, within this new forum. 

What would be done at this assembly ? was asked 
upon all sides : some said that the emperor would 



96 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

present the empress and her son, as a pledge of his 
reconciliation with Europe and of the duration of his 
dynasty ; others expected wonders, at the expense of 
their imagination. At last, the first of June, so anx- 
iously awaited, arrived : the ceremony took place with 
all possible pomp in the Champ de Mars. Napoleon, 
clothed in the imperial mantle, and surrounded by his 
dethroned brothers, and the doctrinaire Lucien, by 
grand functionaries, marshals, and many prelates, was 
seated on a superb throne erected near the military 
school. Twenty thousand electors seated on benches, 
forming an amphitheatre, constituted the first circle ; 
farther oft", were the deputies from the army : then 
fifty thousand soldiers, in full dress, placed behind 
them, and an immense population of the curious, gave 
a magnificent aspect to this solemnity. Divine ser- 
vice having been performed, M. Dubois d' Angers 
pronounced an elegant address in the name of the 
electors of France, and proclaimed the acceptance of 
the additional act. Napoleon, having responded to 
this discourse in a firm and energetic tone, took the 
oath of fidelity to this charter for himself and his 
own ; and Cambaceres, on the part of the electors, 
swore, in the name of France, fidelity of the French 
people to his new government. This oath was repeat- 
ed spontaneously by all the electors and army depu- 
ties, in which even a large portion of the spectators 
joined ; then followed a distribution of flags to the 
deputations from the army, to the troops present, and 
to the national guard. 

However imposing this ceremony, the ideologists, 
political adversaries of Napoleon, saw in it but the- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 97 

atrical pomp ; they demanded if this was the national 
Congress, announced with so much emphasis to give 
laws to the country, and if this formal preparation 
was necessary, in order to attend a mass, deliver a 
discourse, take an oath, and distribute flags. So fash- 
ionable had the spirit of defamation become, that 
they even ventured to say that France, tired of coups 
de theatre, demanded things of a more serious nature. 

Napoleon had however given in his address, the 
explanation of his conduct, in these words : " Em- 
peror, consul, soldier, I hold all from the French peo- 
ple. In prosperity, in adversity, on the battle-field, 
in council, on the throne, in exile, France has been the 
sole and constant object of my thoughts and my ac- 
tions. Like the king of Athens,* I sacrificed myself 
at Fontainbleau for my people, in the hope of seeing 
the realization of the promise given, to preserve to 
France the natural integrity of her territory, her 
honor and her rights. The indignation at seeing these 
sacred rights, acquired by twenty-five years of victo- 
ries, disregarded and lost for ever ; the cry of French 
honor tarnished ; the wishes of the nation have recalled 
me to the throne, which is dear to me as being the 
palladium of the independence, the honor, and the 
rights of the people. 

" Frenchmen ! in traversing the provinces of the 
empire through the midst of public rejoicing, I had 

* Codrus Baved Athens from Heraclides, not by relinquishing his 
crown, but by throwing himself disguised in the midst of the enemy, 
in order to accomplish the sacrifice demanded by an oracle. An exile 
on the Isle of Elba was a sacrifice quite equivalent to an honorable 
death, but it was not voluntary. 



98 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

reason to calculate on a long peace, because nations 
are bound by the treaties concluded by their govern- 
ments. My thoughts were then entirely bent on the 
means of establishing our liberties, through a consti- 
tution conformable to the will and interest of the na- 
tion. With this object, I have convoked the Champ 
de Mai. I soon learned, however, that the kings, so 
often combined against us, desired to make war upon 
us ; they think of augmenting the kingdom of the 
Netherlands and giving it as barriers, all our northern 
strong-holds ; and to conciliate the differences that 
still exist, they speak of sharing Lorraine and Alsace 
among themselves: it is then necessary to prepare 
for war. 

" Before personally encountering the dangers of the 
battle-field, my first solicitude has been to give formal 
existence to the nation. The people have accepted the 
act with which I have presented them. 

" When we have repelled these unjust aggressions, 
and Europe shall be convinced of what is due to the 
rights of twenty-eight millions of Frenchmen, then a 
solemn law, drawn up according to the forms required 
by the constitutional act, will unite the different dispo- 
sitions of our constitutions, at present dispersed.* 

* This speech of Napoleon was wise and noble ; it nevertheless dis- 
pleased on account of this reticence ; it held out, on the one side, the 
revision of the constitution as necessary, and on the other, that this re- 
vision would be in fact but a union of dispositions already existing, 
though scattered among many acts. Thereafter, the emperor's sincere 
conversion was not credited, although his language was, notwithstand- 
ing, that of a statesman, who knows how to appreciate good institutions, 
but who is also aware of the demands exacted by emergencies, in which 
a nation may be placed. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 99 

u You are about returning to your departments : say 
to the citizens that circumstances are of a serious na 
ture, but that with union, energy and perseverance, 
we will issue victorious, from this struggle of a great 
people Tell them that the kings who hereto- 
fore sought my alliance, are now directing all their 
blows against my person. If I did not see that they 
aim at injuring the country, I would place at their 
mercy, this existence, against which they are so exas- 
perated. But say to them also, that as long as they 
entertain for me sentiments of love, of which they 
have given me so many proofs, this hate of our ene- 
mies will be impotent. 

" Frenchmen ! my will is that of the nation, my 
rights are hers ; my honor, my glory, my happiness, 
cannot be but the honor, the glory, and the happiness 
of France." 

This discourse, delivered in a firm and animated 
voice, excited the liveliest enthusiasm. 

A few days afterwards, the electors left for their 
departments, after having proclaimed the acceptance 
of the additional act, and nominated deputies to the 
new assembly. 

On the 7th June, the emperor convened the two 
chambers with the following address : 

" Three months ago, circumstances and the confi- 
dence of the French people clothed me with unlimited 
power. The most urgent desire of my heart is accom- 
plished to-day ; I perform the first act of the consti- 
tutional monarchy. Men are too powerless to secure 
the future, institutions alone fix the destinies of na- 
tions. Monarchy is necessary in France, to guaranty 



100 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

the liberty, the independence, and the rights of the 
people. 

" Our constitutions are dispersed : one of our most 
important occupations will be to reunite them in one 
body, and to arrange them with one mind. This work 
will recommend the present epoch to future genera- 
tions. I am ambitious to see France in the enjoyment 
of all possible liberty: I say possible, because it is 
necessary to avoid anarchy, leading, as it ever does, 
to absolute power. 

"A formidable coalition of kings have a design 
upon our independence, her armies are on our fron- 
tier. Our enemies count on our intestine divisions. . . 
Some legislative measures are indispensable for the 
future. I confide unreservedly in your intelligence, 
patriotism, and attachment. The liberty of the press 
is inherent in our present constitution, nothing there 
can be altered without changing our political system ; 
but good laws for restraining it are necessary, espe- 
cially in the present condition of the nation : I recom- 
mend this important object to your consideration. 

" The first duty of a prince will soon call me to 

head the children of France The army and 

myself will do our duty. Do you, peers and repre- 
sentatives, give the nation an example of confidence, 
energy and patriotism. Like the senate of the great 
people of antiquity, resolve to die rather than sur- 
vive the dishonor and the degradation of France : 
the holy cause of the country will be triumphant." 

The chambers voted separate addresses : both 
dwelt on the necessity of subjecting absolute power 
to constitutional forms and rules. They moreover 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 101 

promised, in the event of a reverse, to exhibit perse- 
verance, and redouble their attachment to the impe- 
rial cause, which was the cause of France. The 
peers assured Europe, that with the new institutions, 
the allurements of victory would not lead the chief 
of state beyond the bounds of prudence. This was 
a recrimination on the past, to which Napoleon an- 
swered : 

" The struggle in which we are engaged is a serious 
one ; the temptation of prosperity is not the danger 
which now threatens us ; foreigners wish to force us 
under the Caudine forks. The justice of our cause, 
the public spirit of the nation, and the courage of the 
army, are powerful reasons for our hoping success. 
But if we experience reverses, it is then especially 
that I should love to see all the energy of this great 
people displayed. Then it is that I should find in the 
chamber of peers, proofs of attachment to the country 
and her chief. It is in trying times that great nations, 
like great individuals, show forth all the energy of 
their character, and become objects of admiration to 
posterity." 

This posterity will acknowledge, while perusing 
these words, that the emperor neglected nothing in 
his power, to raise France to a level with the dan- 
gers that threatened her, and all of which he had 
foreseen. His answer to the chamber of deputies 
proves it still more conclusively. 

This chamber, resting on the promise of properly 
arranging the constitutional laws, did not dissimulate 
its impatience to leap at once into this slippery arena. 
" Faithful to its mission, it will fulfil (it said) the task 



102 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

devolved upon it in this noble work : it demands that, 
in order to satisfy the public wishes, the national de- 
liberation shall rectify, without delay, what the 
urgency of our situation has produced defective or 
left imperfect in the ensemble of our institutions. 
And while your majesty opposes the honor of our na- 
tional arms and the power of your genius to this most 
unjust aggression, the chamber of representatives will 
endeavor to attain the same end, by laboring without 
relaxation on the compact, the perfection of which 
should continue to cement the union of the people and 
the throne, and by the amelioration of our institutions, 
strengthen in the eyes of Europe the guaranty of our 
engagements." 

This plainly announced the idea of taking advan- 
tage of the emperor's absence, for publicly establish- 
ing constitutional controversies, without awaiting the 
initiative of the government, which, nevertheless, 
constituted the fundamental basis of the national ex- 
istence. This was going back to the constituent assem- 
bly of 1789, under still more dangerous circumstances^: 
this was, in a word, a revolutionary act, since by one 
single stroke it changed the face of the government. 

These discourses attest, on the one side, that the 
additional act was not considered the last say of Na- 
poleon ; but they also proved that he would undoubt- 
edly have to sustain more than one assault from these 
men, who persisted in viewing the government as a 
public enemy, unceasingly thinking on the means of 
chaining its authority, so as to reduce its sphere ot 
action to the most perfect nullity possible. A fright- 
ful misconception, which will forever be a certain 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 103 

index of the decay of a state, or the signal of an- 
archy. 

Though Napoleon appreciated these phrases to their 
just value, he exhibited moderation in applauding 
the intentions of doctrinaires, and limiting himself to 
calling their attention to the dangers of untimely con- 
troversies. His answer should find a place here, as it 
completes the picture of his position and that of his 
antagonists. " Under these painful circumstances, 
my mind is absorbed by the imminent war, to the suc- 
cess of which are attached the honor and independ- 
ence of France. To-night I will depart to place my- 
self at the head of my armies. . . . . During my 
absence, I will take pleasure in seeing a commission, 
appointed by each chamber, maturely deliberating on 
our institutions : the constitution is our rallying point, 
it should be our polar star in these stormy times. But 
all possible discussion, tending to diminish, directly or 
.indirectly, the confidence that should be reposed in 
the government and its dispositions, would be a mis- 
fortune to the state : we would find ourselves in the 
midst of dangers, without guide and without direc- 
tion. The crisis at which we have arrived is a peril- 
ous one : let us not imitate the example of the Lower 
Empire, which, when pressed on all sides by the bar- 
barians, rendered herself the laughing-stock of pos- 
terity, by attending to abstract discussions, at the very 
moment the enemy's battering-ram burst open the 
gates of the capital." 

Prophetic words, and well calculated to confound 
all those declaimers who, forgetful of the emperor's 



104 



POLITICAL AJSTD MILITARY HISTORY OF 



principles at this memorable epoch, have levelled so 
many blows against him. 

Napoleon thus plainly perceived, that the measures 
to which he had to a certain extent been compelled to 
have recourse, so as to satisfy public opinion, were 
producing a deplorable effect: they soon aimed at 
words instead of things, at stormy discussions instead 
of calm and quiet administration, and at a later pe- 
riod, led to divisions in the state, through authority 
arrogated to themselves by the chambers. It was al- 
ready perceived that the concessions, however ex- 
tended, still found detractors. At a moment, when 
the liberty of the press should have been deferred till 
the country was free from danger, the emperor was 
obliged to solicit restraining laws for diminishing its 
abuse, and even this step was presented as a tendency 
to despotism. Pamphlets of every hue, written by 
demagogues, others by emigrants, attacked all the 
measures of government, and impaired that confi- 
dence by which it was more than ever necessary it 
should be encircled. License was Carried to such ex- 
cess, that sheets recommending the attempt and 
promising deification to those who would, by any 
means whatever, deliver France from the yoke of 
Napoleon, did not find juries to condemn them. 

Scarcely was he seated on the throne, when he was 
forced to regret not having simply seized a discre- 
tionary power, by proclaiming himself dictator of the 
French empire, and abolishing all organic laws as 
well as the new investiture of the imperial title, until 
peace had been restored. 

Nevertheless, if these concessions, far from satisfy- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 105 

ing the factions, clothed them with more importance, 
we must own that the enthusiasm excited by his 
promises to the party of the revolution, was not with- 
out its advantages ; for, besides the national guards, 
whose levying it facilitated, it gave means for arming 
the people of the principal cities. Those of Paris 
alone formed twenty battalions of tirailleurs federes, 
troops undoubtedly not very formidable in an open 
field, but which, when distributed in garrisons, might 
in case of need serve as a lever for the government in 
the execution of great national measures, and also 
contribute in the defence of cities. Fouche and 
Carnot, who in concert directed all the affairs of the 
interior, exhibited, perhaps with a different object, 
great ardor in the organization of these patriotic fed- 
erations ; both saw in them a means of counteracting 
the influence of the army, and consequently th^ au- 
thority of its chief. With the power of disposing of 
all the interior forces, they would be more powerful 
than he during the war, and would not much fear 
him after the peace. The first especially, who had 
more address and greater grasp of mind, saw in these 
elements a means of getting rid of Napoleon without 
welcoming the Bourbons, as little as the success of the 
struggle with Europe seemed doubtful. 

Napoleon was too clear-sighted and distrustful not 
to suspect these projects; but he was obliged to sub- 
mit to the best circumstances. 

While these cares of internal policy painfully oc- 
cupied his thoughts, he had redoubled his activity in 
his military preparations, so as to place himself in a 
condition to resist all Europe, should the nation, 

5* 



106 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

seriously appreciating her position, desire to make 
every sacrifice for the maintenance of her independ- 
ence. The armories, abandoned under his predecessor, 
resumed such activity, that they succeeded in fabri- 
cating four thousand muskets per day. The national 
guards mobile were organized throughout the empire, 
at the same time that the conscription was levied. I 
have already stated that the line of the army had been 
doubled in two months, (from 1st April to the 1st 
June), and that a vast system of defence would per- 
mit its increase to 700,000 men by the 1st September. 

The problem of French independence depended, 
then, on the possibility of delaying hostilities till the 
beginning of August. Far from allowing him this 
time, the allies, profiting by his example, hastened 
with all speed towards the Rhine and the Meuse. The 
English and Prussians showed unheard of activity in 
their preparations, and the Russians reached the 
banks of the Rhine from the depths of Poland, in 
two months. The allies who were contending for 
Saxony and Cracow, had remained under arms with a 
war complement, they had lighted matches, and 
twenty minutes' time, with four orders for the march 
dispatched from Vienna the same day, were only 
necessary to place the whole of Europe in motion. 

France was far from presenting the formidable atti- 
tude that Europe ^ad preserved ; every thing was in 
confusion ; on the arrival of Napoleon, she was with- 
out arms and without soldiers. They have tried to 
establish a parallel between her efforts in 1793 and 
those in 1815 : in less time, Napoleon had accom- 
plished as much as the committee of public safety, 
/ 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 107 

without having recourse to the revolutionary army, 
nor to a dozen guillotines that followed : but the 
members of the coalition of 1815 acted very differently 
from those of the first invasion ; they did not spend 
three months in besieging Valenciennes, as Mack and 
Cobourg did ; times were very much changed. The 
sea was covered with English convoys bearing troops 
and siege equipages. The riches of Hindostan, se- 
conded by proficiency in the arts and manufactures, 
had transformed England into an immense arsenal, 
that fabricated, with terrible activity, the artillery, 
munitions and trains necessary to the armies of the 
coalition. Nothing in the most distant times resem- 
bled this epoch. 

Since the last of May, Wellington and Blucher had 
assembled 220,000 English, Prussians, Belgians, Hano- 
verians and Brunswickers, between Li£ge and Cour- 
tray. The troops of Bavaria, Wirtemburg and Baden 
assembled in the Black Forest and in the Palatinate. 
The Austrians hastened to join them : their army of 
Italy was re-united at Sardes, on the Alps. The Rus- 
sians, by forced marches, were already traversing 
Franconia and Saxony. A million of men, in short, 
were preparing to rush upon France : it may be said, 
that the coalition had the secret of Cadmus, for 
making soldiers spring forth from the bowels of the 
earth. 

Whatever might be the activity employed in re-or- 
ganizing the army, and in the defence of the frontier, 
Napoleon must have feared that the armies of Europe 
would be much greater than his own, should hostilities 
commence before the month of August. It was then 



108 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

under the walls of Paris and Lyons, that the destinies 
of the empire were to be decided. 

More than once he had had the idea of fortifying 
the heights of Paris ; but was prevented by the fear 
of alarming the country and by the emergencies that 
were thickening around him. There were two me- 
thods of effecting this ; the first was by constructing 
seven or eight large forts on the principal points of 
this enceinte ; if these forts did not absolutely prevent 
their penetrating to the walls, and even forcing an en- 
trance into the city, it would require a very consider- 
able force to make the attempt, for fear there still 
existed a nucleus of a French army that might take 
part in the defence. Besides this, by commanding 
the navigation of the Seine and closing the principal 
avenues, they would render the provisioning of Paris 
by the enemy who dared to hold it, a very difficult 
matter. Lastly, these forts might be connected by 
communicating intrenchments. 

The other method was to place the entire enceinte 
under protection from a coup de main, by means of 
field works. The emperor gave this the preference 
because it required less time. He thought " that a 
great capital contains the elite of the nation, that it 
is the centre of opinion, the depot of every thing, and 
that it is the greatest inconsistency to leave so im- 
portant a point without immediate defence. In times 
of misfortunes and great calamities, states are often 
in want of actual soldiers, but never in want of men 
for the defence of their walls. Fifty thousand na- 
tional guards with two or three thousand cannoniers, 
will defend a fortified capital against an army of 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 109 

200,000 men. These 50,000 men in an open field, if 
not disciplined soldiers and commanded by experi- 
enced officers, will be routed by a charge of a few thou- 
sand horse. Paris has often owed her safety to her 
walls ; if in 1814 she had been in condition to resist 
but for eight days, what influence would this not have 
had on the events of the world? If in 1805, Vienna 
had been well armed and better defended, the battle 
of Ulm had not decided the war; Austerlitz had 
never been fought. If in 1806, Berlin had been for- 
tified, the army beaten at Jena had rallied, and the 
Russian army would have joined it. If in 1808, 
Madrid had been fortified, the French army after the 
victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo- 
Sierra, had not dared to march on this capital, leaving 
the English and Spanish armies behind them, towards 
Salamanca and Valladolid. Lastly, it was the fortifi- 
cations of Vienna, that on two occasions saved Europe 
from the sabre of the Mussulman. 

General Haxo was consequently charged with for- 
tifying Paris. This skillful engineer, intrenched the 
heights situated on the north from Montmartre to 
Charonne, and completed the Ourcq canal, so as to 
cover the plain between La-Villette and St. Denis. 
This village was to be intrenched and protected by 
the inundations of the Rouillon and the Crou. From 
the western foot of Montmartre ran a line of intrench - 
ments that rested on the Seine above Clichy : at the 
eastern extremity, the Bercy park and the space be- 
tween Vincennes and Charonne were equally covered. 
The works were armed with 700 pieces of ordnance. 
On the south, the faubourgs between the upper Seine 



110 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

and la Bi&vre and between la Bi&vre and the lower 
Seine, were not to remain without defence ; their en- 
ceinte had been already traced out when the enemy 
appeared before Paris. 

General Lery presided over the defensive works at 
Lyons ; they were pushed with vigor : 450 iron pieces 
of heavy calibre brought from Toulon, and 250 bronze 
pieces, armed the ramparts or were kept in reserve. 
Every thing led to the belief that the inhabitants of 
this city, whose patriotism equals their courage, sup- 
ported by a corps (Parmee, would give the enemy a task. 

While these great works were being executed, re- 
cruiting was carried on with all the possible activity 
that circumstances would permit. It will be remem- 
bered that by the 1st June the effectives of the line of 
the army had been increased from 200,000 to 400,000 
men ; but in this number must be included the sol- 
diers who were still at the regimental depots, as well 
as the forces required in the west, on the southern 
frontier, and in the most important fortresses of the 
empire. Napoleon had then 180,000 disposable men 
for the campaign on the Rhine and in Belgium. By 
the middle of July, he would have had 300,000 ; all 
the forts would, moreover, have had garrisons of 
national guards, depots for the line, and -some good 
regiments.* 

* The troops of the line had been augmented in two months, from 
200,000 to 360,000 men ; but 150,000 were not yet disposable, being in 
depots. Besides these, there were 200,000 complete, comprising the na- 
tional guard mobile, which would not be fit for service before the end of 
July, though by the middle of June they might be already assembled in 
the fortresses. By the end of August Napoleon expected to have from 
seven to eight hundred thousand defenders at his disposal. Immonse 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. Ill 

All the efforts to enter upon negotiations having 
Deen vain, Napoleon had the option to pursue one of 
two courses ; the first, to meet the Anglo-Prussians at 
Brussels or Nainur, about the middle of June ; the 
second, to await the allies at Paris and Lyons. The 
latter had the inconvenience of delivering half of 
France to the ravages of the enemy ; but it offered the 
advantage of gaining until the month of August to 
finish recruiting and complete the preparations, then 
of fighting with all his means combined while the 
allies were weakened by many corps of observation. 
On the contrary, by transporting the theatre of hostili- 
ties into Belgium, France was perhaps saved from 
invasion ; but in case of reverse the allien would be 
drawn on by the 1st July, six weeks earlier than 
they would have come of their own accord.* The 
armee cVelite, shaken by a reverse, would no longer be 
able to sustain so unequal a struggle, and the recruiting 
might not be completed. On the other hand, this 
course offered the hope of taking the enemy unawares ; 
it was more conformable with the spirit of the nation 
that does not comprehend Fabius. This method can 
be acted upon by an emperor of Russia, with an end- 
less empire ; or by a Wellington on the territory of 
another beyond the sea ; but in a country like France 

works were ordered for putting in order all the frontier places, for a long 
time neglected, and especially to fortify Paris, Lyons, Laone, Soissons, 
and the mountain passes. 

* This calculation, that might very naturally enter into Napoleon's 
thoughts, being based on the march of the Russian armies, the farthest 
ati* of all, was not exact, as to time, because the coalesced power had 
taken measures for entering France at all points on the 1st July. This 
was, besides, an additional motive for anticipating them in Belgium, if in 
condition to do so. 



112 POLITICAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

whose capital is seventy leagues from the Belgian 
frontier, and in the position which the emperor was 
personally placed, the idea of permitting Europe in 
arms to reach the base of Montmartre, would have 
terrified the most determined. Undoubtedly, if France 
had had but one feeling and one will, that of rallying 
around the chief of state and conquering with him, it 
would perhaps have been better to await the enemy. 
But with existing divisions in political interests, opin- 
ions, and passions, everything was to be dreaded while 
awaiting an invasion ; because with the impossibility of 
making head at all points at once, he would have been 
constrained to deliver half of the provinces to the rav- 
ages of war, and the chamber of deputies, already so 
hostile to his power, would not have spared him. A 
victory beyond, would procure him the necessary time, 
and would impose silence on his political enemies in the 
interior : it would thus suit him in every respect ; for 
in beating Wellington and Blucher separately, he 
delivered himself from the dangers he foresaw on 
the part of Fouche and Carnot. Moreover, he has 
unevasively avowed that he believed himself certain 
of this victory, while perceiving the enthusiasm of the 
soldiers and recurring to the souvenirs of the past. 

All these motives determined him then to take the 
initiative, not to occupy Brussels, but to destroy the 
opposing masses in succession. If he succeeded, the 
defeat of Wellington and Blucher ought to be followed 
by important consequences ; this great blow struck 
a propos at the opening of the campaign, might dissolve 
the coalition. Meanwhile, it was impossible to garri- 
son the other points of the frontier : it was necessary 



POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 113 

to leave small bodies at Bordeaux, Toulouse, on the 
Var, in Savoy, at Befort, and Strasbourg. These 
bodies, too feeble to resist in front of an enemy, were 
to serve at least for awing and harassing him on the 
march : moreover these were points d' appui, valuable 
for levying the national guards, and for the rising of 
the country which they were to organize. 

To increase the misfortune, la Vendee was not 
quieted, notwithstanding the success of the movable 
columns. Civil w^ar is a political cancer which should 
be destroyed in its germ, under pain of compromising 
the safety of the state ; even a portion of the young 
guard had to be sent to re-enforce the corps of General 
Lamarque. All these detachments reduced thcstrength 
of the main army to 120,000 combatants, which were 
to assemble between the Meuse and the Sambre, from 
Philippeville to Maubeuge. 

Although the enemy had at least 200,000 men in 
Belgium, Napoleon did not hesitate ; it was important 
not to lose time, so as to avoid having on his hands all 
the hostile armies at once. Leaving Paris on the 
12th June, he inspected the armament of Soissons and 
Laon the next day, and on the 14th removed his 
head-quarters to Beaumont. 

The organization of the army underwent great 
modifications : the emperor gave the command of corps 
to young generals who, called upon to win their 
marshal's baton on the battle-field, would exhibit 
more enthusiasm for the triumph of his cause. This 
baton was conferred on Grouchy, who had shown 
talent and vigor in the campaign of 1814, and in his 
expedition against the Duke d'Angouleme. Soult 



114 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

was appointed major-general in place of Berthier, who 
had forsaken his flag to follow the Bourbons, and who 
it is said, threw himself from the casement of the 
palace of Bamberg, ashamed of finding himself in the 
midst of the enemy's columns that defiled before him 
en route for the frontier of France.* Davoust re- 
mained as minister of war, Mortier was to command 
the guard ; but his health did not permit it. Ney and 
Grouchy were to conduct the wings of the main army, 
in the quality of lieutenants. Suchet commanded the 
army of Italy, Rapp on the Rhine, Brune on the Yar, 
Clausel and Decaen watched the Pyrenees. 

Napoleon had four lines of operation from which to 
choose ; he could reunite his masses on the left towards 
Valenciennes, pounce by Mons, on Brussels, fall upon 
the English army and overthrow it on Antwerp. By 
the centre he could act on Charleroi, through Mau- 
beuge, between the Sambre and the Meuse, and fall 
on the point of function of the two armies of Blucher 
and Wellington. On. the right he could descend the 
Meuse towards Namur, fall on the left of the Prussians, 
cutting them off from Coblentz and Cologne. Lastly, 
it- was possible to make a descent between the Meuse 
and the Moselle, or between the Meuse and the Rhine, 
fall on the corps of Kleist that covered the Ardennes, 
and the communications of the Prussians with the 
Rhine. 

* Berthier's death is still covered by a veil of mystery ; the fact is, he 
foil from the balcony on to the pavement. Some say he was thrown by the 
son of a bookseller of Nuremberg, who had been condemned to death 
under the empire ; others think, that the spectacle of the Eussian army 
defiling on their way to enter France> made him regret his having 
emigrated. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 115 

This last course led only to threatenings, that would 
have resulted in nothing with a man of Blucher's cha- 
racter. Besides, it led too far from the end intended. 
An attack on the Meuse was most wise, but it would 
have thrown Blucher on Wellington, and effected the 
junction that should be prevented. The inverse 
manoeuvre by Mons against "Wellington's army, might 
have produced in an opposite manner the same 
dreaded junction, by throwing the right of the allies 
upon the left. The emperor at last determined on 
falling upon the central point, where he might take 
Blucher en flagrant delit, and defeat him before he 
could receive the support of Wellington. 

In order properly to appreciate its merit, it must be 
remembered that Napoleon had not to oppose only 
one army, under the same chief, and having but one 
interest, but on the contrary, two armies independent 
of each other, having two bases of operations entirely 
diverging : that of the English being based on Ostend, 
or Antwerp, and that of the Prussians on the Rhine 
and Cologne ; decisive circumstances, and which 
secured great success to all central operations, tending 
to separate them and fight them successively. 

' Napoleon's taking the field, and his first plan, may 
be regarded as among the most remarkable operations 
of his life : nine corps of infantry or cavalry cantoned 
from Lille to Metz, were, by marches skillfully con- 
cealed, to concentrate in front of Charleroi, at the 
same moment with the guard's arrival there from Paris. 
These movements were combined with so much pre- 
cision, that 120,000 men were assembled on the 
' ambre, as by enchantment, on the 14th June. Wei- 



116 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

lington, occupied in giving fetes at Brussels, believed 
Napoleon still in Paris, when his columns presented 
themselves on the morning of the 15th to cross this 
river. The French troops occupied over night the 
following positions : — the right, 16,000 strong, under 
Count Gerard, at Philippe ville ; the centre, nearly 
60,000 strong, under Napoleon, towards Beaumont ; 
and the left, 45,000 strong, at Ham-sur-Eur and 
Solre-sur-Sambre. 

The enemy had such slight idea of these movements 
that their armies were not concentrated. Blucher had 
the first of his corps at Charleroi, the second at 
Namur, the third at Dinant, and the fourth under 
Bulow, at Li&ge ; the fifth under Kleist, covered 
Luxembourg. Meanwhile, Napoleon learned on join- 
ing his army, that General Bourmont had deserted on 
the 14th, from Philippeville, to join Louis XVIII. and 
the allies. However censurable this step might be, it 
may be believed, that it was not aggravated, by giving 
the enemy such information as a soldier should con- 
ceal even in such a case. At all events, under the 
circumstances, w T hen endeavoring to surprise them in 
their cantonments, the mere knowledge of the em- 
peror's arrival and the assembling of his army, was a 
serious matter ; this information sufficed for Blucher 
to order the concentration of his corps, and thus 
counteracting all plans for a surprise. We are, how- 
ever, assured that he had already ordered this as- 
sembling, on previous advices received through a 
drummer of the old guard who had deserted that 
night ; the presence of the old guard was a certain 
index, and sufficient to warn the enemy. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 117 

As to Wellington's army, it had not yet stirred 
from the cantonments it occupied from Oudinarde, on 
l'Escaut to Nivelle : but it had been apprised and 
was ready to do so at the first signal. 

The events were so important and so hurried in this 
campaign of four days, that I will be obliged to enter 
into details to have it understood, and to insert in this 
place, a table of the situations of the respective armies 
on the morning of the 15th, to accomplish the same 
object. If Napoleon did not then know precisely the 
composition and position of all the enemy's corps, he 
at least knew that in general terms, the Prussians 
cantoned from Charleroi to Li&ge, and that the Anglo- 
Belgians were distributed between Ath and Brussels, 
with advanced guards towards Mons and Tournay. 
The point of junction of these two armies, was then 
on the causeway leading from Charleroi to Brussels, 
and it was there also that he directed his blows, with 
the greater hope of being able to profit thus by the 
dissemination of the enemy's forces, and overthrow 
them separately. 

As success depended on celerity, the French army 
crossed the frontier on the 15th at dawn, and took the 
direction of Charleroi. The corps of General Beille, 
that bivouacked at ITam-sur-Eur, being nearest the 
enemy, was to cross the Sambre at Marchiennes, and 
march on Gosselies : that of d'Erlon which was farther 
to the rear at Solre-sur-Sambre, was to follow the 
same direction. The centre or main body, with the 
cavalry reserves under Grouchy,* marched from 

* Under this first organization, Grouchy commanded all the cavalry ; it 
was only on the morrow, the 16th June, that the army was organized into 
two wings, and that he took command of the right. 



118 



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120 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

Beaumont on Charleroi, and the right from Philijope- 
ville upon Catelet, where it was to cross the Sambre, 
cutting off the Prussian division that held Charleroi, 
from its retreat on Namur. 

These movements though partly unforeseen by the 
enemy, did not entirely attain their object. Reille's 
corps actually crossed the Sambre successfully, and 
gained the route to Gosselies, preceded by the light 
cavalry of the guard ; but Gerard's leaving Philippe- 
ville, having a much longer march to execute, and 
over detestable roads, arrived at Catelet too late to 
gain the road to Gilly, and fulfil its destination. 

The centre had, also, very execrable roads to 
traverse, in running over from Beaumont to Charleroi, 
and Vandamme, who should have formed the head of 
this column, was rather late in leaving his camp.* 
The Prussian generals, whose divisions were parceled 
out on the line, had thus more leisure in assembling 
them and evacuating Charleroi, this being in their 
plan of concentration ; only two or three battalions 
w T ere cut to pieces in the partial combats. The first 
division of Ziethen's corps, wishing to retreat from 
Pieton through Gosselies, and finding this point al- 
ready occupied by Reille's advanced guard, had to 
force its way in order to reach Heppignies. The 
second division re-assembled at Gilly on the Namur 
road. Reille's corps having driven the Prussian divi- 
sion from Gosselies, and perceiving it continuing the 

* General Gonrgaud will have it thus ; but we have reason to believe that 
an error was committed in transmitting the orders, for Vandamme was 
not one of those men whose activity must be stimulated ; he was but 
too ardent, unless some personal jealousy had excited his displeasure. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 121 

retreat by Heppignies upon Fleurus, Girard's division 
was ordered to follow, while the other three divisions 
continued their march upon Frasne. The light 
cavalry of the guard that preceded it, drove from this 
borough the advanced guard of Prince Weimar, who 
concentrated his brigade on Quatre-Bras. 

Grouchy's light cavalry having debouched from 
Charleroi upon Gilly, found there Ziethen's two divi- 
sions, and was obliged to halt and await Yandamme's 
infantry, who were advancing with difficulty by the 
bridge of this city. In this position the two parties 
exchanged a few cannon shot. 

While these French columns debouched by the 
bridges on the Sambre and sought the enemy, 
Napoleon established himself in front of Charleroi at 
the fork of the roads leading to Gosselies and Fleurus, 
where he awaited reports, and meditated on the 
employment to be given to the masses he had assem- 
bled with so much skill, and on the direction necessary 
to assign them. 

Before proceeding further, it will be well to cast a 
coup d'oeil on the preventive measures the allies had 
taken against the storm that was bursting upon them. 
If their generals were caught at fault at the instant 
of the irruption, it must be acknowledged that they 
were actually well prepared for whatever might 
happen. The Anglo-Prussians desired to assume the 
offensive on the 1st July; during the interval they 
had adopted all the precautions necessary, in case 
they were anticipated. All the partial and general 
concentrations were properly indicated. They under- 
stood Napoleon's system of piercing divided centres 

6 



122 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

too well, not to foresee that lie would manoeuvre in 
order to separate the two armies. Under this hypo- 
thesis, Blucher had chosen the position in rear of 
Ligny for assembling on his right, and Wellington 
had selected Quartre-Bras for concentrating on his 
left ; meanwhile he had reconnoitred the position be- 
tween Hall and Mont-Saint-Jean (or Waterloo,) for 
covering Brussels, and there to accept battle, if the 
French either debouched by Yalenciennes and Mons, 
or arrived by Charleroi. 

These dispositions were incontestably wise, but with 
the impetuosity and ordinary vivacity of the enter- 
prises and the movements of the emperor of the 
French, they might yet fail in accomplishing their 
object and be separated. 

After what had been agreed upon, as soon as 
Blucher heard at Namur of the approach of the impe- 
rial army, he dispatched at midnight of the 14th, 
orders to Ziethen to fall back, fighting on Fleurus ; 
prescribed at the same time the assembling of Pirch's 
corps at Sombref ; ordered Thielmann to march in all 
haste from Dinant to Namur, while Bulow should 
concentrate on Hanut. These measures, evidently 
suggested by the reports of deserters, denoted how- 
ever that Blucher calculated on a hasty crossing of the 
Sambre, and on a decisive battle for the morrow. 

Napoleon could not as yet understand all these cir- 
cumstances ; but after the varied information he had 
received, and from the direction of the retreat of the 
Prussian forces, he perceived that their army sought to 
assemble between Namur and the causeway leading 
from Charleroi to Brussels, as it was by this route that 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 123 

the English would come to their assistance : now, under 
this supposition the emperor had but one wise course to 
follow ; the most simple glance at the map would suffi- 
ciently indicate, that it was essential to seize upon Som- 
bref on the one side, and the central point of Quatre- 
Bras on the other. (A village that took its name from 
the intersection of two roads, forming four branches, 
leading to Namur, Charleroi, Brussels and Nivelles.) 
Because, once master of these two points, he was in po- 
sition to act at will on either of the opposing armies, and 
prevent their junction. Consequently, Napoleon gave 
Grouchy a verbal order, to push as far as Sombref 
that very evening, if possible : Marshal Ney, who had 
just arrived by post from Paris, was ordered to assume 
command of the left wing, composed of Reille's and 
Erlon's corps, to take at once the Brussels road, in the 
direction of Quatre-Bras, and push forward advanced 
guards on the three branches that parted from that 
point, to gather every information.* 

Having learned at that moment, that Grouchy's* 
cavalry had been arrested near Gilly by a portion of 
Ziethen's corps, Napoleon hastened there to order an at- 

* This fact, asserted in Gourgaud's account, is contested by Ney's defen- 
ders. It is certain that in the orders written by Soult, no trace of tin's 
movement is found till the morning of the 16th ; but it is also certain that 
Napoleon gave Ney, on the night of the 15th, all the instructions verbalhj, 
as well as to Grouchy, whom he ordered to push on as far as Sombref if 
possible. It is then more than probable that he gave Ney, by word of 
mouth, the order cited by Gourgaud with circumstances that do not per- 
mit a doubt. How, in fact, would he have pushed his right as far as Som- 
bref, leaving his left in rear at Gosselies, when this wing had less distance 
to traverse, even if it had advanced as far as Quatre-Bras? Besides, if 
the execution of the movement seemed difficult on the night of the loth, 
it is evident that it was indispensable to march on this important point at 
6 the next morning. 



124 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

tack ; the enemy observing the arrival of Vandamme's 
infantry, retired, fighting, and after quite a brisk can- 
nonade, Excelmans and Yandamme dislodged him from 
the woods of Soleilmont and Lambusart, where Zie- 
then's third division had collected. 

While this was taking place, Marshal Ney arrived 
between Gosselies and Frasne, and hearing the boom- 
ing of cannon in the direction of Gilly during the at- 
tack of Ziethen's second division by Vandamme and 
Grouchy, believed that this engagement niight modify 
the emperor's designs, and therefore, instead of briskly 
pushing forward as far as Quatre-Bras, he established 
himself in front of Gosselies. This contre-temps was 
the more grievous, as in admitting that Ney had not 
received a formal order, he should have felt the impor- 
tance of this occupation. It has been said in his jus- 
tification, that his troops, especially those of d'Erlon's 
corps that had advanced from Solre over frightful 
roads, were still scattered between Gosselies and Mar- 
chiennes ; it has been added that the roar of artillery 
in rear of his right flank, induced the belief that his 
recall might become necessary, and that his march 
should not be continued for fear of having too much 
road to travel in retracing his steps'* : Bachelu's divi- 

*We should observe, once for all, that without wishing to prejudice in 
the slightest degree, the faults imputed to his lieutenants, by Napoleon, we 
should recall his exact words used at the very moment of the catastrophe. 
Ney was less active and less impetuous during the loth and 16th June than 
he had been at Elchingen, Jena and Friedland ; but we must take into 
consideration the circumstances of the case. He arrived at Charleroi by 
post from Paris, without equipage and even without horses, when he was 
immediately ordered to take command of eight divisions of infantry he 
had never seen, of which he scarcely knew any of the chiefs, and the po- 
sitions of which were a mystery to him. Had Ney's wing have been un- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 125 

Bion, that had been thrown forward as far as Frasne, 
was even ordered to fall back. 

Be this as it may, night having set 'in before the 
right could reach Sombref, as he had desired, Napo- 
leon probably attached less importance to the delays 
experienced by his left, and returned to Charleroi 
about 10 o'clock that night, where Ney repaired at a 
later hour, undoubtedly by invitation, to determine on 
the operations for the morrow. The troops of the 
main body and the cavalry, bivouacked between the 
woods of Lambusart and the village of Heppignies, 
now held by Girard's division of Eeille's corps : the 
guard and Lobau's corps, in reserve, about Charleroi, 
where were fixed the imperial quarters. The corps 
of Count Gerard remained in the vicinity of Catelet : 
that of d'Erlon did not go beyond Jumet. 

From all that has been stated, we see that Napoleon 
had to renounce the idea of pushing, on the 15th, as 
far as Sombref and Quatre-Bras, which were to be the 
pivots of all his after movements. But to secure the 
success of his wisely combined plan, it behooved him 
to repair with activity and promptness, at day-break 
on the 16th, what had been left incomplete the night 
previous ; unfortunately for him, this was not execu- 
ted with that uncommon activity that ordinarily dis- 
tinguished him. We are forced to avow that the man- 
ner in which he employed this morning of the 16th. 
will ever remain a problem for those who best under- , 
stand it : did he calculate that Ney and Grouchy 

der his orders a few days, and had their anterior movements been directed 
by him, it is probable that he would have reached Quatre-Bras on the 
night of the 15th. 



126 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

would themselves execute at sunrise, the verbal orders 
received, to advance upon Sombref and Quatre-Bras, 
and did he believe in his power of employing this 
time, in arranging the numberless affairs that besieged 
him at his head-quarters ? We can suppose so, as the 
emperor that morning resolved on the definite organi- 
zation of his army into two principal masses and a 
reserve : Grouchy had the command of the right wing, 
composed of Vanda-mme's and Gerard's corps, with 
Pajol's, Excelmans 5 and Milhaud's corps of cavalry. 
Ney commanded the left wing, composed of Reille's 
and d'Erlon's corps, with the cavalry of Count de Yalmy 
and Lefebre Desnouettes. Lobau's corps and the guards 
formed a reserve of nearly 28,000 men.* 

We can also suppose, that on hearing of Blucher's 
presence at ISTamur, where he had spent the 15th, the 
emperor concluded that he would concentrate his dif- 
ferent corps about that city, as it was the central point 
of their cantonments. He could then naturally infer, 
that but a portion of this army would oppose him on 
the 16th, and that it would suffice to take an earnest 
step after mid-day : all the measures prescribed evi- 
dently prove it ; for he informed Ney in the morning 

*This organization has had its critics, because, in truth, the army had no 
centre ; they have thought that it had been preferable to draw the fourth 
division of the two corps of Reille and d'Erlon, and join them to Lobau's 
corps, thus forming a centre and two wings independently of the reserves ; 
this would have facilitated the movements, and perhaps avoided the false 
employment of too great detachments during the 16th and 18th June. 
Napoleon was undoubtedly determined by the reason, that having to en- 
counter two armies quite distinct, it behooved him to have a certain mass 
ready to oppose to each of *them, besides the reserve to reinforce the point 
where he would desire to strike a blow ; a result he would have attained 
better, by having had three masses beside the reserve. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 127 

that he would not resolve on a definite course till three 
o'clock that afternoon.* 

Nevertheless, Napoleon resolved about 8 A. M., on 
sending his aid-de-camp, Flahaut, to Marshal Ney, to 
reiterate the formal order for him to march hastily on 
Quatre-Bras, to take up a strong position there, to re- 
connoitre the three roads, and to detach from thence 
a strong infantry division with the light cavalry of 
the guard, on Marbais ; lastly, to form a connection 
with Grouchy, who, with the right wing, was advanc- 
ing to take possession of Sombref. This dispatch, 
written by Flahaut himself under Napoleon's dictation, 
left by 9 o'clock, and should have been preceded by 
a like order given by the Major General : these orders 
reached Gosselies only towards 11 o'clock, and as the 
Marshal had already left to join the advance guard of 
Reille's corps, near Frasne, he did not immediately 
receive them. 

While these things were happening at the imperial 
quarters, Grouchy's troops advanced to drive Ziethen's 
rear-guard from Fleurus. The latter made no opposi- 
tion, but assembled on the main body, formed on the 
heights between Ligny and Saint Amand, in presence 
of which the French found themselves about eleven 
o'clock. 

*This circumstance is so much the more surprising, as Grouchy had 
transmitted a report, at 6 A. M., announcing that the Prussians were de- 
bouching from Sombref on St. Amand in considerable forces. As this did 
not at all accord with the information received of Blucher's presence at 
Namur, Napoleon seems not to have credited it; besides, he was pained 
and much disturbed at the turn taken at Paris by the Chambers and Jaco- 
bins. It was not till three o'clock that he determined on a course then 
inexecutable. 



128 POLITICAL AJSTD MILITARY HISTORY OF 

A few moments afterwards Napoleon arrived on the 
spot, proceeded to reconnoitre the position,when he was 
informed that Ney still thought it his duty to slacken 
his march on Quatre-Bras, for many reasons : first, 
d'Erlon's corps was still very far to the rear ; second, 
false reports that the junction of the enemy's armies 
had already taken place, and that therefore, the move- 
ment prescribed, far from being useful, would only 
prove adventurous : the marshal, therefore, awaited 
the emperor's decision after the receipt of this infor- 
mation, before seriously engaging."^ 

While this remissness threatened the success of this 
beautiful plan of Napoleon, the allies displayed an 
uncommon activity, and the Prussians especially, re- 
assembled with rare celerity. Being informed at Na- 
mur, at 10 A. M. of the 15th, of the passage of the 
Sambre and the danger that menaced Ziethen, Blucher 
had ordered Thielmann and Bulow to march immedi- 
ately on Sombref. Pirch's corps had left Namur on 
the 15th for this destination, and marched part of the 
night ; Thielmann's, on their way from Dinant, had 
made but one halt of three hours, at jSTamur, to rest 
the troops, and had filed off the entire night towards 
Sombref, where the rear battalions arrived between 
nine and ten in the morning. Bulow, coming from 
Liege, could not reach Gembloux before the night of 

*These delays are contested by Ney's vindicators, who wish to prove 
that the order borne by Flahaut, not reaching Gosselies before 11 o'clock 
and Frasne towards noon, could not be executed before two, and that much 
he did. But the orders given verbally on the 15th and 16th at 1 A. M., 
cannot be doubted, without accusing Napoleon of incapacity. Besides, 
how could Ney excuse himself at nine in the morning for not having yet 
advanced on Quatre-Bras, if he had not previously received verbal orders. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 129 

the 16th and 17th. The main body of the Prussian 

army (three corps, together 90,000 men) thus found 
itself in position between Bry and Tongrines, at ten 
o'clock on the morning of the 16th. 

Wellington, who believed Napoleon still at Paris, 
was not aware of his army's approach, until the news 
of the passage of the Sambre received at 5 P. M., on 
the 15th at Brussels, while at a dinner; but the duke 
had forewarned his troops to hold themselves in readi- 
ness for the first signal, and he sent officers in all 
directions to put them in motion. His left under the 
Prince of Orange, w r as in cantonments between Mons 
and JSfivelles, and with its head-quarters at Braine le 
Comte ; his right under General Hill, extended to- 
wards Ath. It was then only by a prodigy of activity 
that this extended line could be concentrated on his 
left by the evening of the 16th or the morning of the 
17th, and it was evident that a connection with the 
Prussians could be effected by the road from Nivelles 
to Quatre-Bras. After having dispatched these orders, 
Wellington repaired to Quatre-Bras, where on the 
morning of the 16th he found a portion of Per- 
poucher's Belgian division just from JNTivelles, and the 
brigade of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar. While await- 
ing the columns from Brussels and Braine, the duke 
galloped over to Bry, wmere, about noon, he held an 
interview with Blucher; finding the Prussian army 
disposed to give battle, he promised to collect thirty 
or thirty-five thousand men during the night, to sup- 
port his right, and with this object returned to Quatre- 
Bras, where he arrived after two o'clock. 

To conquer an enemy that made such wise disposi- 

6* 



130 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

tions, it would have required the ancient impetuosity 
of the conqueror of Italy, Ulm, Jena, and Ratisbonne ; 
but his warmest admirers would not recognize it here. 
As we have already observed, he undoubtedly trusted 
to the alacrity of his lieutenants themselves, to recover 
the time lost, and to execute in the morning the verbal 
orders he had given them the previous evening, for 
the occupation of two points, without which he could 
not reckon on the success of his project. Neverthe- 
less this hope did not suffice, and the emperor of 1809 
would not have failed being in person at Fleurus by 
8 o'clock in the morning, to judge of the state of 
things, and to verify the report Grouchy had sent him 
at 6 o'clock, announcing the presence of strong 
Prussian columns that were debouching from Sombref 
on St. Amand. 

Be that as it may, as we have seen above, Napoleon 
arrived near Fleurus at 11 o'clock, and there received 
information of the new delay caused in the movement 
on Quatre-Bras. To counteract this deplorable inci- 
dent, the emperor reiterated the order to Ney, to push 
vigorously on Quatre-Bras, with the understanding 
that 8,000 men should be detached on Marbais, as 
soon as he received the command through General 
Flahaut. This new order at the same time informed 
him that as Grouchy was to occupy Sombref, he 
w T ould certainly have to oppose but the troops hasten- 
ing from Brussels. Waleski, a polish officer, was the 
bearer of this letter. 

While the latter proceeded at a gallop on the 
Gosselies road, Napoleon about noon ascended the 
mills at Fleurus, to reconnoitre the Prussian corps 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 131 

whose presence had been signaled. On his front, the 
position was covered with difficulties that bordered 
the rivulet of Ligny ; the left extended to the environs 
of Sombref and Tongrines, the centre about Ligny ; 
the right in rear of St. Amand. This large borough, 
formed of three distinct villages (that bear the names 
of St. Amand le Chateau, St. Amand la Haie, and 
St. Amand le Hameau,) protected the right wing 
whose flank rested on Wagn&le. The second line and 
the reserves were between Sombref and Bry. Thus 
six large villages, four of which were difficult of 
access on account of the rivulet, covered the line of 
the enemy, like so many bastions ; his reserves and 
his second line posted in columns of attack by bat- 
talions between Sombref and Bry, could support all 
points of it.* 

After this reconnoissance, it became still more 
manifest that Napoleon's heaviest blow should be 
struck at Blucher's right ; because this wing was 
already turned by Ney's march, and it was the only 
point of junction with Wellington. It is said that the 
emperor felt some surprise in seeing this position ; all 
reports agreed in stating that Blucher had passed the 
15th at Namur, where his army was not as yet con- 
centrated. Though Napoleon was aware of all the 
interest the allies had in effecting a junction, he did 
not think that Blucher would thus abandon his com- 

* The four divisions of Ziethen's corps formed in the front line defended 
Ligny and St. Amand ; those of Pirch's corps forming the second line, 
came into line successively. The left under Thielmann, only arrived at 9 
A.M., were towards Tongrines. Gourgaud's narrative states that Napo- 
leon made this reconnoissance at 10 o'clock, while Soult, no earlier than 2 
P.M., informs Ney that a Prussian corps has just been discovered. 



132 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

munications with Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle, as lie 
believed his army to be less numerous, and would 
have moreover expected to find it in the beautiful 
defensive position between Sombref and Tongrines, at 
the fork on the causeway from Namur. The line he 
had selected suited the French perfectly, but it was 
necessary to profit by it without delay, and too much 
time had already been lost. 

Although this procrastination in the design on 
Quatre-Bras appeared vexatious, since the occupation 
of this point in the morning had been an important 
matter, we must acknowledge that after the reconnois- 
sance just made, the emperor had cause for gratula- 
tion, as it resulted that Ney would be yet disposable 
in seconding his attack of the Prussians. 

This reconnoissance having been completed in an 
hour, Napoleon had actually one of three courses to 
pursue : 

1st. To arrest the march of Ney's column at once ; 
order Kellermann's cavalry to take up position at 
Frasne, to cover the route from Charleroi, this being 
the line of retreat ; then to throw the seven divisions of 
Reille's and d'Erlon's corps on Mablais, by the Roman 
causeway, in order to turn Blucher's right and fall 
upon his rear, while Napoleon attacked him in front. 

2d. To prescribe this movement for d'Erlon's corps 
alone, leaving Reille's corps with Kellermann's cavalry 
on the defensive, towards Frasne and Quatre-Bras, to 
watch the enemy and cover the road to Charleroi. 

3d. To direct Ney, on the contrary, to fall impetu- 
ously on all forces at Quatre-Bras, force them on 
Genape, in the direction of Brussels, then immediately 



THE CVMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 133 

to turn towards Bry, in the direction of Namur, and 
co-operate in the attack on Blucher. 

In a tactical point of view, the rirst of these, incon- 
testable offered the greatest results ; but Napoleon had 
actually pushed Ney on Quatre-Bras, as much to 
prevent the Anglo-Belgian troops from taking the 
Namur road to support the Prussian army, as to 
cover his natural line of retreat by the road to 
Charleroi, and by leaving it to the protection of the 
cavalry alone, he relinquished this double advantage, 
by delivering this important route to the mercy of the 
enemy. Under this supposition he might have adopted 
the second, which had the advantage of sufficiently 
covering the retreat, while allowing forces sufficient 
to outflank Blucher's right. Napoleon preferred the 
third, undoubtedly with the hope that the order sent 
by Flahaut before 9 o'clock, would be executed at 
the moment this reconnoissance had been completed, 
and that Ney, once master of Quatre-Bras, could with 
so much greater security, assist in the defeat of 
Blucher, after having beaten the Anglo-Belgians that 
opposed him. However, it is probable there was 
some uncertainty in the emperor's resolutions, as it 
was not until two o'clock that the following order was 
sent to Ney : — 

" In bivouac in front of Fleurus, 2 P. M. 
" Marshal : — The emperor instructs me to inform 
you, that the enemy has concentrated a corps of troops 
between Sombref and Bry, and that at half past two, 
Marshal Grouchy with the third and fourth corps will 
attack it. His majesty's intention is, that you also 



134 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

attack those in your front ; that after having pressed 
them vigorously, yon turn in this direction, and aid in 
enveloping the corps of which I. have just spoken. 
If this corps is first routed, his majesty will then 
manoeuvre in your direction, to facilitate in a like 
manner your operations. You will immediately inform 
the emperor of your dispositions, and of what is 
happening in your front." 

All the expressions of this dispatch seem to attest, 
that Napoleon was but imperfectly aware of the 
Prussian force, as he speaks but of one corps, and 
supposes he might be overthrown without the aid of 
the left wing: this last circumstance naturally ex- 
plains the double interest, the French general had 
attached to the previous occupation of Quatre-Bras, 
so that Ney should not be withdrawn until free from 
all anxiety on that point. 

While these resolutions, rather tardy and based on 
incomplete information, were borne to the left wing, 
Napoleon was making his preparations for attacking 
the Prussians. The corps of Count Lobau, left at first, 
at too great a distance towards Charleroi, was ordered 
to hasten to Fleurus. The left of the corps de hataille 
under Yandamme, was drawn up fronting the village 
of St. Amand ; the centre under Count Gerard, took 
up its ground facing Ligny ; the guard was posted in 
rear of these. two attacking portions ; Grouchy 's cavalry 
was deployed on the right, to keep in check the 
Prussian left, that had just been reinforced by the 
arrival of Thielmann's entire corps. 

The attack commenced between two and three 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 135 

o'clock at St. Amand, which was at first seized by Yan- 
damme, notwithstanding a vigorous resistance ; but the 
Prussians, favored by the village of La Haie, and by the 
heights that command it, having advancd their second 
line, soon retook it. Count Gerard met with similar op- 
position at Ligny,only a portion of which he was able 
to hold. 

This resistance proving that the enemy mustered 
stronger than was supposed, Napoleon, at a quarter 
past three, unfortunately rather late, caused a formal 
order to be dispatched to Marshal Ney, ordering him 
to manoeuvre with his forces on Bry and St. Amand ;* 
fearing that even this order might suffer some hin- 
drance, and knowing that d'Erlon's corps had not 
reached beyond Frasne, General Labedoyere was sent 
to communicate to this general the order given to 
Marshal Ney, with instructions at once to commence 
its execution. 

While this was taking place, the engagement along 
the whole line continued raging. A second attack by 

* The following are the very words of this last order, which had been 
decisive atone o'clock, but which, it will be seen, was productive of more 
harm than good : 

" In bivouac at Fleurus, 

between 3i and 31 o'clock. 
To Marshal Net. 

I wrote you an hour ago, that the emperor would attack 
the enemy in the position he has taken up, between the villages of St. 
Amand and Bry ; at this moment the engagement is most decisive. His 
majesty instructs me to say, that you should at once manoeuvre in such a 
manner as to envelope the enemy's right, and fall with might and main on 
his rear ; if you act with vigor this army is lost. The fate of France is 
in your hands ; so do not hesitate in executing the movement ordered by 
the emperor, and move forward upon the heights of Bry and St. Amand, 
to concur in perhaps a decisive victory : the enemy is taken en flagrant 
delit, at the moment he seeks to join the English. 

The Duke of Dalmatia." 



136 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

Vandamme on St. Amand, favored by Girard's divi- 
sion, that had crossed the ravine and out-flanked the 
enemy, placed the French in possession of that village ; 
"but the brave Girard paid with his life, for a success 
of short duration ; because Blucher, having thrown 
forward a portion of his reserves, the village of St. 
Amand was retaken and disputed with desperation. 

The battle raged more furiously still at Ligny, which 
Gerard had frequently seized, without the power of 
preserving : forced to leave Hulot's division in obser- 
vation on his right, and thus reduced to 10,000 com- 
batants, he maintained his position with the most bril- 
liant valor against more than 25,000 Prussians, in the 
lower portion of the village, even up to the rivulet 
that cuts it in two. 

The guard, posted in the centre, in rear of these 
two attacking portions, was prepared to sustain either. 
On the extreme right, Excelmans manoeuvered skill- 
fully to prevent the left of the Prussians from debouch- 
ing from Tongrenelle, while Pajol watched Boignee, 
and Milhaud's cuirassiers supported Gerard's right. 

Things were in this state about half past five, and 
Napoleon awaited with a just impatience, to learn 
what was to be hoped from the movement prescribed 
for Ney, as the wind and the roar of a violent cannon- 
ade prevented his hearing the attack at Quatre 
Bras. The emperor was preparing to bring forward 
his guard, when a report from General Yandamme 
xnformed him, it is said, that a strong column was 
visible in the direction of Wagnele, and that Girard's 
division, deprived of its general and attacked at the 
same time by superior forces, had been forced to retire 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 137 

towards St. Amand-le-Hameau. General Yandamme 
announced, that he had at first taken this column for 
the detachment that Ney was to send on Marbaix ; 
but as it was much too considerable, and as the scouts 
had recognized it as of the enemy, it threatened to 
drive him back if not promptly supported. 

Though difficult to comprehend how a column could 
glide between ISTey and Napoleon, this might, how- 
ever, be a reinforcement sent to Blucher from Quatre- 
Bras, or probably, a corps of his own army that, hav- 
ing executed a movement by the ancient Roman 
causeway beyond Wagnele, was in the act of turning 
Yandamme's left.* Prior to any farther action, Na- 
poleon thought it his duty to be sure of it. The nar- 
rative from St. Helena, in exposing these facts, affirms 
that the emperor suspended his grand attack on this 
account, and sent his aid-decamp, Dejean, to recon- 
noitre and discover who they were.f We are assured 
that this officer, at the expiration of only one hour, re- 
ported that this was Count Erlon's corps, who, instead 
of marching in a northerly direction towards Bry or 
Marbaix, had turned too much to the south, towards 
Yillers-Peruin, attracted, undoubtedly, by the roar of 
two or three hundred pieces of ordnance, that thun- 
dered in the direction of St. Amand. These assertions 
have been somewhat contested, and as an impartial 
historian, I must avow, that respecting this matter, 

* This Roman causeway, that intersects the two from Brussels and Na- 
mur, leaves the latter between Bry and Marbaix, passes half a league to the 
north of Wagnele, and attains the former between Frasne and Gosselies. 

t In a letter addressed to Marshal Ney's family, General Dejean denies 
having had such a mission ; perhaps it was confided to some other aid-de- 
camp, though this it is impossible to confirm. 



138 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

there is nothing but doubt and confusion. As Napo- 
leon had ordered a movement turning his left wing 
from the Brussels road into the direction of Bry, it 
was evident that this column should have been the 
one expected : the surprise manifested on this subject 
should then appear rather extraordinary. However, 
if it be true that Yandamme actually took this column 
for the enemy's, it was at least prudent to be made 
certain of it, and therefore the contested mission of 
General Dejean would have been the most natural 
one ; but it is necessary at least to add, that no posi- 
tive order directing these troops on Bry had been 
given. This forgetfulness, though it might be alleged, 
was a manifest fault. It will be said, that Napoleon 
might have seen in the presence of Erlon's corps, a 
sufficient indication of the near arrival of Marshal 
Ney, to whom he undoubtedly desired to leave the 
task of directing his own columns : this, if admitted, 
does not entirely justify him ; because the false direc- 
tion just taken by these forces, demanded of the em- 
peror, in every case, to state precisely what should be 
done to accomplish his views. We will see farther 
on, the sad part played by these four fine divisions. 
However, about half-past six, Napoleon advanced 
upon Ligny with his guard, to strike the Prussians a 
vigorous blow, which, three hours previously, would 
have had more chances of success. The great confi- 
dence with which he made this splendid attack, au- 
thorizes us, moreover, in believing, that in ordering 
it, he firmly expected that a concurrence of a large 
portion of Ney's troops would not fail him, and that 



THE CAMPAIGN OP WATERLOO. 139 

the column that had given Yandamme so much uneasi 
ness was soon to cause Blucher greater anxiety. 

After seven o'clock in the evening, Napoleon de- 
bouched with impetuosity through the village of Lig- 
ny with a division of the guard, seconded by Gerard's 
infantry, the mounted guard and Milhaud's cuirassiers : 
the enemy's centre was broken and thrown partly on 
Sombref, and partly on Bry. 

The Prussians fought excellently well during the 
whole day ; but Blucher, deprived of a general re- 
serve of cavalry, had but his infantry with which to 
oppose this torrent : because, seeing the guard leave 
the environs of St. Amand, and taking this movement 
as the commencement of the retreat, he had advanced 
with the few that yet remained on St. Amand, with 
the hope of pursuing the French. Very soon unde- 
ceived, he hurried back with the few cavalry he could 
hastily collect. But of what service is courage to a 
general-in-chief, in such a mel£e ? His horse, killed 
by a shot, fell upon him at the instant of the disorder ; 
the marshal remained ten minutes in the power of 
the French cuirassiers without their suspecting it, and 
succeeded, through the presence of mind of JSTostitz, 
his aid-de-camp, in regaining Bry on a lancer's horse. 
It was unfortunate for some, and fortunate for others, 
that he was not recognized ; his capture might, per- 
haps, have influenced the battles that followed. 

Besides, this brilliant blow, struck, unfortunately, 
rather late, was partially arrested by the approaching 
night, partially by the movement which Blucher's 
entire left executed about Sombref, and lastly by the 



140 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

excellent stand made by the remains of Ziethen's and 
Pirch's forces between Sombref and Bry. 

While the imperial troops issued so gloriously from 
a difficult and perilous attack, Ney proved less fortu- 
nate at Quatre-Bras. Arriving in front of this posi- 
tion, at two o'clock, with the three feeble divisions of 
Reille's corps, Pire's light cavalry division and a bri- 
gade of cuirassiers led by Kellermann, the marshal 
skirmished with the enemy until three o'clock, when 
the sound of the cannonade at St. Amand resolved 
him, boldly to attack the allies. But the state of 
things had greatly changed since the morning. Gen- 
eral Perponcher, perceiving the great importance of 
Quartre-Bras, in securing the concentration of the 
different corps of the Anglo-Netherlanders, and after- 
wards in facilitating their junction w T ith the Prussians, 
had taken up a position there with his own division 
and the brigade of the Prince of Weimar — in all, 
9,000 men. These forces, the command of which 
was assumed by the Prince of Orange, might have 
been very easily overthrown, if attacked in the morn- 
ing, by two corps d'armee. Wellington, on reaching 
this spot at eleven o'clock, had ordered that the ad- 
vanced posts engaged with those of Ney towards 
Frasne, should be recalled, so as not to be drawn into 
an unequal combat, previous to the arrival of rein- 
forcements that were hurrying in from every quarter. 
The duke then repaired to Bry, to have an interview 
with Blucher, and returned between two and three 
o'clock. At the moment that Ney launched Reille's 
divisions on the enemy, Picton's English division ar- 
rived on the field of battle, and was soon followed by 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 141 

that under the Duke of Brunswick. Nevertheless, 
Ney fell upon the allies with his accustomed vigor. 
Foy's division, on the left, advanced on Quatre-Bras 
and Germioncourt, while Bachelu's attacked the vil- 
lage of Piermont. Prince Jerome's entered later into 
action, by attacking the woods of Bossut on the ex- 
treme left. The French troops vigorously pressed the 
enemy at all points. 

Certain of the near arrival of his reinforcements, 
Wellington received these attacks with his usual sang- 
froid, which did not prevent the troops of the Prince 
of Orange and of Picton, from yielding their posi- 
tions after considerable loss. The arrival of Bruns- 
wick's corps soon restored the balance ; the battle- 
field was disputed with fury, and the Duke of Bruns- 
wick himself fell, pierced with balls, in the midst of 
his efforts to preserve it. 

Things were in this condition, when Ney received 
the major-general's order, and the intelligence, that 
d'Erlon's corps was advancing directly on Bry. The 
marshal had not a single infantry soldier in reserve ; 
he saw the masses of the enemy incessantly augment- 
ing ; nothing was left him but to charge with his 
cuirassiers, and the greater portion of them had been 
left with d'Erlon's, near Frasne. The marshal hastening 
however to the Duke de Valmy, exclaimed : " My 
dear general, the safety of France is in danger ; an 
extraordinary effort must be made ; break into the 
English army with your cavalry ; I will order Pirc to 
support you." Without hesitation, Kellermann at 
once charged at the head of this brigade of brave 
men, overthrew the 69th regiment, captured the bat- 



142 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOKY OF 

teries, and pierced through two lines up to the farm 
of Quatre-Bras, where the reserve of English, Hano- 
verian and Belgian infantry welcomed him with such 
a murderous fire, that his men were forced to make a 
large circuit in seeking to withdraw from this danger- 
ous place. Kellermann, having had his horse killed 
under him, remained dismounted in the midst of the 
English, and with great difficulty regained his com- 
mand. 

Excited by this splendid charge, the French infantry 
renewed its efforts on Quatre-Bras and the woods of 
Bossut, the greater portion of which last had been 
occupied by Prince Jerome's division. But at this 
critical moment, the division of English guards and 
that of General Alten, coming into action after a 
forced march, gave Wellington such superiority, 
that he had nothing more to hope for. Ney had 
in fact sent d'Erlon imperative orders, to hasten to 
his succor instead of bearing on Bry : but this corps 
that had well nigh reached St. Amand, was too far 
off to arrive in time, so that the marshal was obliged 
to fall back on Frasne to meet him, after having 
lost 4,000 men hors de combat: the allies having 
entered the action successively, had lost 5,000. Wel- 
lington at first ordered a vigorous pursuit, but the 
retreat was protected by Eoussel's division of cui- 
rassiers. 

In following attentively the successive train of 
movements that I have just pointed out, the reader 
will judge with what fatality d'Erlon's corps paraded 
uselessly along the whole line, neither reaching Bry, 
where it would have rendered the victory complete, 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 143 

nor Quatre-Bras, where it would have prevented 
Ney's defeat. 

It will also be noticed, what strange destiny pre- 
sided over all the operations of this left wing, whose 
inarch was by turns too slow or too hasty. If it 
had advanced on Quatre-Bras, on the evening of the 
15th, or at least at dawn of the 16th, it would 
have arrived in time to crush Perponcher's division, 
then isolated, and to detach two divisions on Mar- 
baix and Bry, in order to accomplish Blucher's de- 
feat. But when, three hours later, Marshal Ney 
was instructed to march towards Bry himself, in 
order to envelop the Prussians, the thing was im- 
possible, as he was an hour afterwards engaged 
at Quatre-Bras: so that it had been preferable for 
these two corps to have remained at Frasne, in- 
stead of pushing on so far. Much fatality and 
loss of time was occasioned by the faults of every 
one.* 

Before passing to the events that followed, I 
should here observe that though Erlon had already 
reached beyond Yillers-Peruin, yet at the earnest re- 
call of Ney, he marched to join him with three di- 
visions and the light cavalry of the guard, leaving 
Durutte's division between Villers-Peruin and St. 

* Napoleon could have pushed as far as Fleurus on the 15th, or have 
taken possession of it at 6 A.M., on the 16th; he would have thus dis- 
covered Blucher's position before sending Flahaut to Marshal Ney. To 
obtain a complete victory on the 16th, it would have been necessary to 
have had the concurrence of Lobau and d'Erlon's corps, and to have led 
but one corps of infantry and ono of cavalry on Quatre-Bras. To accom- 
plish this, the recooiioissanoe made by the emperor at mid-day, should 
have been made at 8 o'clock. 



144 POLITICAL AKD MILITARY HISTORY OF 

Amand, in case Napoleon required anew a co-opera- 
tion on Bry. This division remained there all night 
perfectly inactive, on the flank of the rear-guard 
left by Blucher in this village, which it occupied 
until one o'clock in the morning, while Ziethen's 
corps retired under cover of the night on Gilly, 
Pirch's on Gentinne, and the left under Thielmann's 
orders took the direction of Gembloux. 

At day-break, Blucher's rear-guard had disappeared 
from Bry ; Thielmann's was seen by the scouts, on 
the road from Sombref to Corroy le Chateau, towards 
Gembloux, intermediate between the road from Na- 
mur and that from Brussels by Wavre. Blucher, who 
had perhaps been wrong in accepting battle when 
isolated, after three o'clock, instead of then retiring 
beyond the Dyle by Bousseval and Cour-St.-Guibert, 
in order to place himself in a line with the English 
forces that were concentrating at Genape, felt that it 
was necessary promptly to repair the misfortune in 
the partial defeat of his army, and no longer hoping 
to gain Bousseval direct, resolved to rally his forces 
on Bulow's entire corps, which must have arrived at 
Gembloux during the night, and proceed by Wavre 
to join the English. Consequently, Thielmann was 
ordered to proceed to Gembloux and assemble on 
Bulow ; the corps of Ziethen and Pirch fell back by 
Mont-St.-Guibert on Bierge and Aisemont. 

On the 17th, the Prussian Marshal dispatched the 
chief of his staff to the Duke of Wellington, to con- 
cert measures for securing the junction so much de- 
sired, either in front or in rear of the forest of Soignes. 

The victory just gained by the French at Ligny 



TIIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 1^5 

was a glorious one, as they had fought 60,000 men 
against 90,000. This success was, however, due in 
part to two incidents, of which the emperor was not 
aware : the first was, that the presence of Grouchy's 
cavalry on his right towards Boignee, had paralyzed 
Thielmann's 25,000 men posted near Tongrines and 
Mont-Potriaux, who were no doubt fearful of his 
seizing the road to Namur, thus cutting off Bulow's 
corps from the army, and this from its natural line of 
operations. The second incident was, as I have al- 
ready stated, the movement of the guard, executed 
from St. Ainand towards Ligny, at the moment when 
Blucher had nearly forty battalions engaged at St. 
Amand, causing this general to suppose that Napo- 
leon, disheartened at not being able to force any 
point of his position, had commenced to beat a, re- 
treat. With this idea, the Prussian marshal resolved 
to advance in person, with what remained of his re- 
serves, in order to penetrate between St. Amand and 
"Wagn&le, at the very instant when the imperial vor 
serves were hurled on Ligny ; so that his centre was 
found stripped of all support, at the moment the 
storm burst upon him. A chasse croise was the re- 
sult, bearing the main portion of the Prussian forces 
on St. Amand, at the decisive moment when the em- 
peror launched his own upon Ligny, and which 
Becured him the victory. 

The French army had just obtained an advantage 
which, under any other circumstances, would have 
proved a signal one ; the enemy had had, in the two 
battles, from eighteen to twenty thousand men killed, 
wounded and made prisoners ; had lost forty pieces 



146 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

of cannon ; and notwithstanding the check at Quatre- 
Bras, the army, full of enthusiasm and confidence, 
would have rushed on to new victories. They should 
have profited by this success, and actively pursued 
the enemy. Napoleon had been ignorant of Durutte's 
passing the night on the flank of their line of retreat, 
and that his advance posts might have heard, very 
distinctly, the uproar which such an unforeseen retreat 
occasioned, by the march of an immense materiel and 
the confusion of the columns ; otherwise it is pre- 
sumable that he would have taken measures for press- 
ing them closer. Yet, if the darkness contributed in 
arresting the pursuit that very night, it ought to have 
contributed also in augmenting the disorder in the 
retreat of the enemy's right wing, and had they acted 
on this occasion as the Prussians did two days after- 
wards at Waterloo, we rest assured that the trophies 
would have been greater, and that the blunders com- 
mitted on the two following days would have been 
avoided.* Napoleon had, during his career, given 
them many lessons ; but they, in their turn, taught 
him, that a night pursuit, notwithstanding its incon- 
veniences, might have great advantages. 

Ou the morning of the 17th, Napoleon awaited with 
equal anxiety, the detailed reports of what Ney had 
accomplished at Quatre-Bras, and the news from 
Paris, where the hostile disposition of the chambers 
did not cause him less concern, than the revolutionary 

* The Prussian troops that held Bry on their right and Sombref on 
their left were in good order, and sufficient to arrest too bold a pursuit ; 
nevertheless, it would have been wise to have attempted a slight attack at 
nightfall ; no risk could be run. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 147 

ardor of the federated societies. While waiting for 
exact information on what was happening on the 
English side, he ordered Pajol's cavalry to follow the 
Prussians on the Namur causeway, which was their 
natural line of operations, at the same time that Ex- 
celmans made a reconnoissance of the road to Gem- 
bloux. The narrative from St. Helena adds, that 
General Monthion was charged with the pursuit on 
the left, that is, in the direction of Tilly and Mont- 
St.-Guibert. The emperor then turned his attention 
to the administration, reviewed the troops and the 
field of battle, in order to administer to the comfort 
of the multitude of wounded, of both parties, with 
which it was strewed, and who were the more in need, 
as the ambulances had not been able to follow the ar- 
my in its forced marches. 

To those who can recall the astonishing activity 
that presided over the events of Eatisbonne in 1809, 
of Dresden in 1813, and of Champ- Aubert and Mont- 
mirail in 1814, this time lost, will always remain 
inexplicable on the part of Napoleon. After a suc- 
cess, such as he had just achieved, it seems that, at 
six in the morning, he should have placed himself on 
the heels of the Prussians, or, as well, have fallen, 
with all his forces, upon Wellington, whose cavalry 
reserve, artillery and portion of his infantry, had only 
arrived that night, excessively fatigued. The neces- 
sity for not leaving his line of retreat on Charleroi to 
the mercy of the English general, was an imperative 
reason why he should have proceeded against him in 
preference. 

It should not be supposed, that the emperor was 



148 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

entirely unaware of the check experienced by Ney 
at Quatre-Bras ; because if the marshal had not had 
time to make a detailed report of it, he had not surely 
forgotten his duty, so far as to permit him to be igno- 
rant of the fact. This was, moreover, a greater rea- 
son for marching there without delay. However, it 
was well known that Ney could not obtain a great 
success, nor experience a great reverse, on account of 
the dispersed state of the Anglo-Netherland army, 
and of the double movement of d'Erlon's corps. Giving 
"Wellington the morning of the 17th, in which to re- 
cover himself, was then a fault more real, perhaps, 
than allowing that of the 16th to Blucher. We will 
state further on what was the result of it. Undoubt- 
edly the emperor had powerful motives for resigning 
himself to such inactivity; but these motives have 
never reached us. 

Napoleon, having at last received, through his aid- 
de-camp Flahaut, the details of the unfortunate com- 
bat at Quatre-Bras, at the same time that Pajol re- 
ported the capture of some Prussian artillery at Mazy 
on the Namur road, resolved, about eleven o'clock, to 
march against the English with his reserve and Ney's 
command, while Grouchy, with his seven infantry di- 
visions and his two cavalry corps, should vigorously 
pursue the Prussians. This presents one of the most 
serious circumstances of this campaign, and which it 
is my duty to expose, with all the frankness and im- 
partiality professed by a conscientious historian. 

The narrative from St. Helena affirms, that Grouchy, 
in receiving verbally the order to pursue the Prus- 
sians, without losing sight of them, received also that 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 149 

of holding himself constantly between their army and 
the route to Brussels ', which was to be taken by Napo- 
leon — that is to say, in such a manner that the two 
French masses might form between them, two interior 
or central lines, that could assist each other, while 
separating and dividing the two armies of the enemy. 
Marshal Grouchy, in a pamphlet for his own justifica- 
tion, declares, " that nothing of the kind was said to 
him ; that on the contrary, he received, without other 
comment, the order to direct his pursuit on Namur 
and the Meuse : finally, that having indicated the de- 
sire of not withdrawing to such a distance from the 
main body of the army, Napoleon humorously asked 
him, if he pretended to give him a lesson" The mar- 
shal cites General Baudran, as a witness ready to 
attest these facts. 

It would be very difficult to decide between such 
contradictory assertions ; all that I can add is, that 
Major General Soult, writing on the morning of the 
17th to Marshal Ney, informed him that Grouchy 
was to pursue the Prussians on Namur and the Meuse. 
Nevertheless, a little later, General Bertrand sent him 
a positive order to march on Gembloux. Grouchy 
exculpates himself equally, by reproaching the em- 
peror for the long hours employed in reviewing the 
battle-field, and pending which the traces of Blucher's 
army were lost, and subsequently, only partially found. 
He also observes that the emperor, having re- 
served to himself the right of disposing of the 
troops at all points, the marshal was unable, of his 
own accord, to prescribe any disposition for this pur- 



150 POLITICAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

suit, and that lie frequently asked for orders which 
were not given him.* 

After having exposed all the facts alleged on both 
sides, it is my duty to observe, without any pretence 
to judging, that the order mentioned in the narrative 
from St. Helena, was so conformable to the system of 
interior lines, to which Napoleon owed so great a num- 
ber of his victories, that his having really given it 
should not be doubted ; but it must also be admitted, 
that it would have been better, in every possible case, 
to have positively assigned to Grouchy, the direction 
intermediate between Liege and Brussels, as the one 
he desired his right wing to follow. It was evident 
that Blucher had one of three courses to pursue, 
namely : to fall back on Liege, to gain Maastricht, or 
seek to join Wellington and resume the offensive, to 
avenge himself for the affront received at Ligny. The 
last was certainly the most skillful, the most daring, 
and the most conformable to the character of the 
Prussian general ; but in order to execute it, it was 
necessary to renounce, somewhat, his line of retreat 
on the Rhine. Besides this, as Blucher had taken the 
road to Wavre, he could not effect the junction at all, 
but in rear of the forest of Soignes : because, by 
marching in front of it, he would be compelled to 
skirt its whole length, exposing his flank to the French. 
Napoleon must have believed, that the enemy would 

* It seems certain, that the orders given on the morning of the 17th to 
the different corps of cavalry for the pursuit, were addressed by the em- 
peror direct to Pajol, Excelmans and Monthion. This last was adjutant- 
general, and made his reports directly to the emperor; he had reconnoi- 
tred in the direction of Tii'ly and Mont-St.-Guibert. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 151 

not dare undertake so hazardous a movement with 
Grouchy in close pursuit ; he must have supposed, 
then, that if Blucher sought not to gain Maas- 
tricht or Liege, he would march from Wavre on 
Brussels, a movement, that would force Wellington 
also to fall back on this capital or fight alone at 
Waterloo. 

Under all these hypotheses, it was advisable to di- 
rect Grouchy on Mont-St.-Guibert and Moustier, the 
morning of the 17th, because the valley of the Dyle 
being the most favorable line for covering Napoleon's 
right flank, Grouchy could have crossed this river at 
Moustier ; from thence it had been easy to draw him 
on to Waterloo to take part in the battle, or cause 
him to advance on Wavre, flanked towards St. Lam- 
bert, by Excelmans' dragoons and an infantry divi- 
sion. By this means, the emperor would have been 
certain of his power to collect all his right wing 
about him, if Wellington accepted battle on the 18th 
in front of the forest of Soignes, and could have 
counted on the impossibility of the Prussians' co- 
operating. 

Be that as it may, the two fractions of the impe- 
rial army should have moved at the same time, in 
proceeding to their respective destinations. The re- 
serve, led by Napoleon, left however first, to join 
Ney and the left wing at Quatre-Bras, in order to at- 
tack the English if they stood their ground ; his ad- 
vanced guard moved at ten o'clock ; the guard follow- 
ing at eleven. The right wing moved later still; 
Vandamme, who formed the advance, proceeded at 



152 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

first to Point-du-Jour (an inn situated at the fork of 
the roads to Gembloux and Namur) ; Gerard's corps 
did not leave Sombref till after three o'clock. Mar- 
shal Grouchy, having received orders to march on 
Gemblonx, of which we have spoken above, and the 
intelligence that General Excelmans was in pre- 
sence of the Prussians near this city, hastened there 
in person, directing Vandamme and Gdrard on the same 
point. Pajol alone patrolled with his hussars and 
Teste's division, in the direction of Mazy and Tem- 
ploux. We leave them there, in order to follow the 
operations of the imperial army. 

Napoleon, on arriving near Genape, met the Eng- 
lish rear-guard. The weather was frightful, the win- 
dows of heaven seemed to be opened, and yet the 
troops did not the less exhibit an extreme ardor in 
the pursuit of the enemy. The Duke of Wellington 
did not hear, until eight o'clock on the morning of 
the 17th, and that by accident, of Blucher's defeat 
(the officer who was bearer of the news losing his way 
in the dark, had been killed). We can judge what 
would have been his embarrassment, had Napoleon 
marched against him at day-break. The English 
general hastened to place his impedimenta in retreat, 
while his exhausted cavalry took some repose. At 
ten o'clock, his columns were in march on the Brus- 
sels' causeway, protected by all the cavalry concen- 
trated under the orders of Lord TJxbridge, who took 
position at Genape behind the Dyle, to allow the army 
time to gain ground. This general officer displayed, 
on this occasion, the same aplomb of which he had 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 153 

given proof in Spain,* by charging with his English 
guards, those who were rash enough to dare attempt 
the passage of the defile in his presence. The French 
followed him, step by step, as far as Maison du Hoi, 
on the heights of Planchenois, where the army arrived 
at night-fall. 

The enemy manifested his intention to maintain 
the position in front of the forest of Soignes. At 
first, it was thought, that this was but a strong rear- 
guard covering the march of columns through the 
forest ; it was very soon perceived that the entire 
army was present ; but as it was too late in the day 
to commence an action, the different corps bivouacked 
near Planchenois. The rain continued to fall in tor- 
rents till the next morning. 

At three o'clock in the morning, Napoleon went 
the rounds of the posts, and assured himself that the 
army had not stirred ; Wellington had then decided 
on accepting battle ; he was delighted, regarding it 
as a stroke of fortune that the two hostile armies thus 
appeared in the lists, isolated, each in its turn. 

Meanwhile, to profit by this happy chance with 
security, it behooved him to be assured, that no junc- 
tion of the two armies could however take place. To 
this effect, it is affirmed that Napoleon had, about 
dusk, sent a courier to Grouchy with orders to occupy 
the defile of St. Lambert immediately, so that, if he 
took no active part in the fete by falling on the Eng- 

* Lord Uxbridge is the same personage, who rendered himself so illus- 
trious in Spain under the name of Sir Arthur Paget, and who now bears 
the title of Murquis d' Anglesey. He distinguished himself at Benevento, 
and in many other rencontres. 



154: POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

lish left, lie could at least cover the right flank and 
give them some uneasiness. This order, the existence 
of which has been denied, was addressed to Wavre, 
under the conviction that the marshal had reached 
this city during the 17th, having but seven or eight 
leagues to pass over from Sombref.* About mid- 
night, the emperor received this marshal's report, 
stating that he had reached Gembloux at five in the 
afternoon, and would spend the night there, although 
he had travelled but two leagues ; from this it was 
evident that he would not receive the order directed 
to Wavre. If we would credit the same narrative, 
the confirmation w T as forwarded by the Gembloux 
road, hoping that he would receive it in time. 

The rain, bad roads, and forced marches had worn 
out the French army. Napoleon might have found 
it somewhat to his interest, to have given it repose, 
and then to have dislodged Wellington by manceu- 

* Some persons have been astonished at Napoleon's supposition, that 
Grouchy had, on the 17th, already reached Wavre, as they had only sep- 
arated towards mid-day, and two hours were necessary for the troops, 
altogether unprepared, to set out on the march. There is something for 
and against, in these statements ; Napoleon, departing from Ligny, push- 
ed on as far as La Belle Alliance ; now, Grouchy, having but one league 
more to pass over to gain Wavre, could, strictly speaking, very well have 
accomplished it. What should be a matter of astonishment is, that of 
supposing Grouchy at Wavre, if he had at first been directed on Namur, 
as the major-general's correspondence would make us believe ; then af- 
terwards on Gembloux, as General Bertrand's letter proves. Be that as it 
may, the order cited is not found among the records of the staff; and be- 
sides, it did not reach its destination, the officer having fallen at night in 
the midst of the Prussian posts and been killed As to the con- 
firmation of this order, no trace of it has been found, unless the question 
in point be a letter of the major-general, written at 10 A. M., to Gros- 
Caillou, and which Grouchy -eceived at four in the afternoon, in front of 
Wavre. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 155 

vring, but 300,000 of the enemy were on their way 
to invade la Lorraine, and required the chief of state 
with his principal forces on the Moselle ; on the other 
hand, Blucher would soon rally and be re-inforced, 
and thus every thing demanded that he should finish 
with the English as soon as possible. 

The emperor had reconnoitred their position ; they 
occupied, in front of Mont-St.-Jean, a beautiful pla- 
teau, the slope of whose sides was favorable for firing, 
and from which all the movements of the French 
could be discovered. The right extended to the rear 
of Braine la Leud, and a corps of Netherlander of 
15,000 men were besides detached as far as Hall, to 
cover the causeway from Mons to Brussels. The po- 
sition in itself had great defensive advantages, be- 
cause the villages of Braine and de Merbes, the 
chateau of Hougomont, la Haie Sainte, la Haie and 
Frischermont formed so many advanced bastions, that 
prevented any approach to the line ; but it rested 
back against the vast forest of Soignes : now Napo- 
leon thought, that if it be an advantage for a rear- 
guard to be thus posted, considering that the defile 
protects its retreat, it is not so for a large army with 
its immense materiel and its numerous cavalry, having 
as communications but a narrow causeway and two 
cross-roads, encumbered with parks, the wounded, 
etc. etc.* He therefore believed that all the chances 
were in his favor. 

The opportunity of giving battle being acknow- 

* This is one of the gravest questions of the grand tactics of battles. 
General Jomini has discussed it in his last Precis de V Art de la Gverre % 
and inclines to Wellington's opinion in opposition to Napoleon's. 



156 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

ledged, it remained to decide what system would be 
most expedient for attacking the English. To manoeu- 
vre by the left, in order to overthrow their right, was 
a difficult matter, and led to nothing decisive ; this 
was not a good strategic direction, as it would be en- 
tirely removed from the centre of operations, which 
was naturally connected by the right, with Grouchy, 
and with the road to Lorraine : besides this, the ene- 
my's right wing was protected by the farm of Hougo- 
mont, and by the two large boroughs of Braine la 
Leud and Merbe-Braine. 

To attack with the right, in order to crush the Eng- 
lish left, was much more preferable, as this would 
maintain a direct relation, ox an interior line with 
Grouchy, and would prevent the junction of the two 
hostile armies : but to gain, en masse, this extreme 
left, it would be necessary to extend beyond Frischer- 
mont, leaving open the line of retreat, and venturing 
into the obstructed country of St. Lambert, where a 
defeat had been without remedy. 

It remained for Napoleon to take a middle course, 
that of renewing the manoeuvre executed at Wagram 
and Moscowa, (Borodino,) that is, to assail the left at 
the same time that he drove in the centre. It was 
the best plan of battle he could have adopted, and 
with him, it had often proved successful. To force 
the centre only is difficult and dangerous, unless it 
happens to be a weak and unfurnished point, as at 
Austerlitz, Bivoli, and Montenotte ; but we do not 
always find an enemy sufficiently complaisant, as to 
allow us such an advantage, and it would be absurd 
to expect it from an army following a good system, 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 157 

or, rather, that understands the principles of war. 
But to make an attack upon a wing, overthrow it, and 
at the same time fall upon the point, where this wing 
joins the centre, with a large force, is an operation 
always advantageous when well executed. 

Napoleon resolved, then, to attempt it. However, 
instead of concentrating the bulk of his masses against 
the -left, as at Borodino, he directed them on the cen- 
tre ; the extreme left was not to be assailed, but by 
the division forming the right of Erlon's corps, which 
would attack Papelotte and la Haie ; Ney was to 
lead the three other divisions on the right of la Haie 
Sainte ;* Reille's corps would support this movement 
on the left of the Mont-Si- Jean causeway ; Bachelu's 
and Foy's divisions, between this causeway and the 
farm of Hougomont ; Jerome's, led in fact by Guil- 
leminot, was to attack this farm, the salient point of 
the enemy's line, the chateau and park wall of which, 
Wellington had crenelled, and where he had posted 
the English guards. Count Lobau, with the 6th corps 
and a mass of cavalry, would follow the centre in a 
third and fourth line, on the right and left of the 
causeway, to support Ney's attack on la Haie Sainte : 
lastly, twenty-four battalions of guards and de Yalmy's 
cuirassiers, were to second the decisive shock, wherever 
needed, in a fifth and sixth line. 

Such was the plan that many incidents deranged, 
and which Napoleon can leave, without fear, to the 
scrutiny of the masters of the art. It could not be 
bettered, unless moving his reserves a little nearer 

* It is necessary not to confound la Haie Sainte, on the centre, with la 
Haie on the left wing of the allies. 



158 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

his right, thus giving more vigor to the effort between 
Papelotte and the Charleroi causeway. 

It would have signified much for the success of this 
project, had a sudden attack been made in the morn- 
ing, but torrents of rain had fallen all night ; the 
weather was beginning to clear ; it required some 
hours to give a little consistency to the soft ground, 
and this time was employed in forming the army ir 
position.* 

The cannonade and musketry commenced, at 11 
o'clock, against the farm of Hougomont, which Je- 
rome sought to carry ; it pleased the emperor to open 
the battle at this point. A few moments after, Ney's 
light cavalry appeared towards Frischermont, at the 
opposite extremity, where were exchanged a few 
cannon shot. It was then found that the rivulet, 
though narrow and slightly embanked, was very 
miry, and that it would be necessary to turn it by 
the west of Smouhen, as it would prove troublesome 
to cross it lower down, in face of the enemy's bat- 
teries. Compelled thus to turn a portion of his right 
upon their centre, Ney succeeded finally in forming 
his four divisions of d'Erlon's corps, and his artillery 
only succeeded, after incredible efforts, in taking 

* We cannot share this opinion, which has been set forth by Napoleon, 
in Book IX. from St. Helena ; when, even had a splendid sun succeeded 
the rain, four hours would not have sufficed to dry such a ground ; be- 
sides, this sun did not appear ; misty weather followed the storm ; no- 
thing then prevented him from making the new effort at 9 A. M. ; it could 
have been done as well as at one, and the Prussians would have arrived 
after the blow had been struck. In the then state of affairs, this delay 
of four hours was a blunder ; but the arrival of Blnehex was not expected, 
and the troops required rest. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 159 

position in the muddy ground, with their pieces sunk 
to the naves of their wheels. 

The marshal immediately opened a heavy fire upon 
the enemy's left, and only waited for the signal, to 
burst upon it. Napoleon was about giving it, after 
mid-day, when rather strong columns were discovered 
on the right in the direction of Lasne and St. Lam- 
bert ; this might be the enemy, or the detachment 
demanded of Grouchy. The emperor immediately 
pushed forward 3,000 horse under General d'Homond 
towards Pajeau, at once to reconnoitre the state of 
things ; cover the flank, if needed, were it the enemy, 
or effect a junction with Grouchy, if he it was who 
had arrived.* It behooved him to undertake nothing, 
before receiving a report of this reconnoissance. 
Very shortly afterwards, a Prussian hussar was 
brought with an intercepted letter ; he announced 
the approach of Bulow's corps, which he estimated 
at 30,000 men. 

Notwithstanding this serious contre-temps, nothing 
seemed desperate. Under all other circumstances, it 
had perhaps been better to have deferred the battle ; 
but what could be done ? — shot had been exchanged ; 
it was necessary to continue the fight, or shamefully 
decamp before Wellington, with whom Napoleon 
measured himself for the first time. Apart from the 

* It was hard to believe that this was Grouchy, after the reports received 
irom him during the night. However, had he taken, on the morning of 
the 18th, the road to Moustier instead of that to Wavre, by Sart a Valain, 
the case was not an impossible one. Besides, this column discovered 
about twelve, was only Bulow's advance guard; the corps did not arrive 
till four, on account of a violent conflagration that had pre\ented it from 
dealing through Wavre. 



160 POLITICAL AKD MILITARY history of 

point of honor, what moral effect would this retreat 
produce, if he fled, without unsheathing his sword 
against the English ? What could he hope for his 
cause, when the Russians, Austrians and the whole 
Germanic empire, should burst upon Lorraine, the 
Austro-Sardinians upon Dauphiny, the Swiss upon 
Franche-Comte, and the Spaniards upon Languedoc ? 
If Bulow came with a score of thousands, the belief 
should be that he was closely followed by Grouchy, 
and in that case, the arrival of this new enemy would 
not change the chances of the battle. 

The emperor then ordered Ney to commence the 
attack, and in order to secure the threatened flank, he 
moved Count Lobau's two divisions, en potence, to- 
wards Planchenois, where they could, if needed, serve 
as reserves to Ney, or otherwise, in a measure, oppose 
Bulow. If this latter was closely pursued by Grou- 
chy, the Prussian corps would thus find itself be- 
tween two fires, in a cut-throat position, and would 
become an additional trophy for the conqueror. 

Nearly one hundred pieces of ordnance open upon 
the enemy's centre, to the right and left of la Haie 
Sainte ; it is there that the great effort is to be made, 
and if Ney, seconded by Lobau and the guard, suc- 
ceeds in penetrating here, as he did at Friedland, they 
will seize on the point where the causeway enters the 
forest of Soignes, which is the sole retreat for the ene- 
my. But Count Lobau's support is soon to fail him in 
this vigorous effort, and render success doubtful. 

About one o'clock, Ney marched forward at the 
head of d'Erlon's corps, which was formed of the divi- 
sions in separate columns, so as to cross with more 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 161 

rapidity the space that separated it from the enemy.* 
This movement, executed in very deep columns, closed 
in mass, under a murderous fire, and through a terri- 
ble mud, was accomplished without much wavering ; 
a portion of his artillery remained in rear, and con- 
tinued to counter-batter that of the enemy from a dis- 
tance, while the infantry effected the passage of the 
ravine. Though the formation in columns had left 
between the divisions very considerable intervals, they 
were not, however, sufficiently great for deploying 
them. The different narratives heretofore published, 
differ materially as to the manner in which this first 
attack was executed : some have it, that the four divi- 
sions of d'Erlon's corps, thus formed into as many 
masses, in echelon, the left in front, were directed 
against the position of the allies' left wing, slighting 
the post of la Haie-Sainte, which was left behind 
them. Others have the -2d division of d'Erlon's corps 
marching on this post, and the 4th on that of Smou- 
hen, nearly simultaneous with the attack of the po- 
sition. 

Nevertheless, I have every reason to believe, that, 
in fact, these divisions, in deep columns, moved to- 
gether to attack the position, the front line of which 
was composed of General Perponcher's Belgians, on 
the right of the Mont-St.-Jean causeway, while Du- 
rutte's division advanced on Smouhen, or at least in 

*It appears that each division formed a single mass of eight or ten 
battalions, marching in rear of each other. It is uncertain, whether all 
these battalions were formed in columns of attack, or deployed into 
eight or ten lines, but they formed a very deep mass. It also appears 
that Marcognet's division made a flank movement to draw nearer tho 
centre, and that the English took advantage of its waverings. 



162 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOET OF 

conjunction with. Jaquinot's light cavalry, kept in 
check the enemy's extreme left* 

Braving all the difficulties, which the soft ground 
offered to the movements of masses thus agglome- 
rated, together with the fire of a formidable artillery, 
the 1st and 3d divisions reach the front line of the 
enemy at the point held by General Bylandt's Belgian 
brigade, (Perponcher's division,) which they drive in 
after a vigorous onset. But, far from having accom- 
plished their task, they are suddenly assailed by Pic- 
ton's English division, posted in a second line, and 
lying behind a ridge that favors them. Here a fu- 
rious combat takes place ; the English infantry de- 
ployed in line, envelop with its concentrated fire the 
head and flank of this heavy mass, which can oppose 
but a few musket shots, more calculated to diminish 
its enthusiasm than cause the enemy any loss. Gen- 
eral Picton falls dead ; but his troops stand firm, and 
the French column, arrested by their murderous fire, 
turns and gives way. At this moment, Lord Uxbridge 
lets loose General Ponsonby's English cavalry, to 

* G-reat confusion reigns in all the narratives, published up to this time, 
on the battle of Waterloo. Some have the left of the position attacked 
by the four divisions farthest off ; others say that Durutte's advanced on 
Smouhen, and Quiot's on la Haie Sainte. The Victoires et Conquetes 
speak of a grand column formed of the 2d and 3d divisions, (Donzeiot's 
and Marcognet's). This would then be Quiot's — the first that must have 
attacked la Haie Sainte. Nevertheless, German authors have as many 
columns as divisions ; they speak of a brigade of cuirassiers, Valmy's or 
Milhaud's, seconding this first attack, and French narrators say not a 
word about it. They state that the eagles of the 45th and 105th regiments 
were captured in the grand column; but, one of these regiments belonged 
to the 1st division and the other to the 3d. Lastly, other versions would 
make us believe, that Durutte did not advance on Smouhen till 4 P. M. It 
it is impossible to make out any thing from such a chaos. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 163 

charge them in flank and spread the disorder : em- 
boldened by this success, the English squadrons throw 
themselves into the interval between the 2d and 3d 
columns, where they gain the same advantage ; finally, 
carried away by their ardor, these squadrons rush on 
Ney's reserve artillery, a portion of which remained 
in rear on account of the mire ; they sabre the sol- 
diers of the train and the cannoniers, lead away the 
horses, and thus deprive the infantry of part of its 
ordnance. Napoleon launches Milhaud's cuirassiers, 
supported by a brigade of lancers, against these reck- 
less fellows ; in a few moments this cavalry of the 
enemy is destroyed, and Ponsonby killed ; but the 
French infantry has been shaken and a portion of the 
artillery rendered immovable. Meanwhile, Ney has 
ordered the attack of the farm of la Haie-Sainte by 
a brigade of d'Erlon's corps, which at first experiences 
an active resistance and serious loss. 

While these things were taking place against the 
left of the allies, and on the point where this wing 
joined the centre, Jerome Bonaparte, seconded by 
Foy, had with difficulty dislodged the enemy from 
the park of Hougomont ; but all efforts proved fruit- 
less against the chateau and the crenelated farm, 
where Wellington himself led reinforcements to the 
English guards, who defended this important post 
with admirable valor. 

The Duke of Wellington, certain of the near arrival 
of Blucher's entire army, and too happy at having 
gained half the day by the delay of the attack, had 
determined to conquer or to die. Seeing that all 
efforts were directed against his centre and left, he 



164 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

hastened to shorten his line, by withdrawing from 
Braine-la-Leud and Merbes twenty battalions of Bel- 
gians and Brunswickers, which he placed successively 
in reserve, in rear of the right and centre. Then, he 
in person, conducted reinforcements to the English 
guards, now at the point of succumbing at Hougo- 
mont, and re-animated their ardor. 

General Foy, on his side, wishing to second the at- 
tacks which Jerome's division (led by General Guille- 
minot) was making on the chateau, sought to pass 
this post and fall upon Lord Hill's line and the Bruns- 
wickers, formed behind an excavated road that ran 
along a great portion of the enemy's front, from the 
chateau of Nivelle to the vicinity of Papelotte. But 
struck by a ball in the shoulder, and seeing his troops 
mowed down by a murderous fire, without hope of 
dislodging the enemy, Foy had to give up this design ; 
the combat at this point degenerated to # cannonade 
and a scattering fire, without reciprocal advantages. 

During this interval, Ney had put to the test all 
his energy and presence of mind, in recovering from 
the checks received in his first attacks ; his right in 
possession of Smouhen, debouched on Papelotte, and 
the marshal himself led a second assault on la Haie 
Sainte. Donzelot's division, supported on the left of 
the causeway by a brigade of the Duke de Yalmy's 
cuirassiers, and on the right by a brigade of General 
Quiot's infantry, succeeded finally in expelling the 
Scotch and Hanoverian battalions from it : at four 
o'clock these troops were masters of these two points, 
after efforts the most glorious. 

Pending this struggle, the emperor passed down 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 165 

Key's line and that of Milhaud's cavalry, through a 
storm of bullets ; General Devaux, commanding the 
artillery of the guard and reserve, was killed at his 
side ; a sad loss, at a moment when he was to be 
called upon, to renew the splendid manoeuvre of Wa- 
gram. 

The simultaneous capture of la Haie Sainte and 
Papelotte, about four o'clock, still continued all the 
chances in favor of the assailants. But at the time 
that Wellington was accumulating his forces on the 
centre, Napoleon was compelled to withdraw his own, 
because of the information that Bulow was at last 
debouching from the woods of Frischermont on Plan- 
chenois. If we would wish to follow exactly the 
chronological order of the enemy's movements, we 
would have to recall here the doings of the Prussian 
army since the previous evening, but it seems more 
advisable to narrate the events, in the same order in 
which they came to Napoleon's knowledge. We will 
then return, farther on, to Blucher's operations, limit- 
ing ourselves to pointing out, here, the successive ar- 
rivals of his corps. 

At the moment of Ney's success in carrying la Haie 
Sainte, Bulow, having debouched from the woods of 
Frischermont, attacked the Count de Lobau, and, 
thanks to his superiority, drove him on Planchenois, 
by overthrowing his right. Napoleon then learned 
with certainty, that Grouchy was not following this 
Prussian column ; it was no longer possible to labor 
under the slightest illusion ; all that could be done 
was to dispute the honor of this fatal battle-field, in 
wbich his line was out-flanked to such an extent, that 



166 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

the Prussian bullets nearly reached the Charleroi 
causeway in rear of his centre. Success was not at 
all possible, but by dint of perseverance he might 
force the enemy to retreat. lie resolved then, about 
five o'clock, to get rid of Bulow by a vigorous coup 
de main, in directing against him the young guard, 
under the brave Duhesme, supported by General Mo- 
rand with a portion of the old guard, then immedi- 
ately to attempt a last effort against Wellington, with 
his entire reserves. While awaiting the issue of this 
manoeuvre, Ney should have been satisfied with hold- 
ing la Haie Sainte and Papelotte. 

Meanwhile, the marshal, finding himself isolated 
by the direction of the attacks of Reille's corps, about 
the chateau of Hougomont, earnestly asked for rein- 
forcements. For want of infantry the emperor as- 
signed him Milhaud's cuirassiers. Wellington, on his 
part, encouraged by Bulow's attack, and strengthened 
by the troops from his extreme right, had conceived 
the hope of again taking possession of the park of 
Hougomont and the farm of la Haie Sainte. With 
this object, he had, at five o'clock, launched the Han- 
overians, on this last post, simultaneously with Lord 
Hill's English on the first. At this very instant, Ney, 
whose troops suffered terribly from the enemy's fire, 
seeing the light cavalry of his right driven back by 
that of the English, sought to seize, at all hazards, 
the plateau of Mont-St.-Jean, by casting his brave 
cuirassiers upon the centre of the allies. Unfortu- 
nately, his infantry was so shaken, that it could offer 
but feeble succor. However, these squadrons meeting 
the Hanoverians marching on la Haie Sainte, fell upon 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 167 

them, sabring one regiment, carrying off the artillery 
posted on the enemy's front, breaking a square of the 
German legion, but attempting the same upon others 
without success; the enemy formed in squares by 
regiments, sheltered the cannoniers and artillery 
horses, and by a well sustained fire baffled the efforts 
of this heroic cavalry,* which, charged in its turn by 
Lord Somerset's English cavalry, was forced to rally, 
and effected it with audacity under the very fire of 
the enemy's line. 

Undoubtedly, it had been preferable had this charge 
been executed a little earlier, in conjunction with d'Er- 
lon's first attack, or had been deferred until the return 
of the young guard from extricating Count Lobau, 
so as to make a combined effort of the three arms 
re-united. But the plateau was crowned, it was ne- 
cessary to sustain what was already accomplished, or 
look upon the loss of Key's troops. Napoleon then, 
after six o'clock, orders Kellermann (Yalmy) to ad- 
vance with his cuirassiers on the left of la Haie Sainte 
causeway, and overthrow every thing in his path ; the 
heavy cavalry of the guard follow this movement, 
and engage the enemy, it is said, contrary to the 
emperor's intentions, j- At the sight of all these rein- 
forcements, Milhaud also renews his attacks. These 
10,000 horse make terrible havoc in the enemy's line, 
carrying off sixty pieces of cannon from the front of 

* The Duke of Wellington himself assured me, at the Congress of Vero- 
na, that he had never seen any thing more admirable in war, than the ten 
or twelve reiterated charges of the French cuirassiers upon the troops of 
all arms. 

t Napoleon might have intended to preserve this precious nuoleus in 
reserve, but assuredly he had placed it at Ney's disposal. 



168 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

their position, and breaking two squares ; but the 
rest of the English infantry oppose an admirable 
front; the fire of the 2d line, destroys the French 
squadrons that have become scattered in their charges ; 
lastly, the English, Belgian, Hanoverian and Bruns- 
wickerian cavalry, led by Lord Uxbridge, form in 
fine order to charge in their turn, — success cannot 
fail them. To remain in such a situation is impossi- 
ble ; it is then necessary to sound the rally at some 
distance, abandon the captured artillery, in fact give 
the English cannoniers the liberty of returning to 
their guns and crush anew this body of cavalry. It 
nevertheless turns about and drives back Lord Ux- 
bridge's squadrons upon their infantry.* It would 
be necessary to borrow the most poetic forms and 
expressions of an epic, to depict with any truthful- 
ness the glorious efforts of this cavalry, and the im- 
passive perseverance of its adversaries. We can 
besides judge, what would have been the result of 
these brilliant charges, had Lobau's corps and the 
young guard been able to follow the cuirassiers in 
their course, instead of being engaged towards Plan- 
chenois, making head against the Prussians. Eye- 
witnesses have attested to the disorder that was appa- 
rent among a portion of the allied troops, and to the 
alarm that spread as far as Brussels, where the French 
were momentarily expected. 

Napoleon had greater hopes of obtaining the vic- 
tory, as, in the interval, Bulow, attacked by Lobau 

* Lord Uxbridge (Marquis d' Anglesey,) had his leg taken off by a 
shot ; I am uncertain whether it happened at the instant of this attack, 
or later. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 169 

and Dushesme, supported by a detachment of the old 
guard, under General Morand, had just been driven 
on to the Pajeau road, and the booming of Grouchy 's 
cannon being heard on the Dyle, it could be supposed 
that he would at least hold in check the surplus of 
Blucher's army. Undoubtedly this victory had not 
led to immense results, but it was already more than 
won : to decide it finally, the emperor, at half-past 
seven o'clock, ordered the entire guard to be concen- 
trated, in order to carry the position of Mont-St.- Jean. 

The illusion was not of long duration ; the French 
cavalry had scarcely rallied its victorious squadrons, 
when new hostile columns from Ohain, were disco- 
vered from the plateau: this was Blucher himself, 
who arrived with Ziethen's corps in the direction of 
Papelotte. At the same time, Pirch's corps having 
debouched from Lasne, had already come into action, 
to second Bulow at Planchenois. 

Though difficult for Napoleon to estimate the 
strength of all these forces, they were more than 
sufficient to snatch victory from him. It is said, how- 
ever, that he flattered himself with leading fortune 
under his banner, by refusing his right threatened by 
very strong forces, in order to bring all his efforts to 
bear through his left on Hougomont and Mont-St.- 
Jean ; a rash change of front, that necessarily aban- 
doned the line of retreat to Charleroi, to follow a new 
one on the Nivelle causeway, and ♦which, moreover, 
destroyed all communication with Grouchy. Had 
the success of this measure been in the least proble- 
matical, its execution had become impossible ; even 
the assembling of the entire guard could not be 



170 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

effected: disorder began to infect the cavalry, and 
Durutte's division, menaced by three times their num- 
ber on the plateau, between Smouhen and the cause- 
way ; it was necessary to fly to d'Erlon's support, with- 
out even waiting for the return of the guard com* 
manded by Morand, as well as other detachments. 
Napoleon placed himself at the head of Friant's di- 
vision, the only disposable body, and conducted it to 
la Haie Sainte, at the same time that he ordered Reille 
to make dispositions for another attack on Hougomont. 
This reinforcement, led by Napoleon, gave courage to 
the French cavalry, and to the debris of d'Erlon's corps ; 
if Morand's entire division had been there, an attack 
might have been made with some chances of success ; 
but forced to hold some battalions in hand towards 
la Belle Alliance, Napoleon was unable to assemble 
but four, on the summit of the plateau in front of la 
Haie Sainte. Ney, sword in hand, led them against 
the enemy. 

Meanwhile, Wellington, certain of the near arrival 
of Blucher on his left, thought of retaking the park 
of Hougomont and la Haie Sainte ; he had drawn 
Brunswick's division and a Belgian brigade on the lat- 
ter point, at the moment when this handful of the 
brave guard proceeded to attack, with levelled bayo- 
nets, the broken line of the Anglo-Hanoverians. 

Aware of the importance of this movement, the 
Prince of Orange* quickly throws himself before them 
at the head of a Nassau regiment, while Brunswick's 
division attacks them from another quarter ; but the 
Prince falls, wounded by a shot, while pointing out 
to them the road to victory. The brave soldiers of 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 171 

the old guard, at first repel the shock, but, deprived 
of support, in the midst of the enemy, which is being 
reinforced by a Belgian brigade de chasse, surrounded 
by a sheet of fire that consumes them, they feel the 
moment is at hand when their cause will be lost for- 
ever, and with difficulty retire to the foot of the pla- 
teau, that had cost so much blood. Napoleon having, 
meanwhile, re-assembled the six other battalions of 
the old guard, that had been detached on different 
points, is in the act of seconding these efforts on Mont- 
St.-Jean, when the disorder which begins to be mani- 
fest on the right of d'Erlon's corps, forces him to form 
these battalions into squares, on the right of la Haie 
Sainte. 

While these things are passing on the front of the 
French army, between eight and nine o'clock, the 
young guard and Lobau struggle with rare bravery 
against the constantly increasing forces of the Prus- 
sians. Strengthened by the arrival of Pirch's corps, 
Bulow finishes the overwhelming. of the remainder of 
these braves, whose distress is redoubled by the de- 
parture of the old . guard, and by the entrance into 
action of Blucher and Ziethen on their left flank. On 
the arrival of this last, the cavalry of Wellington's 
left wing, (Vivian's and Vandeleur's brigades,) that 
had suffered least of all, gallop to the centre to his 
support. Ziethen, who, at eight o'clock, had de- 
bouched at the vertex of the angle formed by the 
French line towards Frischermont, easily overthrows 
Durutte, at the same time that he out-flanks the left 
of the crotchet formed by Lobau and the young 
guard. Pirch turns Planchenois, which Bulow 



172 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

attacks in front. All this portion of the imperial ar- 
my, crushed, overrun and surrounded by quadruple 
numbers, crowd upon each other and seek safety in 
flight. Duhesme and Barrois are severely wounded > 
Lobau, in endeavoring to rally his men, falls into the 
hands of the enemy ; Pelet shows front with a hand- 
ful of heroes, about whom crowd a scattered few. 
The very report of General Gnisenau on this cele- 
brated battle, will ever remain the most splendid tes- 
timony to the heroic defense of these twelve or fifteen 
thousand French against sixty thousand Prussians, 
favored, moreover, by the nature of the battle-field, 
which, rising on their side into an amphitheatre, gave 
to their numerous artillery a terrible ascendency over 
that of their adversaries. 

Judging from the continuance of the fire, that Blu- 
cher and Bulow were giving the finishing stroke, Wel- 
lington on his part assembles all the best troops possi- 
ble, retakes the park of Hougomont, and about nine 
o'clock bursts on the old guard with an overwhelming 
superiority, at the same time that Blucher's Prussian 
cavalry outflanks Durutte, and thus gets in rear of 
the line. A furious combat takes places ; Generals 
Friant and Michel are seriously wounded ; all that 
remain of the cuirassiers and cavalry of the guard 
perform wonders ; but their position is no longer ten- 
able. Assailed by sixty thousand Prussians concen- 
trated on "Wellington's left, the whole French right 
flows back, in the greatest disorder, on la Belle Alli- 
ance ; the guard that shows front to the English is 
also forced to give way ; Wellington's cavalry profits 
by the disorder, and introduces itself between Reille's 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 173 

corps and the guard, formed into different squares, at 
the same time that Blucher takes the line in reverse. 
These masses of cavalry, render the rallying of d'Er- 
lon's and Reille's corps impossible. 

For a long time the Prussian artillery ploughs with 
its shot the Charleroi causeway, quite far in rear of 
the line, and contributes not a little in redoubling the 
disorder, which night, in spreading her wings, succeeds 
in completing. The infantry, cavalry and artillery 
take, pell-mell, the road to Genape, and some even 
endeavor to gain the Neville route, being less molested 
than that to Charleroi. 

Dragged far from the last gallant few, who, under 
Cambronne, show front to the enemy, Napoleon finds 
himself separated from them, and reduced to the al- 
ternative of regaining the Genape route across the 
country, accompanied by his staff, having no longer 
in hand even a single battalion, at the head of which 
he might seek death in the ranks of the foe. 

Wellington, who with impetuosity has changed 
from the defensive to the offensive, meets Blucher at 
la Belle Alliance, (the name of a farm, to which the 
events gave a whimsical pertinency). This meeting, 
which many have wished to attribute to chance, had 
been skilfully planned ; it is time to say by what con- 
current circumstances it was effected. 

We left Grouchy departing for Gembloux, at 
noon of the 17th. We remember that Thielmann's 
corps had withdrawn from Sombref in this very di- 
rection, undoubtedly, in order to rally on Bulow, who 
had just arrived after a forced march of twelve leagues, 
while the right of Blucher's army, composed of Zie- 



174: POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

then's and Pirch's corps, retired by Mont-St.-Guibert 
on Bierge and Aisemont. Be that as it may, Grouchy 
reached Gembloux, and was informed during the 
evening that Bulow and Thielmann had re-united 
there in the morning, and had then taken the direction 
of Wavre. These two corps formed a mass of 52,000 
men. 

Gerard's corps not arriving at Gembloux till eleven 
o'clock at night, in consequence of a violent storm 
that had destroyed the roads and jaded his troops, 
Grouchy resolved to advance on Wavre the next 
morning at six, with Vandamme's corps, Gerard to fol- 
low alone at eight o'clock. This resolution, howsoever 
much it seemed in conformity with the orders Napo- 
leon had given him, to follow on the heels of the 
Prussians, was an actual blunder. In fact, from the 
time that Blucher relinquished the natural base of the 
Meuse, it was evident that he thought only of uniting 
with Wellington, retaking the offensive and revenge 
himself for the affront he had just received: from 
that moment, even admitting that Napoleon had at 
first indicated the pursuit on Namur, Grouchy being 
aware that this order could not possibly be executed, 
became again master of his actions, according to his 
own inspirations ; moreover, the order transmitted af- 
terwards, through General Bertrand, to proceed on 
Gembloux, had sufficiently indicated the end the mar- 
shal was to attain. To pursue the Prussians was his 
duty, but he had many ways of performing it. One 
consisted in merely following the trail of the retreat- 
ing columns, the other in alone harassing the rear- 
guard by means of light bodies, directing his princi- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO, 175 

pal forces on the flanks of the columns, to attack 
them in earnest, as the Russians did in 1812 at 
Wiasma, Krasnoe, and at the Beresina.* 

Under the circumstances in which Grouchy was 
placed, it was more than ever his duty to follow this 
plan ; because his first mission was to prevent the 
Prussians from turning back against Napoleon, and 
the second point alone was to harass him in his retreat. 
Now, by marching along the Prussian columns with 
his infantry, while his light cavalry harassed his rear, 
he would have had the double advantage of opposing 
all attempts at a junction with the English, and avoid- 
ing the battle in the defile, which otherwise he would 
be constrained to give at Wavre. 

Three principal roads were open to him : that on 
the right by Sart a Yalain, which had been followed 
by Bulow ; that on the left by Mont-St. Guibert, from 
whence he could advance on Wavre, qither by follow- 
ing the right bank of the Dyle, or crossing this river 
at Moustier, and reaching Wavre by the left bank, 
thus avoiding a horrible combat in a defile. All 
were equally long, but that on the left approached 
within two leagues of Napoleon's army, and on the 
contrary, that on the right deviated as much farther 
from it. Nearly a day's inarch was gained by the 
first, without considering that he interposed between 
the two allied armies. 

The marshal should not, then, have hesitated ; he 
should at day-break, on the 18th, have marched with 
all speed on Moustier, with Excelmans, Vandamme and 

* See what General Jomini says on the subject of lateral pursuits, in 
his las Precis de VArt de la Guerre — 2 vol. ; published by Anseliu. 



176 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

Gerard, directing Pajol's cavalry and Teste's division 
on Wavre, in pursuit of the enemy's rear-guard.* 
Being able to reach Moustier by ten o'clock, he could 
have then forwarded his infantry on Wavre by Limale, 
pushing Excelmans' dragoons on St. Lambert, or else 
have marched to Lasne himself, from which place he 
would have heard, at noon, the violent cannonade at 
Waterloo. 

Instead of taking this wise resolution, Grouchy, 
undoubtedly desirous of following to the letter, on 
the heels of the Prussians as ordered, and deceived 
by reports that still signalled Prussian columns in the 
direction of Pervez, directed his own on Sart k Yalain, 
this being the route Bulow had taken. The marshal 
decided thus, the more so as he was perfectly ignorant 
that half the Prussian army had passed by Gentines 
and Mont-St. Guibert, the reconnoissance made in this 
direction on the 17th, having been reported to Napo- 
leon and not to him. To this fault, that of starting 
at too late an hour, can be added ; and as a conse- 
quence, towards noon only Yandamme had«got beyond 
Sart a Valain, and the head of Gerard's column had 
but reached this village. 

Grouchy had just been rejoined by this general, 
when the sound of a cannonade, hollow and distant, 
but lively and well sustained, announced an important 
battle : Count Gerard then proposed to the marshal, 

* This strategic movement would have been one of those, that build up 
the reputation of a great captain. It is probable that Napoleon, placed at 
Gembloux, in Grouchy' s situation, would have e cutedit; however, he 
made no mention of it, and prescribed nothing o the kind ; he even ap- 
proved the movement on Wavre : the fact is, he never believed in the 
daring flank movement executed by Bluchen 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 177 

to take that direction immediately, persuaded that in 
marching au canon, as Ney did at Eylau, he might 
decide the victory.* 

However wise this advice might have been in itself, 
we must avow that the same advantages would not 
have accrued, as if this movement had been operated 
from Gembloux at day-break, and that his arrival 
would have been too late to prove decisive ; because, 
supposing that Yandamme, whose corps was in advance, 
could commence moving at one o'clock, and this on 
the heights of St. Martin, it is probable he would not 
have reached Moustier before four. Now the fright- 
ful state of the roads, the bad condition of the bridges, 
the boggy defiles of the Dyle, and above all, the pre- 
sence of Thielmann's corps, which extended from the 
heights of Bierge to Limale, opposing his crossing, 
authorize us in believing, that Grouchy would not 
have reached Lasne or St. Lambert before seven or 
eight in the evening. Then, Thielmann's and Pirch's 
corps, formed in rear of the rivulet of Lasne, pre- 
venting him from pushing on farther, Bulow and Zie- 
then would not the less have decided the battle of 
Waterloo ; it certainly would have proved less dis- 
astrous for the conquered, but there was not the 
slightest possibility of gaining it. 

Great controversy has arisen on this point ; each 
one has interpreted in his own way and according to 

* The maxim to march au canon is generally a very wise one, as it is at 
bottom but a concentric manoeuvre, the effect of which is nearly always 
certain ; under particular circumstances, there are exceptions ; the battle 
of Bautzen is one of the most striking examples of it. (See a former 
volume.) 

8* 



178 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

his own views, the results that would have followed 
this movement advised by Gerard. To judge properly 
of the consequences that might have been expected 
from it, it must not be forgotten, that Thielmann's 
corps, posted on the heights of Bierge, with in- 
formation as far as Limale, had orders to follow 
that of Pirch on St. Lambert, in case Grouchy did 
not make his appearance towards Wavre, and that 
one of his divisions had already marched to this 
effect. If it be true that Grouchy's troops, taking 
at noon the Nil-St. Martin route on Moustier, would 
have arrived there between three and four o'clock, 
they would certainly have been immediately engaged 
with Thielmann's 20,000 men, forcibly suspending, 
and perhaps stopping his march. If they had wished 
to debouch by Limale, this force of the enemy 
would have been met earlier. On the other hand, 
Pirch's columns, that at this moment were advancing 
on Lasne, would have probably halted, seeing them- 
selves thus menaced in reverse ; even admitting that 
they had retrograded in order to support Thielmann ; 
but then Bulow had already concentrated his four 
divisions to attack Planchenois, and Ziethen was ad- 
vancing with Blucher towards Ohain, along the vast 
forest of Soignes, where there existed no possible 
route, by which to turn on Brussels in case of a re- 
verse. 

What resolution would Blucher and his counsellors 
have taken, if the alarming reports of Grouchy's ar- 
tillery had, about five o'clock, thundered between 
Moustier and St. Lambert? That is the question. 
To halt and receive an attack, in a position at once 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 179 

open and dangerous, would have been not only to 
lose all the fruits of a skillful and bold manoeuvre, 
but a piece of folly that would have compromitted 
the Prussian army in a perfect cut-throat position. 
Blucher had, then, but three courses to choose from : 
1st. To retrogade without delay on the road that leads 
from Wavre to Brussels ; 2d. To halt his columns and 
at once direct them on the Dyle, to dispute Grouchy's 
passage ; 3d. To precipitate his movement on Ohain 
and Planchenois, so as to hasten the so much desired 
junction with Wellington's army, a union that was 
his first aim, and became his only safe course, when 
once he found himself engaged in such a situation. 

Notwithstanding the manifest advantages of this 
last, it appears that Blucher, informed of the appear- 
ance of the heads of Excelmans' and Yandamme's col- 
umns on the heights of Corbaix, and fearing to see 
them debouch by Moustier, decided on the second ; 
as he suspended Pirch's march, and ordered Ziethen 
to fall back on the Dyle. It is even asserted, that 
these troops did not commence their movement till 
after a report from Thielmann, announcing that tno 
French columns were extending themselves towards 
Wavre. 

We will be permitted to believe, however, that in 
either case, the Prussian marshal, after having recon- 
noitred Grouchy's force, had judged the eight divi- 
sions of Pirch and Thielmann sufficient to hold it in 
check, while with the eight divisions of Ziethen and 
Bulow he would aid Wellington in obtaining the 
victory. 

Be that as it may, it is evident, that the sole ap- 



180 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

pearance of Grouchy towards Moustier had placed 
the Prussian generals in a really embarrassing posi- 
tion, upon the consequences and gravity of which no 
one can decide ; because all the reasoning that can 
be brought to bear on this subject, is limited to 
vague conjectures, for judging of the moral effect 
which this event had produced on the Prussian gen- 
erals and their troops. 

We cannot deny, however, that if General Gerard's 
advice was not entirely equivalent to the resolution 
of advancing on Moustier at day-break, Marshal 
Grouchy ought to regret his not deciding on follow- 
ing it. He would have done at least all that it was 
possible for man to do, to prevent a catastrophe 
which has unhappily been imputed to him. His 
bravery and zeal had been tested, he had often given 
proofs of talent, but he here lost the opportunity of 
placing his name among the number of most able 
generals, by laboring to follow strictly the orders 
that had been given him, it is said, with a little bit- 
terness, and the letter of which he endeavored to 
execute, instead of interpreting the spirit of it. In 
fact, means for his justification are not wanting ; the 
most important and the best established of all is, that 
unable to diviiy? Blucher's intentions, and supposing 
him concentralfa in front of Wavre towards Dion le 
Mont, GroucM might fear to lay entirely open the 
communications of the army, by thus throwing him- 
self into the environs of St. Lambert, leaving all the 
Prussian army behind him. The over-excited parti- 
sans of Napoleon have judged his lieutenant with 
extreme rigor, not dreaming that a portion of the 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 181 

blame should fall on their hero, who had not given 
him orders entirely satisfactory ; and it must be ad- 
mitted, that there exist but few generals who would 
have resolved to throw themselves thus on St. Lam- 
bert, without knowing what Blucher's main force 
would undertake. 

While the French were committing these faults, 
their adversaries executed one of the most wise and 
daring manoeuvres. 

The Prussian marshal, who had bivouacked with 
all his forces about Wavre, on the night of the 17th, 
had sent, as has been already stated, his chief of 
staff, Gneisenau, to the Duke of Wellington, to con- 
trive their ulterior operations. It was agreed, that if 
Napoleon burst upon the English, these should give 
him battle in front of Waterloo, in the position 
which their general had reconnoitred eight days pre- 
viously, in order to cover Brussels if necessary; in 
this case, Blucher, favored by the Dyle and the di- 
rection of its course, should join him and take part in 
the battle, by falling on the French right ; under the 
contrary supposition, that is to say, if Napoleon 
marched on the Prussians to attack them at Wavre, 
is was agreed that Wellington should act on the same 
concentric principle, an<£ fall on their left. 

Perceiving by the false* direction of Grouchy 's 
march, and by the reports of his flankers, that Napo- 
leon was bearing against the English, and that he 
could without fear fly to his assistance, Blucher 
caused the corps of Bulow and Pirch to depart for 
St. Lambert at four o'clock on the morning of the 
ISth, and himself with Xiethen's, marched on Ohain 



182 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

in order to join the left of the English general. Thiel- 
maun was left with 25,000 men at Wavre to defend 
the Dyle, with instructions to follow the other corps, 
if Grouchy did not make his appearance. This plan 
was very well conceived, and it is necessary to say, 
in praise of the allied generals, that in these combi- 
nations is recognized, all the progress they had made 
in the art of war. 

In conformity with these wise dispositions, Bulow 
was proceeding through Wavre, between seven and 
eight o'clock in the morning, when a violent confla- 
gration burst forth in the principal street of this city, 
which was the only passage-way; the advanced-guard 
having already cleared this burning defile, continued 
on its route ; but his artillery not being able to fol- 
low, the column busied itself in extinguishing the 
flames. About noon, the advanced-guard formed at 
St. Lambert, and awaited the arrival of the corps, 
that debouched between three and four o'clock from 
the environs of Pijeau; Pirch's corps had reached 
beyond Lasne, between five and six o'clock ; Blucher, 
advancing with Ziethen, had made several counter- 
marches, which prevented him from attaining Ohain 
before seven o'clock in the evening. We are already 
aware of the part which these 65,000 Prussians took 
in the battle of Waterloo, while Thielmann's corps, 
posted on the heights of Bierge, overlooking Wavre, 
and the whole valley of the Dyle, was making his 
dispositions for opposing Grouchy with a wall of 
brass, when he should make his appearance. 

Arriving in front of Wavre, at four o'clock, this 
marshal formed his troops to attack the forces left to 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 1S3 

dispute with him the crossing of the Dyle, which 
presented a very difficult defile at this point. At five 
o'clock, he received the orders directed to him that 
morning at Gembloux ; Grouchy then sent Pajol with 
8,000 men on Limale, attacked Thielmann's detach- 
ment with the remainder of his forces, and debouched, 
after a very brisk combat, which extended beyond 
Wavre and the mills of Bierge. The details of this 
combat, very honorable to both parties, and in which 
Gerard was wounded, should not form part of our 
summary. 

What was taking place at M ont-St.-Jean rendered, 
moreover, this success more hurtful than useful. The 
debris of Napoleon's army regained Genape in hor- 
rible disorder ; in vain did the staff strive to form it 
into corps ; every thing was pell-mell. It would be 
unjust to reproach the troops for this ; never had they 
fought with more valor, and the cavalry especially 
had surpassed itself; but, little habituated to seeing 
themselves thus turned and nigh being enveloped ; 
having exhausted all their munitions and forces, they 
thought it their duty to seek safety in the most pre- 
cipitous retreat. Each one wishing to retake the road 
he had previously followed, they crossed each other 
in different directions, some to reach the road to 
Charleroi, others to secure that leading to Nivelle, and 
escape from the enemy that already appeared on the 
former ; the confusion was complete. The chief of 
Blucher'8 staff, a man of head and heart, was, not- 
withstanding the night, ordered in pursuit of this tu- 
multuous crowd with the Prussian cavalry that had 
been less engaged ; he appeared unexpectedly before 



184 POLITICAL A]ffD MTLITAKY HISTORY OF 

Genape, into which he threw a few shot and shell, 
and this gave the finishing stroke to the rout. 
The disorder w T as so much the greater, as the avenues 
of this defile had been barricaded to cover the parks 
that had remained there ; and this precaution, so often 
neglected by the French, turned, under these circum- 
stances, against them, by encumbering the only re- 
maining passage-way ; this augmented the confusion 
and doubled the loss of materiel. Grouchy, on his 
part, being compromised beyond the Dyle, by the 
very success he had just gained, had only time to 
throw himself in all haste on Namur, in order to se- 
cure the route to Givet and Mezi&res, and the Prus- 
sians failed to prevent him. 

The vanquished army had lost 200 pieces of ord- 
nance, and 30,000 men hors de combat or prisoners ; 
as many more remained, independently of Grouchy's 
35,000 men ; but the difficulty was to rally them in 
presence of an enemy, that had taken lessons in au- 
dacity and activity from Napoleon himself. The loss 
of the allies was not less considerable, but there re- 
mained to them 150,000 men,* the confidence of vic- 
tory, and the certainty of being seconded by 300,000 
allies, who were crossing the Rhine from Mentz to 
Bale. 

Such was the issue of this struggle, commenced 
under such happy auspices, and which resulted more 
fatal to France than the battles of Poitiers and Azin- 



* Besides the troops engaged at Waterloo, the allies had a splendid 
English division advancing from Ostend, a division encamped at Hall, and 
Kleist's Prussian corps, that had taken no part in the battle, without men- 
tioning other armies. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 185 

court. It must be admitted, that this disaster was 
the work of a multitude of unheard-of circumstances : 
if Napoleon can be reproached for certain faults, it 
must be allowed that fortune dealt cruelly with him 
in the lesser details, and that his enemies in return, 
were as fortunate as they showed themselves skillful. 
However unjust be the spirit of party, we are forced 
to render homage to the merits of two generals, who, 
unexpectedly attacked in their cantonments extending 
from Dinant and Li&ge to Eenaix, near Tournay, had 
taken such wise measures, as to be in condition next 
morning for giving battle to equal forces, and for af- 
terwards conquering by an able concentration of the 
two armies. 

As to Napoleon, we have already pointed out the 
faults in execution, committed the 16th and 17th, as 
well by himself as by his lieutenants. In the very 
battle of Waterloo, the French might be censured for 
having attempted the first attack in masses too deep. 
This system was never successful against the murder- 
ous fire of English infantry and artillery.* I have 
already stated, on the subject of the battle of Esling, 
(in a former volume,) all that can be said in this re- 
spect ; but even supposing that this system be suitable 
on a dry and an open field, easy of access, and with 
equal artillery force, it is certain, that infantry masses, 
hurled over muddy ground, from which it is difficult 

* It is probable that this kind of formation had not been ordered by 
Napoleon ; we have never learned, that lie concerned himself about pre- 
scribing the manner in which his lieutenants should form their troops, to 
Lead them to an attack. In 1818 alone, he prescribed the columns of bat- 
talions by divisions in two ranks, very different from these heavy masses, 
and such that General Jomini has proposed it in his different works. 



186 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY Off 

to emerge, with an insufficient concurrence of other 
arms,* attacking troops posted in excellent positions, 
have many chances against them. Besides, they 
might also be blamed for not having sufficiently sup- 
ported this first effort, which, executed without the 
assistance of the cavalry and reserves, became a par- 
tial and isolated movement, and consequently without 
result. 

There were likewise extraordinary charges of cav- 
alry, which being devoid of support, became heroic 
but useless struggles. Notwithstanding all this, it is 
almost certain that Napoleon would have remained 
master of the field of battle, but for the arrival of 
65,000 Prussians on his rear ; a decisive and disastrous 
circumstance, that to prevent was not entirely in his 
power. As soon as the enemy led 130,000 men on 
the battle-field, with scarcely 50,000 to oppose them, 
all was lost. 

It is time, however, to quit the field of conjecture, 
and return to the debris of Napoleon's army. 

The appearance of the Prussian cavalry, and the 
cannonade with which it opened on Genape, in the 
middle of the night, was a circumstance altogether 
novel in war, where night ordinarily puts a stop to 
carnage and pursuit. General Gneisenau thought this 
innovation without danger, against a disbanded army, 
and was not mistaken, as all took the Charleroi road 

* The French had numerous batteries on their front, but they battered 
the enemy's lines from a distance, and vaguely, and could not easily follow 
the assailing troops ; while the English artillery remaining in position 
fired muzzle to muzzle, against the columns advancing upon them, and 
which offered themselves victims to a concentric fire, directed on a single 
point. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 187 

in great disorder, without waiting for day ; and it was 
only under the guns of Avesnes, that it became pos- 
sible to rally the battalions and re-organize them a 
little. 

Napoleon had but one course left him, which was 
to direct Grouchy through the Ardennes on Laon, to 
collect at this point all that could be drawn from the 
interior, from Metz and from Rapp's corps, leaving 
but garrisons in Lorraine and Alsace. The imperial 
cause was very much shaken, but not entirely lost ; 
should all Frenchmen determine on opposing Europe 
with the courage of the Spartans of Leonidas, the 
energy of the Russians in 1812, or of the Spaniards 
of Palafox. Unfortunately for them, as for Napoleon, 
opinion was very much divided on this subject, and 
the majority still believing that the struggle interested 
only the power of the emperor and his family, the 
fate of the country seemed of little consequence. 

Prince Jerome had collected 25,000 men in rear of 
Avesnes : he was ordered to lead them to Laon ; there 
remained 200 pieces of artillery, beside those of 
Grouchy. 

It required eight days for this marshal to reach 
Laon : the emperor repaired to that city to await 
him, persuaded that Wellington, prudent as he had 
been in Spain, would fear to involve himself, in the 
midst of so many strong fortresses, and would advance 
with caution on the Somme. 

Napoleon did not admire what are called counsels 
of war ; but under serious circumstances, he loved to 
reason with some of his familiars for and against the 
different plans he should follow, and after having 



188 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OP 

listened to all their advice, usually formed his resolu- 
tion, without even communicating it to those he had 
called together. 

Reaching Laon on the 19th, where he had at first 
resolved to await the junction of Grouchy and Jerome, 
the emperor discussed, with the small number of the 
trustworthy who had followed him, the course he 
should adopt after this frightful disaster. Should he 
repair to Paris, and concert with the chambers and 
his ministers, or else remain with the army, demand- 
ing of the chambers to invest him with dictatorial 
power and an unlimited confidence, under the convic- 
tion, that he would obtain from them the most ener- 
getic measures, for saving France and conquering her 
independence, on heaps of ruins ? 

As it always happens, his generals were divided in 
opinion ; some wished him to proceed to Paris, and 
deposit the crown into the hands of the nation's dele- 
gates, or receive it from them a second time, with the 
means of defending it. Others, with a better appre- 
ciation of the views of the deputies, affirmed, that 
far from sympathizing with Napoleon, and seconding 
him, they would accuse him of having lost France, 
and would endeavor to save the country by losing the 
emperor. A grave circumstance gave weight to this 
opinion ; it was, that on the very day when he tri- 
umphed at Ligny, the elective chamber factiously 
usurped the initiative right, by adopting a law, order- 
ing the re-union of the institutions scattered through 
the different constitutions of the consulate and em 
pire. Lastly, the most prudent thought, that Napoleon 
should not go to Paris, but remain at the head of the 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 189 

army, in order to treat with the sovereigns himself, 
by. offering to abdicate in favor of his son. 

It is said, that Napoleon inclined to the idea of re- 
maining at Laon with the army ; but the advice of 
the greatest number determined him, and he departed 
for Paris. In fact, this was certainly the most effica- 
cious means for concerting with all the authorities, 
ministers and administrations, on the prompt and vig- 
orous measures necessary to be adopted, in order to 
organize a grand national resistance ; because the Em- 
peror could accomplish more in a few hours himself, 
than by a hundred despatches. But to succeed, he 
had to find more ability, disinterestedness and devo- 
tion in the chambers than they had yet exhibited. 

However, his departure being decided upon, Napo- 
leon repaired to Paris during the night of the 21st 
June. This, so natural a return, was ill-interpreted ; 
his defeat had lessened him in the eyes of the multi- 
tude, who so rarely view things in their true light : 
they considered his departure from the army as an 
act of weakness. He had proved, at Areola, Eylau, 
Ratisbonne, Arcis, and also at Waterloo, that he was 
not afraid of bullets ; and had he not believed in the 
resources of France, he would have died at the head 
of the remains of his army : he quitted them, because 
he had not a general of his rear-guard who could not 
lead them to Laon as well as himself, while no one 
could replace him at the helm of the vessel of state, 
which, for the instant, was not at his head-quarters, 
but at the Tuileries. 

In eight or ten days, he hoped to be on his return 
to Laon, at the head of 100,000 men, with 400 pieces 



190 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

of artillery, and chastise the Anglo-Prussians for their 
invasion. Undoubtedly this would not have rid him 
of the grand armies, which the allied sovereigns were 
leading by the Yosges : nevertheless, he would have 
gained time ; and if 300,000 men were assembled on 
the Loire during July, France might yet conquer her 
independence, and preserve her glory, for many na- 
tions have lifted themselves up from a lower depth. 
The following picture of his situation, traced by Na- 
poleon himself, proves that he was far from despair- 
ing : " So far, PSris could finish her preparations for 
defence, those at Lyons were completed. The prin- 
cipal fortresses were commanded by chosen officers, 
and guarded by faithful troops. All could be re- 
trieved, but it required character, energy and absolute 
devotion on the part of the government, the chambers 
and the entire nation. It was necessary, that she 
should be animated by the sole sentiment of national 
honor, glory and independence ; she should fix her 
eyes on Rome after the battle of Cannae, and not on 
Carthage after that of Zama ! France once assuming 
this lofty stand, is invincible." 

Without recurring to the age of the Scipios, it 
sufficed to recall the example of Spain in 1808, when 
the French held her places and her capital, and that 
of Russia setting Moscow on fire, to escape the con- 
sequences of the bloody field of Borodino. It will 
be asserted, undoubtedly, that the circumstances were 
very different, and that France was too much ex- 
hausted of men, to hope for such a result. Such 
reasons merit no reply : pusillanimous souls never 
lack pretexts for immediately submitting, when 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATEKL00. 191 

placed under obligation to conquer or to die. It is 
not allotted to every one to feel like the Spartans, and 
sacrifice all to national glory. 

Throwing aside thi%point of patriotic honor, it was 
not difficult for the political adversaries of Napoleon 
to prove, even to his partisans, that the cause of France 
was for the first time separate from his own. To lis- 
ten to them, " it would only be at the price of seas 
of blood and of the most dreadful ravages, that you 
could clear the soil invaded by 500,000 men, and se- 
cure her independence. By submitting to the Bour- 
bons, the same result could be obtained, in a manner 
less Roman, truly, but more certain, and less cruel to 
France, already worn out by so many wars." 

This language was not heroic, but it was conclusive, 
and calculated to lead all weak minds. The army 
and the revolutionary party were inclined to resist- 
ance, without being alarmed at the sacrifices it de- 
manded ; but the party wished for resistance, for the 
benefit of demagogism, and not for the interest of 
the imperial authority. The leaders were deluded into 
believing, that they could resist Europe by means of 
decrees, as in 1793. Lafayette, especially, was of a 
provoking good nature ; he flattered himself, that Eu- 
rope made war only against the ambition of one man, 
and that the arms of the sovereigns were harmless in 
presence of his Gallo.American doctrines ; he did not 
perceive that the days of Mack and Cobourg were in 
the distant past, and that these were precisely the 
doctrines upon which the sovereigns had designs. 

Great disasters, like volcanoes, are announced by a 
hollow noise which precedes the explosion. Paris 



192 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

had been agitated, since the 20th June, by most alarm- 
ing reports that bewildered every one. At the first 
news of the catastrophe, Fouche had his friends of 
the two chambers assembled #t his house,* at the 
same time that his secret agents noised it throughout 
Paris, that the abdication of Napoleon could alone 
save the country. 

The leaders of the utopianist party dreaded, un- 
doubtedly with reason, the dissolution of the chambers, 
because, after the course which some of the deputies 
had adopted, they felt that the emperor would regard 
them more as obstacles, than as means of government. 
It was then agreed, in this secret assembly, to forestall 
the danger ; Lafayette was to bell the cat, by propos- 
ing to the chamber, on the next day, to declare itself 
permanent, and proclaim him a traitor to the country, 
who would dare to order its dissolution. As a remu- 
neration for this act, qualify it as you will, the great 
citizen^ who had accompanied the people from Paris 
to Versailles in 1789, would be newly honored with 
his favorite title of Commanding General of the Na- 
tional Guards of the Kingdom. 

While Fouche and his friends were thus plotting 
Napoleon's overthrow, he, at four o'clock on the morn- 
ing of the 21st, arrived at the Elysee-Bourbon, where 
Caulaincourt awaited him with just impatience. Far 
from speaking of a dissolution, the first words uttered 
by the emperor announced his idea of convening the 
two chambers in extraordinary session, in order to 
depict to them the misfortunes of Waterloo, and de- 

* Lafayette, Manuel, Dupont de TEure, Flauguergues, Dupin the elder, 
and Henry Lacoste. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 193 

mand of tliem the means for saving France ; after 
which he would hasten to rejoin the army. 

It is said, that Caulaincourt expressed his regrets 
on his leaving it, and his fears that the chambers were 
little disposed to second him. The ministers, sum- 
moned immediately after by the emperor, were invi- 
ted to give their opinions on the measures to be taken. 
Napoleon imparted to them his views, his resources, 
and the need he had of the dictatorship in order to 
save France ; he could seize upon it himself, or receive 
it from the chambers ; this latter would be more legal 
and more efficacious ; but was there a certainty of his 
obtaining it ? The greater number of the ministers 
thought, that every thing depended on the harmonious 
action of the chambers. Caulaincourt cited the for- 
lorn condition of the country in 1814, as a frightful 
example of the consequences of a dissolution. Fouche 
also rested all his hopes on an unreserved confidence 
in these assemblies, in the bosom of which he wielded 
an active influence. Decrfes thought, on the contrary, 
that it was not necessary to depend upon them. 
Regnaut de Saint-Jean d'Angely himself, this obse- 
quious and complaisant orator, dared to add to the 
opinion of the minister of marine, that the chambers 
would undoubtedly exact a new abdication ; he even 
carried his boldness so far as to insinuate, that if not 
offered, they ought to exact it. Justly indignant at 
this, and recalling to mind the 18th Brumaire, Lucien 
demanded that the emperor should dispense with the 
chambers, and save France by himself alone. Lastly, 
and it should be said to his praise, Carnot entered 

more largely into the views of a desperate defence, 

9 



194: POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

and of the dictatorship that would furnish the means ; 
he considered it necessary to redeem the soil of France 
at any cost, and to renew, if needed, all the energy 
of the committee of public safety of 1793. If he 
never ranked as a great politician, he at least showed 
the energy of a Roman. 

While these grave questions were discussed at the 
Elys^e, the resolutions, adopted the night before in 
Fouche's secret assembly, bore their fruit in the cham- 
bers ; the rumors of a dissolution, perfidiously spread 
long before the subject had been agitated, and at the 
very moment when, on the contrary, they were pro- 
posing proper harmony with the chambers as the only 
means of safety, had produced the effect intended by 
the conspirators. Lafayette had just made the sortie 
agreed upon with success, and had carried, either 
through jealousy or the weakness of the deputies, the 
decree declaring as traitors to the country all those 
who would dare pronounce a dissolution, though this 
act was nevertheless one of the constitutional rights 
of the emperor. Singular mania of these pretended 
apostles of legality, immolating the chief of state 
for wishing to execute the law ! 

This decree, that was, by itself alone, an entire re- 
volution, was transmitted to the assembly of the min- 
isters engaged with Napoleon : henceforth there was 
nothing more to hope for ; in vain did Lucien, accom- 
panied by the ministers, demand of the chambers, in 
the name of the emperor, to appoint a commission to 
contrive measures of public safety, indispensable un- 
der the circumstances : his abdication was the sole 
aim of the conspirators. The commission was in 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 195 

truth appointed, but was composed of the warmest 
enemies of the emperor, Laujuinais, Lafayette, Gre- 
nier, Flauguergues, and Dupont de l'Eure ; the ma- 
jority only proposed a foolish and vain negotiation 
with the powers. At the reading of the report a 
crowd of deputies, and Lafayette, especially, cried 
out that this would be insufficient without the abdi- 
cation ; that this abdication or its forfeiture, was neces- 
sary within the hour. 

While these vociferations of mediocrity and of ha- 
tred, staggered moderate minds, Napoleon was at 
the Ely see, a prey to the most violent agitation. The 
people assembled about this palace, made the air re- 
sound with cries of vive Vempereur ! and asked for 
arms. Lucien urged his brother to profit by this en- 
thusiasm, and enact an 18th Brumaire, more legal 
than the first, because, in ordering the dissolution ac- 
cording to the prescribed forms, he had a right to 
require it and have it executed. 

The idea of saving the country by arming the lower 
classes against the highest magistracy, must have been 
revolting to the judicious and lofty spirit of Napoleon. 
Besides, discord, already so potent in France, would 
not fail to redouble after a coup cPetat^ which would 
recall rather that of May 31st, 1793, than that of the 
18th Brumaire. The sacred union of the nation and 
its chief, could alone repair the cruel effects of these 
bloody disasters ; it was then by closing around the 
celebrated conqueror, that France could still issue 
gloriously from a gigantic struggle. From the mo- 
ment the nation divided itself into three hostile camps, 
and the authorities gave the example of defection, all 



196 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

was lost, because Napoleon could not himself alone, 
save the independence of the country, as well as his 
throne. The ideologists and the factious, who were 
so senseless as to imagine, that Europe would be eager 
to lay down her arms before their decrees, and who 
thought of causing the triumph of their Utopias by 
sacrificing a great man, will alone have to answer for 
the humiliation they were preparing for themselves. 

Repelling, then, the suggestions of his brother, Na- 
poleon preferred to resign, and dictated to Lucien the 
following abdication in favor of his son : 

" Frenchmen ! in commencing the war for uphold- 
ing the national independence, I calculated on the 
union of all efforts, of all wills, and on the concur- 
rence of all the national authorities ; I had reason to 
hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of 
the powers against me. Circumstances appear to me 
changed. I offer myself a sacrifice to the hatred of 
the enemies of France. May they prove sincere in 
their declarations, and have really no design but upon 
my person. My political life is ended, and I pro- 
claim my son, under the title of Napoleon II., em- 
peror of the French. The present ministers will 
compose the council of the government. The interest 
I take in my son induces me to invite the chambers, 
immediately, to pass a law organizing the regency. 
Let all unite for the public safety, and to continue an 
independent nation !" 

We are assured, that the emperor at first intended 
to send a pure and simple abdication, but that Lucien 
and Carnot determined him to stipulate in favor of 
his son. Be that as it may, many have blamed him 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 197 

for this resolution as a weakness. If he had only- 
consulted his own character, he would have buried 
himself beneath his country's ruins, sooner than have 
so easily yielded ; the long series of combats sustained, 
after his departure from Moscow, even to the very- 
foot of Montmartre, sufficiently proves it. But how 
could he share his sentiments with entire France, 
when the very government had just declared that a 
second abdication was necessary ? Without the con- 
currence of the country, what could he do ? If Na- 
poleon had made the sacrifice of his throne at Fon- 
tainbleau, when he had greater titles to the devotion 
of the nation, and when the enemy were less formi- 
dable, could he refuse now, when himself and his 
private interests were alone concerned? Could he 
consent to a social subversion, and to France being 
laid waste, in order to satisfy his military vanity? 
No. . . . His resignation, far from being an act of 
discouragement, was worthy the rest of his life. 

Having decided on going to America, Napoleon 
hoped that the allies would rest satisfied with the 
hostage he placed at their discretion, and would leave 
the crown on the head of the son of Maria Louisa. 
He thought this was the best means, of effecting the 
fusion of ancient interests with the new, and preventing 
a civil war which might again run over the entire 
circle from 1789 to 1801 : but the solemn enjxa^e- 
ments entered into at Yienna, between the sovereigns 
and Louis XVIIL, did little permit them to consent to 
such a transaction, which at best had then been ex- 
cusable, as their object was to prevent the grand 
struggle that was expected, and the issue of which 



198 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

was not considered so certain or so speedy. Before 
the war, the sovereigns might have hesitated in effect- 
ing the triumph of the principle of legitimacy, by 
the doubtful force of arms ; but once conquerors, how 
were they to repel it ? By what right could they 
prevent their ally, Louis XVIII., from entering the 
capital, and resuming the crown ? Besides, Napo- 
leon's precaution in stipulating for his son, remained 
without result through the singular pre-occupation of 
the leaders of the chamber, who flattered themselves, 
with yet dictating laws to France, and having them 
accepted by Europe. Not wishing to admit Napoleon 
II., nor establish the regency, they hastened to form a 
provisional government, in the hope of seizing the 
helm of state, treating with the allied sovereigns for 
their existence, and not resuming the government of 
the Bourbons, but with conditions imposed by the 
chambers. How absurd a dream in the actual state 
of affairs! and which would suit neither Louis XVIIL, 
nor the sovereigns armed in the cause of thrones. 

Here the task of the historian, who attaches great 
value to impartiality, becomes not less embarrassing 
than painful. Indeed, how will he portion out to each 
one, the meed of blame or praise that pertains to 
him, in these great political conflicts ? Will he treat 
all the adversaries of Napoleon as ' sycophants and 
revolutionists ? Will he compare Fouche to Catiline, 
and will he regard the utopianist deputies, on whom 
he relied, as so many of the Gracchi ; or rather, fol- 
lowing in the footsteps of the ignoble Abbe of Mont- 
gaillard, will he treat Napoleon and all his partisans 
as blood-thirsty ogres, dreaming but of devastation 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 199 

and pillage ? Will he, like this pamphleteer, raise to 
the rank of clemi-gods, all those who contributed to 
the ruin of the imperial system ? 

Without thus pushing things to extremes, it will 
ever be a perplexing matter to qualify Fouche's in- 
trigues ; some will state that they were the result of 
a wise foresight of the ills that threatened France, 
after the declarations of the Congress at Vienna, as 
well as a worthy desire of preserving her from too 
unequal a contest ; others will attribute them solely 
to tae ambitious and seditious tendency of his mind, 
as well as to his still somewhat revolutionary doc- 
trines. Should a minister be stamped as a traitor or 
receive commendations, who, while preserving his 
official position towards the chief of state, corre- 
sponded and treated clandestinely with his enemies, 
without authority ? 

Who will dare award civic crowns to the influential 
members of the chambers, for their conduct, both be- 
fore and after the news of the disaster at Waterloo ? 
Will it be credited, that they preserved France from 
utter ruin, by usurping an authority which the consti- 
tution did not give them ; or else, will they be ac- 
cused of having added to the military humiliation of 
the country, by cowardly abandoning the only cap- 
tain who was still able to heighten the brightness of 
her standards, and preserve her independence ? 

In recapitulating all the disasters that might befall 
France, by prolonging a struggle d outrance, we can- 
not deny that it was a frightful alternative, and that 
the result of the course adopted would sufficiently 
justify the conduct of the chambers, had they always 



200 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

been inspired solely by the interest of the country. 
However, who can also say, that Napoleon would not 
have cleared French soil of her enemies, had he been 
powerfully and freely supported ? Who can affirm, 
that the expenses of the occupation, and the two 
thousand millions imposed by the allies or paid to the 
emigrants, had not exceeded, by far, the monetary 
and transient ravages, the consequences of a few 
months' struggle ? Though, perhaps, despairing too 
soon of the public safety, had the chambers at least 
appreciated the only remedy for the evils that threat- 
ened the country, and had boldly proclaimed the re- 
call of the legitimate government, soliciting from the 
king the proclamation of certain fundamental princi- 
ples, requisite to re-assure minds against a violent 
reaction, we would have been able to acknowledge 
some political foresight on the part of their leaders ; 
but all their measures, on the contrary, attest a mis- 
erable spirit of mediocrity, of hatred towards the 
powers of the government, and a liberalism ridicu- 
lously vain, which destroyed even the garb of patri- 
otism with which they clothed their declamations? 
These are grave and immense questions, upon which 
I do not feel myself called upon to pass judgment, 
and which I hasten to leave, and return to the em- 
peror. 

Still full of the souvenirs of 1813 and 1814, Europe 
did not at all comprehend the rapidity of this second 
fall. The empire of Carthage, likewise crumbled at 
Zama ; because the Carthagenian hero had, like Na- 
poleon, lost his influence in the heart of the country. 
The monarchy of Frederic the Great fell as rapidly 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 201 

at Jena, but owed her existence to the principle of 
legitimacy, so ill appreciated by declaimers ; Frederic 
William, happier than Hannibal and Napoleon, had 
left his nation in mourning and preserved the love of 
his people. In this great wreck, Napoleon could, 
nevertheless, exclaim, with Francis I. : All is lost, 
save honor. 

Napoleon did not quit France, till the enemy neared 
his retreat at Malmaison. Informed of his abdication, 
and of the anarchy that had succeeded him, and even 
prompted, as it is asserted, by Fouche, the Anglo- 
Prussians had advanced rapidly on Paris ; they could 
have outstripped Grouchy, but they followed closely 
on his steps. Wellington had carried Peronne and 
Cambrai at the first onset, where pitiable citizens 
ignominiously aided him. The rapidity of this inva- 
sion fully proved, that Europe had not forgotten the 
lessons given by Napoleon himself. 

Meanwhile, the Prussians made a hazardous move- 
ment, in seeking to turn the works erected to the 
north of Paris ; they alone crossed the Seine near 
Pecq, while Wellington remained on the right bank, 
and, from Ids position, unable to support them. The 
army, then commanded by Davoust, and encamped 
in the vicinity, might have fallen upon them with 
70,000 brave men, and annihilated them by tumbling 
them into the Seine. Napoleon proposed to the pro- 
visional government, to take command of the army, 
and resign the same after having conquered. Vile 
intrigues prevented him from washing out the stain 
of Waterloo, and taking leave of France after a vic- 
tory, that had permitted him to treat honorably with 

9* 



202 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

the allied sovereigns, instead of surrendering at dis- 
cretion to an English general and a Prussian marshal, 
as was done by the provisional government. Far 
from accepting his proposition, Fouche, who was al- 
ready corresponding with Wellington, had even 
resolved, for fear he would of his own accord put 
himself at the head of the army, to secure his person 
and place him in a species of captivity, by confiding 
him to the guard of General Becker. 

Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the troops was still 
so great, that this deplorable government had great 
difficulty in causing a suspension of hostilities, and 
General Excelmans even destroyed an entire brigade 
near Ville-d'Avray, at the moment when they were 
enchaining the courage of his comrades. 

The emperor left for Rochefort immediately after- 
wards. Decres the minister, proposed to him to leave 
from Havre, on an American vessel ready to set sail ; 
but this was too near the English coast, and he was 
also rather late. He could also have embarked at 
Bordeaux, on the one chartered by Joseph : the ob- 
jections to a' disagreeable counsellor diverted him 
from it ; fearing to fall into the hands of his enemies 
in a commercial port, he determined to go aboard a 
public ship, but some of the factious had time to 
forewarn the English of the fact."^ Joseph embarked 
alone at Bordeaux, and reached America without inter- 
ruption, on the vessel which he had offered to his 
brother. The latter was less fortunate : closely pressed 

* The History of the Restoration asserts positively, that Fouche in- 
formed Wellington of this embarkation, and so contrived it, that the em- 
peror should not escape. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 203 

by the English cruiser on his leaving Rochefort, and 
seeing that it would be difficult to escape, he pushed 
directly for her, hoping to place himself under the 
safeguard of British honor and British laws. He 
wrote the following letter to the prince regent : 

" Your royal highness : exposed to the factions that 
divide my country, and to the enmity of the greatest 
European powers, I have terminated my political ca- 
reer. Like Themistocles, I come to sit at the hearth 
of the British people. I place myself under the pro- 
tection of their laws, which I demand of your royal 
highness, as from the most powerful, the most con- 
stant, and the most generous of my adversaries." 

This letter, remarkable for the simplicity of its 
style, and for the just comparison established, between 
the position of Napoleon and that of the illustrious 
Athenian, could not disarm the hatred of his enemies. 
His was a cruel disappointment. It has been thought, 
that he would have been treated very differently, had he 
presented himself at the head-quarters of the emperor 
Alexander, trusting his fate to the magnanimity of 
his sentiments. Had this monarch considered it 
necessary, for the repose of Europe, to confine his 
formidable antagonist in one of his palaces, he 
would have treated him, at least, with all the con- 
sideration that was due him, and not with the bar- 
barity of the unworthy jailor, that England gave 
him. 

Posterity will judge of the treatment he suffered. 
Prisoner in another hemisphere, nothing was left 
him, but to defend the reputation that history was 
preparing for him, and which was still being per- 



204 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

verted according to the passions of parties. Death 
surprised him while writing his commentaries, which 
have remained imperfect, and this was, no doubt, one 
of his greatest regrets. However, he can repose in 
peace ; pigmies cannot obscure his glory ; he has 
gathered, in the victories of Montenotte, Castiglione, 
Areola, Kivoli, the Pyramids, as well as in those of 
Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Abens* 
burg, Ratisbonne, Wagram, Borodino, Bautzen, Dres- 
den, Champ- Aubert, Montmirail, and Ligny, laurels 
sufficient to efface the disaster of Waterloo ; his five 
codes will be titles not less honorable, to the suffrages 
of posterity. The monuments erected in France and 
in Italy, will attest his greatness to the remotest ages. 

His adversaries have reproached him with a ten- 
dency to an oriental despotism, and I shared this 
opinion with them for a long time : only true states- 
men should judge him in this respect ; what seemed 
a crime to the eyes of utopianists, will some day be- 
come, to the eyes of enlightened men, his most glo- 
rious title to wisdom and foresight. With hollow and 
abstract ideas, or a philanthropic sentimentality, a 
great nation will never march on to high destinies, or 
even, be able victoriously to defend herself, against 
formidable neighbors. 

The great European communities, whatever be said 
by all the Don Quixottes of governmental metaphy- 
sics, will never be but egotistical and rival communi- 
ties.* Therefore, all well-ordered communities should 

* This truth, which appears simple by being evident, has very singu- 
larly been unrecognized in these latter times, because the celebrated 
author of the Letters cm. the hundred days, in speaking of Napoleon's fall, 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 205 

invest their chiefs with all the power indispensable 
for rendering them formidable abroad and respected 
at home. Without these conditions, there will exist 
in his government but anarchy, demagogism or weak- 
ness. According to the Utopias of Lafayette, Lanjui- 
nais, and B. Constant, we should only make citizen 
kings, without dignity and without power, like those 
of Poland or Hungary ; or else anarchical republics, 
like those of the year IV. and the year V. All subtle 
declamations could not weaken this great truth. — • 
That with the license of the press and popular elec- 
tions, no continental power would exist fifty years ; 
and France less than any other, thanks to the passion- 
ate and impetuous spirit of the nation. Experience 
will finally prove who best understood his true inter- 
ests, Napoleon or the doctrinaires who undermined 
his power. 

Some men, blinded by their Utopias, have pretended 
" that he had alienated from himself the enlightened 
classes of Frenchmen, by smothering thought ; that 
he had, by striking it with a magic sceptre , arrested 
the moral and political progress of the human species, 
which was compressed under an enormous weight, and 
retained in woeful immobility." These grand phrases 
have fascinated little minds ; but the suffrages of sen- 
sible men will remain to him, and the next generation 

has attributed it to the hatred that commerce bore him, which, according 
to the publicist, tends to efface rivalry between nations, and to draw to- 
gether individuals as well as nations : strange doctrine, that denotes an 
inconceivable ignorance of the history of all ages, as if the great strug- 
gles of Carthage and Rome, as well as those between England, France, 
and Holland, only sprung from the rivalry of merchants, more tenacious 
even than feudal or national rivalry. 



20G POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

will justly appreciate, whether the shamelessness of 
thought, and the press is not more to be dreaded, for 
a nation like the French, than the bounds he wished 
to place to their license ;* they will see whether the 
public morals and the national character, will have 
gained much by the rupture of all checks ; whether 
the right to say every thing, print every thing, and 
villify every thing, will form great men, and will 
cause real progress in human reason, or rather, 
whether the result of this pretended golden age be 
not all the reverse. 

As to the charge of unbridled and unbounded am- 
bition, which we ourselves have not spared him, it 
must be admitted that appearances at least con- 
demned him : however, we have not sufficiently con- 
sidered the necessities of his position, as well towards 
England as towards the other European powers, and 
especially towards the emigrant princes of the revolu- 
tion. Many invasions and aggressions were dictated 
by these necessities. 

The idea of a grand European domination, in oppo- 
sition to the English power, certainly led him beyond 
all bounds of wisdom and moderation, and powerfully 
contributed to his fall ; but if this idea was a lofty 
one, and worthy of him, it is just to say that the 
means he employed for accomplishing his ends, were 
revolting to his allies, and did him more injury than 
the projects themselves. 

* We cannot too often repeat that the imperial censorship, absurd in 
its regulating dispositions, would have been good in itself, if it had ex- 
tended only over the periodical press, and had been confided to men more 
independent by their position. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 207 

Here ends our task ; this small work haying for its 
object, but the completion of the life of Napoleon, 
related by himself, we have not considered it our 
duty to narrate the sequel of the invasion, which 
followed the battle of Waterloo, and the depart- 
ure of the emperor. Everybody is aware of the 
convention concluded on the 3d July, by Davoust 
and the delegates of the provisional government, for 
the evacuation of Paris and the retreat of the army 
behind the Loire. We cannot, however, refrain from 
citing the heroic defence of Huningue, by General 
Barbanegre with a handful of mutilated veterans, and 
the glorious combat sustained in Savoy, by Colonel 
Bujeaud, with his single regiment, against an entire 
division of the Austrians, in which he made more 
prisoners than he had soldiers ; an isolated feat of 
arms, but which attested the spirit which animated 
the army. 

Lastly, we will also recall the fact, that the cham- 
bers received the reward of their deplorable conduct. 
The commissioners they sent to the sovereigns were 
scarcely admitted at head-quarters, and after certain 
conferences, were informed, that there was no occa- 
sion for treating with them : finally, a picket of Prus- 
sian landwehrs, posted one beautiful morning at the 
door of their chamber to prevent their assembling, 
taught the deputies the vanity and puerility of their 
pretensions. 

A few days subsequently, Louis XVIII. quietly 
entered the Tuileries ; prompted by the most excited 
royalists, he at first yielded to the most violent reac- 
tionary ideas ; but France and Europe did not delay 



208 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 

in raising their voices against the folly of this exag- 
gerated course. JThe world knows what took place 
after the death of this sage and paternal monarch, 
and how the revolution of 1830 proved, that the re- 
turn from Elba was not so extravagant as had been 
imagined. In truth, the results to the country were 
frightful ; the foreign occupation continued to 1818, 
the loss of many important fortresses, the two thou- 
sand millions paid to the allies and emigrants, the 
military humiliation, worse, perhaps, than all these? 
such were the sad results of a resolution which Na- 
poleon would have abstained from taking, had he 
been able to have foreseen the consequences. The 
reports that the allied sovereigns had quitted Yienna, 
little satisfied with the proceedings of the congress, — 
the rumor of a project on foot for removing him from 
Elba, and exiling him far from Europe, — lastly, the 
famous discourse of Ferrand, of which we have spo- 
ken, were the three grand motives that led him to 
this bold attempt ; if the departure of the sovereigns 
had been confirmed, every thing leads us to the belief 
that he would have succeeded; because he would, 
have had time to negotiate, on the one hand, and on 
the other, to place the entire nation under arms. 

Such: is the weakness of human calculations, that 
the most astounding enterprise that has ever been 
conceived, succeeded, at first, against all probabilities 
and appearances, then miscarried in another which, 
proving false, destroyed all chances of success. We 
are undoubtedly authorized in believing, that victory 
at the battle of Waterloo by Napoleon, would have 
rendered the struggle still long and terrible ; but it 



THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 209 

would require a great share of credulity to be per- 
suaded, that he could have prevented the 350,000 
allies that crossed the Rhine between Bale and Man- 
heim, from pushing forward to Paris ; because Napo- 
leon, being compelled to leave from sixty to eighty 
thousand men in Belgium, against Blucher and Wel- 
lington, could not have assembled 100,000 on the 
Moselle or the Vosges. Now, Paris being occupied, 
what course would France have pursued, thus divided 
in opinion, and placed between two chiefs, dethroned 
in fact ? Would she have imitated Spain, and con- 
tinued a national war a outrance, as desired by Napo- 
leon and Carnot? 

If the coalition had had to open partial negotiations 
between London, Berlin, Petersburg and Vienna, Na- 
poleon would have had four months more in which to 
arm, and without doubt would have succeeded in de- 
taching one or other of the powers. This was then 
his principal chance of success. 

As to the chances of war, we have seen that Ney's 
delay on the 15th and 16th June ; that caused by Na- 
poleon in the reconnoissance made and in the mea- 
sures adopted for attacking Blucher's army ; the 
vague and tardy direction assigned to Grouchy ; 
finally, the false route taken by the latter, on the 
morning of the 18th, were the leading causes of the 
disaster at Waterloo. Some military men have also 
thought, that Napoleon would have succeeded better 
by not throwing himself between the allied armies, 
as this gave to each the possibility of assembling com- 
pletely ; they believe that he should have fallen either 
on Blucher's centre, by Namur, or on Wellington's, 



210 

by Ath or Mons. It is certain that by this means, he 
would have cut off one or other of these enemies ; if 
he had beaten the centre and left of Wellington's 
cantonments, the right would have retreated in the 
direction of Ostend or Antwerp ; had he overthrown 
the centre of Blucher's cantonments, the left would 
have been forced on Liege, and hence the junction of 
these disjointed parts had been quite impossible. But 
both of these projects offered difficulties ; to fall by 
Florette, between Charleroi and Namur, that is to 
say, between the corps of Ziethen and Pirch, there 
was the very difficult ground situated at the mouth of 
the Sambre ; besides, the troops arriving from French 
Flanders would have to defile during more than one 
day, in front of the enemy's cantonments. By falling 
on Braine, or Ath, the centre of the English can- 
tonments, the corps of the Prince of Orange could 
not be prevented from joining Blucher with all the 
troops on the left ; now, 120,000 Prussians, increased 
to 180,000 by the half of Wellington's army and a 
portion of Kleist's corps, might still be in condition 
to dispute the Meuse against 120,000 French. Chances 
multiply ad infinitum, when we abandon ourselves to 
gratuitous suppositions, in the field. The plan of 
operations adopted was so much the most favorable, 
that without the time lost, on the 16th and the morn- 
ing of the 17th, he would have succeeded completely, 
and that even this loss of time would have been re- 
gained on the 18th, had the right wing taken the 
direction of Moustier. 



APPENDIX. 



The Duke of Elchingen, son of Marshal Ney, having made 
certain observations on the faults imputed to his father, in this 
campaign of Waterloo, the Author has replied in the following let- 
ter, that throws a new light on these important events : 

Monsieur le Due, — 

I have carefully read and considered the obser- 
vations you have done me the honor of addressing me, on my 
political and military summary of the campaign of 1815, printed 
two years since, but not yet published. 

While I render full justice to the filial sentiments that prompt 
you, to remove the reproaches heaped on your father, for the de- 
lays in occupying Quatre-Bras, during the 15th and 16th June, I 
ought also to render justice to the frankness and impartiality that 
prevail in all your researches, and to the convictions that animate 
you. 

You must have noticed in my narrative, that I expressed real 
doubts as to what occurred relative to Quatre-Bras, up to nine 
o'clock on the morning of the 16th, the hour when, it is said, Gen- 
eral Flahaut left Charleroi with written orders for him to take 
possession of it. These doubts have not appeared entirely satis- 
factory to you, and you would wish me to share all your convic- 
tions, which, in view of the numerous contradictions that are 
evident from the published documents, is not without difficulty. 

Napoleon and General Gourgaud affirm, under circumstances, 



212 APPENDIX. 

that seem by their nature to merit confidence, that a previous order 
to occupy this important position, had been given verbally to the 
commander of the left wing, on the night of the 15th. 

To these assertions, you oppose : 

1st. A letter from the major-general, that speaks of Gpsselies, 
and not of Quatre-Bras ; 

2d. The expressions and date of the letter dictated to General 
Flahaut, on the 16th ; 

3d. Your conversation with Marshal Soult in 1829 ; 

4th. The declaration of General Heymes, an eye-witness ; 

5th. A declaration of General Reille, setting forth, that at seven 
o'clock on the morning of the 16th, Marshal Ney had said to him, 
that he was awaiting orders ; from which you conclude that he 
had not yet received any. 

Your reasons are powerful, Monsieur le Due ; however, the last 
one especially, might also be differently explained ; the marshal 
could very well have received verbal orders during the night, and 
yet say to General Reille that he still awaited them, because he 
might suppose, that important modifications would occur in the 
emperor's combination, in consequence of reports he had just made 
him, according to his own statement. 

My great familiarity with war operations and the duties of the 
staff, induces me to give you a sketch of the manner in which, it 
seems to me, these things must have happened, without pretending, 
however, to set myself up as judge in this great debate, and with- 
out renewing the recital of operations already to be found in my 
volume. 

Debouching from Charleroi, with his whole army, Napoleon had 
before him, two causeways, forming nearly a right angle, th*t is 
to say, going in directions entirely divergent, one to the nortfe on 
Brussels, and the other to the east on Namur, Wellington beinf at 
the former and Blucher at the latter. The route from Charlevoi 
to Brussels, being at once on the extreme left of the cantonments 
of the Anglo-Netherlanders, and on the extreme right of the Prus- 
sian cantonments,, was evidently the point where the junction of 
the two armies should take place. A cross-road that conne^s 
these two causeways, runs directly from Namur to Brussels, and 



APPENDIX. 213 

into Hainault ; it passes through Sombref, joins the Brussels' cause- 
way at Quatre-Bras, and thus forms the base of a triangle, of 
which Charleroi is the vertex. 

With the slightest glance at the map, you perceive that in occu- 
pying Sombref, the Prussians from Nam ur are prevented from 
joining the English, the same as in occupying Quatre-Bras, you 
prevent the English from Nivelles and Brussels from joining the 
Prussians. This double combination could not escape the eagle 
eye of Napoleon : it is also averred, that he gave Grouchy a ver- 
bal order to push, if possible, as far as Sombref on the 15th. 
ShoulcTwe not conclude from this, that he must also have made 
known to the commander of the left wing, his desire that he should 
push on to Quatre-Bras, this decisive point being nearer Reille's 
corps than Sombref was to Grouchy's troops? 

As for myself, I think I am too well aware of Napoleon's ge- 
nius, to doubt his conceiving, on the 15th June, the idea of having 
Quatre-Bras occupied, and even previous to the assertions from 
St. Helena, I could not express the least thought to the contrary, 
though the declaration of the Duke of Dalmatia, cited in your 
pamphlet, has raised doubts in my mind.* 

Admitting, then, the existence of this verbal order of the 15th, 
the main point would still be to know, in what terms it was couched. 
Did he prescribe to the marshal, to rush headlong upon all he 
should find in this direction, as is affirmed in book IX. from St. 
Helena'? or else, limit himself to recommending, as he did to 
Grouchy, as rapid a march as possible on the route to Brussels, 
taking care to throw forward his advance-guard on Quatre-Bras? 
The order having been given verbally, it would be very difficult to 
decide between these two hypotheses ; but all the information given 
in your pamphlet, and all that took place on the 16th, authorize us 
in admitting the second version. In that case, I believe we would 
be justified in drawing from this fact, different conclusions from 

* The Duke of Dalmatia declares, in this conversation, that the order 
for the occupation of Quatre-Bras was not issued on the night of the 15th, 
but only on the 16th, after the emperor had breakfasted. It could be, 
however, possible, that a verbal order had been given on the 15th, with- 
out the major-general's presence, and even without his knowledge. 



214 APPENDIX. 

those that have been admitted heretofore ; the following are the 
reasons : 

Vandamme's and Gerard's infantry, having been retarded on the 
15th, by incidents unnecessary to recall, and Grouchy having only 
cavalry with him, was stopped towards Gilly by two divisions of 
Prussian infantry, so that instead of advancing as far as Sombref, 
he was not even able to occupy Fleurus, held by Ziethen's troops. 
Marshal Ney, finding himself, then, with Reille's corps, beyond 
Gosselies, ought, very naturally, to hesitate in throwing himself 
on Quatre-Bras, with three divisions, before being joined by d'Er- 
lon's corps, that was with difficulty debouching from Marchiennes ; 
because the cannonade of the combat at Gilly, that thundered au- 
dibly in his rear, might render this movement dangerous. In truth, 
decisive circumstances sometimes present themselves in war, when 
it is not necessary to be too much alarmed at what is passing in. 
the rear, (witness the little importance attached by the French, to 
Lusignan's column, debouching in their rear at the battle of Ri- 
voli) ; but these eases are exceptions, and as a general rule, we 
cannot devote too much attention to what the enemy may under- 
take on our line of retreat. Moreover, Reille threw Girard's 
division to the right on Heppignies, to cover himself in the direc- 
tion of Fleurus, where Ziethen concentrated his four infantry divi- 
sions, to await Pirch's four divisions, that were to arrive that 
night. 

Certainly, if Marshal Ney had had his seven divisions in hand, 
he could very well have led four on Frasne, and three on Quatre- 
Bras ; but knowing that he could not calculate on d'Erlon's corps 
that day, and being absolutely ignorant of the position of Welling- 
ton's forces, can he be blamed for having hesitated to execute this 
partial and somewhat eccentric movement, in the midst of two ar- 
mies, that numbered not less than 220,000 combatants ? For my 
own part, I do not think so, unless the order to rush headlong on 
Quatre-Bras ) had been expressed in a formal manner* I go far- 

* Napoleon wrote at St. Helena from recollection, having no written 
documents : his memory was a good one, it is true, but when verbal or- 
ders, given amid the confusion of an operation such as the passage of the 
Sambre, are at issue, he may, three years afterwards, have been deceived 
as to the expressions employed. 



APPENDIX. 215 

ther, I even believe that Napoleon, on his return to Charleroi, 
after the combat at Gilly, ought to have congratulated himself, on 
his left remaining d la hauteur of the rest of the army, that bivou- 
acked about Lambusart ; because, thus situated, this wing ran no 
risk, and could, at five o'clock in the morning, depart for Quatre- 
Bras, while Grouchy rapidly advanced on Sombref. 

This, so palpable a fact, bears me out in the belief, that in his 
interview with Marshal Ney, the night of the 15th and 16th, Na- 
poleon expressed himself to that effect.* It is at least quite cer- 
tain, that among the first words they interchanged, the emperor 
must have entertained the marshal with what had been done, and 
what was necessary still to do ; now, if the former expressed more 
or less regret that the left had halted between Frasne and Gosse- 
lies, the right being towards Lambusart, he must necessarily have 
added, either that this delay should be repaired next morning, or 
that at day-break he should receive further instructions, such as 
the reports of the night would demand. 

In fact, if Marshal Ney had not again seen the emperor after 
the receipt of the order of the 15th, it is clear, that it would have 
been his duty, at day-break, to resume its execution, deferred the 
previous night ; because, when operations are carried on at the 
distance of a march from head-quarters, and when a prescribed 
movement is delayed by certain incidents, it ought, as a matter of 
course, to be executed as soon as possible, so long as it is not re- 
voked. But as the generals had conferred a long time together, 
the night subsequent to the non-execution of the order, it was alto- 
gether otherwise, and the marshal could regard this anterior order 
as null and void, if not formally confirmed. We see, then, that 
the intention manifested by the emperor at this interview, consti- 
tutes the knot in the enigma. Which of the two intentions above 
mentioned, did he express ? There lies the whole question ; and, 
if there was no witness to this conference, God alone can decide. 

* This is so true, that in book IX. the emperor formally states, that on 
the night of the 15th, every thing had succeeded to his wishes, and that 
his operation promised a certain success; an unaffected avowal of the 
little value he attached, to the partial and isolated occupation of Quatre- 
Bras, for that day. 



216 APPENDIX. 

For myself, I can only form an opinion from appearances, or on 
conjectures : now notice what to my eyes are these appearances, 
should I properly retrace the emperor's state of mind and the data 
from which he judged. 

Napoleon did not certainly calculate on surprising the allied ar- 
mies, asleep in their cantonments, that extended from Liege to 
Malines ; but he counted on taking the initiative, and beating them 
separately, while endeavoring to concentrate. Rapidity was then 
the first of the elements of victory, but the rapidity of Rivoli, Cas- 
tiglioni, and especially of Abensburg and Dresden. 

The Prussians were the first to be encountered, and their resist- 
ance at Gilly intimated, that the main body of their forces was not 
very distant. This might have determined the emperor not to re- 
new the formal order to march on Quatre-Bras at day-break, be- 
fore having received the morning reports. Grouchy wrote on the 
16th, at six o'clock, that large Prussian columns arriving by the 
Namur road, were forming towards Ligny ; his report, which I 
have seen, could have arrived at seven ; but things do not always 
move as rapidly as they should, and it is probable that this dispatch 
did not arrive before nine o'clock. Napoleon had just dictated to 
General Flahaut, the order to advance on Quatre-Bras, and he 
stated in this communication, that a similar order had been previ- 
ously sent by Marshal Soult, but that he dispatched his aid-de- 
camp Flahaut, because he was better mounted than the staff offi- 
cers, and would reach him sooner. 

These precautions certainly attest, that at this moment, the em- 
peror attached great value to the prompt execution of this move- 
ment, and authorize the belief that he had conceived the idea at 
day-light, because he had already prescribed to the Duke of Dal- 
matia to expedite it, and dictated, at eight o'clock, the confirmation 
of a previous order. But all this appears, also, to indicate, that 
in the night conference no similar order had been given to Mar- 
shal Ney ; if this had happened, so much care would not have 
I been taken to send him a triple order, after eight o'clock in the 
morning, when he could have already reached Quatre-Bras, had 
the order been issued at midnight. 

This reasoning leads me to the conclusion, that if a first order 



APPEETDIX 217 

had actually been given him on the evening of the 15th, the 
emperor had announced, in the night conference, that he would 
issue him others the next day; the entire purport cf General 
Flahaut's letter, as well as the saying of Reille, conduces to the 
belief. 

After having done all in my power to clear up the events of 
the day and night of the 15th, it remains for me to penetrate the 
mysteries of ihe morning of the 16th, and at the very outset, I 
find myself ij presence of a very grave circumstance. 

Book IX. from St. Helena pretends, that Marshal Ney re- 
ceived during the night, the order to advance rapidly on Quatre- 
Bras, and at the same time declares, that this order was carried 
by the aid-de-camp, General Flahaut. Now, your pamphlet gives 
a letter from this general, affirming, that the order in question 
was dictated to him between eight and nine o'clock in the morning, 
which, in the month of June, is some hours after dawn. In fact, 
General Flahaut also says that this dictation occurred at an early 
hour, an expression that astonishes me, as at this period of the 
year, eight and nine o'clock are not early hours. 

I have explained above, how the inference might be drawn, 
from the very expressions of this dispatch, that it contained the 
first formal order to occupy Quatre-Bras. One single circum- 
stance, might cause a different interpretation of the facts I have 
just cited ; it is thus stated in the writings from St. Helena, 
(Book IX) : " Marshal Ney must have suspended his movement 
on Quatre-Bras a second time, because he had learned that the 
junction of the two armies was taking place, and thought this 
might change the determinations of the emperor, from whom he 
demanded orders." 

We indeed find in your pamphlet, that General Reille called 
on the marshal at seven in the morning, and that the latter in- 
formed him, that he was awaiting the emperor's orders, to whom 
he had reported his position. 

It is probable that this fact is the same that is mentioned above ; 
but it is expressed in such a manner, that we cannot conclude in 
favor or against the marshal, as the report appears to have been 
made verbally by an officer of the staff, long after the departure of 

10 



218 APPENDIX. 

General Flahaut. The orders, dictated first to Marshal Soult, ami 
later to this general, were not then occasioned by this report ; and 
the inferences you can draw from these reiterated dispatches, to 
prove, that no confirmation of the verbal order of the 15th had 
been given at night, remain in their full force. 

After all, great obscurity prevails over this report of the mar- 
shal, as over many other points ; book IX. speaks of the arrival 
of this officer towards Fleurus, just as the Prussian army had been 
reconnoitred, that is, about noon. Now, the marshal had already 
stated to Reille, at Gosselies, about seven, that he had rendered an 
account of his position, and had asked for orders. The officer 
charged with it had been sent to Charleroi : how was it, that he 
did not arrive before the emperor's departure 1 

On the other hand, I find in General Reille's letter, that at nine 
o'clock he received and expedited directly to the emperor, an officer 
sent by General Girard, announcing that the entire Prussian army 
was forming in rear of Fleurus. One hour afterwards, Marshal 
Soult writes from Charleroi to the commander of the left wing, 
that an officer of lancers has just reported, that large masses of 
the enemy appear in the direction of Quatre-Bras. This last was 
written at ten o'clock, and coincides with the sending of the officer 
from Girard. This, perhaps, might be the suspending report, 
mentioned in page 90. On the other hand, how could the emperor 
confound Quatre-Bras and Fleurus, while answering the report of 
the officer sent by Reille "?* And when he had inserted in the 
same dispatch, that Blucher having passed the night at Namur, his 
army could detach no portion on Quatre-Bras, was Napoleon igno- 
rant of what Grouchy, Girard and Reille had reported, or else, 
placed he more faith in his secret agents who gave him contrary 
information? This is what the most skilful would be unable to 
explain. Finally, it is unfortunate, that this report attributed to the 
marshal, has not come down to us in manuscript ; it would 

* This may seem strange, but is not at all impossible : pre-occupied 
with the thought, that Eeille was advancing towards Quatre-Bras against 
the English, Napoleon perhaps imagined, that the assembling of the army 
reported by the officer sent by this general, was only a portion of the 
English army, that was to cover Quatre-Bras. 



APPENDIX. 219 

have cleared up many doubts respecting the orders previously 
given. 

But let us throw aside all the suppositions to which these divers 
incidents would give rise, and return to facts. General Reille 
writes from Gosselies, at a quarter after ten o'clock, that General 
Flahaut has communicated to him the orders with which he was 
charged for the marshal, which presupposes that these orders passed 
Gosselies about ten, and reached Frasne about eleven, as Colonel 
Heymes states. General Reille adds, " that in the absence of 
Ney, he suspends his march on Quatre-Bras, because very recent 
information, as to the arrival of great Prussian masses, appears to 
him of a nature to change the emperor's dispositions ; he therefore 
awaits a positive order from the marshal.'" 

This incident, which was certainly a misfortune, occasioned a 
new delay, but this was not a decisive event, after what had taken 
place at Fleurus and Ligny. In fact, it is evident, that if the mar- 
shal did not receive the order at Frasne, before eleven o'clock, and 
if Reille awaited the result of it before placing himself in motion, 
he could not well move before noon ; therefore, there was no pos- 
sibility of commencing the attack at Quatre-Bras before two, as it 
actually happened. Now, at noon, the Prussian army in rear of 
Ligny had just been reconnoitred, and it was rather late to advance 
on Genape, when it had become necessary to march on Bry : it 
would have been better, to have established the half of the left in 
position in front of the Prince of Orange, to mask this corps, and 
disposed of the other half for completing the defeat of the Prus- 
sians, a manoeuvre that the previous delays did not prevent them 
from executing. 

We indeed know, that if the first and most important of the 
principles of war is, to concentrate the main body of the forces to 
strike a decisive blow on a portion of the enemy's line, there is a 
second which is the complement of it : it is, not to compromise 
the weak wing, on the contrary, to refuse it in such a manner, that 
it cannot engage in an unequal struggle. A serious engagement at 
Quatre-Bras, was then a real misfortune at that hour. 

For the rest, Monsieur le Due, I refer you to my work, where I 
have frankly stated what I thought of this uncertainty, that has 



220 APPENDIX. 

reigned throughout the morning of the 16th ; and as I perceive 
that I have already written to too great a length, I will endeavor, 
as well as in me lies, to recapitulate amid so many contradictions. 

1st. It appears to me evident, that from the 15th, Napoleon ex- 
pressed the desire that Quatre-Bras, as well as Sombref, should 
be occupied. But as the right could not advance beyond Lambu- 
sart, the night of the 15th, it is probable, that he was satisfied 
with the left remaining between Frasne and Gosselies. 

2d. In every state of the case, the delay caused to this occupa- 
tion on the 15th, was of no consequence, as it sufficed that it should 
take place on the 16th, towards eight or nine in the morning. If 
the left was then required to move with this object at day-break, it 
was necessary to reiterate the order during the night, as a verbal 
order, the execution of which was annulled by the very events of 
the previous night, could be very properly considered by the mar- 
shal as not to be carried out, with the very probable idea that the 
events would lead to new combinations the next day. Besides, to 
concentrate the somewhat scattered troops of the left, it was very 
necessary that d'Erlon's corps should receive orders before day. 
Every thing, then, depends on knowing, what was said and done 
at the night conference. 

3d. As to the day of the 16th, the two orders expedited from 
Charleroi, between seven and nine o'clock — one by Marshal Soult, 
the other by Napoleon himself — appear to have been, in fact, the 
first confirmation of the movement said to have been prescribed on 
the evening of the 15th. Both of these dispatches, seem to have 
preceded the reception of the information given by Grouchy, on 
the arrival of grand Prussian masses towards Ligny. What seems 
astonishing, is that an order, undoubtedly conceived by Napoleon 
towards six in the morning, should not have reached Frasne before 
eleven, and its execution not commenced till after mid-day.* 

* In order to admit all the accounts from St. Helena, and properly un- 
derstand them, it would be necessary, 1st. That Marshal Ney had received 
the verbal order, urging him to advance on Quatre-Bras on the evening of 
the 15th ; 2d. That he had received anew the formal order during the 
night, that is, at the interview ; 3d. That he had at seven declared in his 
report, that he had again suspended its execution because of the junction 



APPENDIX. 221 

4th. It is then incontestable, that the whole time from five 
o'clock in the morning until noon, was not profited by in any 
suitable manner, and to my view, every one contributed somewhat 
to this blunder ; because there was delay in the final resolution, 
and slowness in the transmission of orders, as well as in their exe- 
cution. 

5th. Be that as it may, at noon, the question entirely changed 
its aspect; he found himself in presence of 90,000 Prussians ; the 
interest, wholly strategic, of the occupation of Quatre-Bras, then 
became but of secondary importance, compared with the tactical 
advantage of having Ney nearer to him, in hand, so as to have the 
power of at once casting one of his two corps of infantry and his hea- 
vy cavalry on the Prussians' right flank, which could be executed 
from Frasne as well as from Quatre-Bras. Undoubtedly, it had 
been desirable that this central point of Quatre-Bras, should be 
previously occupied by Reille's corps, and the light cavalry of 
Colbert and Lefebre-Desnouettes ; but this was no longer a 
decisive question, because, definitively, the route from Brussels 
could be covered by leaving these corps in front of Frasne, to 
mask that of the Prince of Orange, and nothing opposed the 
throwing of d'Erlon and Valmy on Bry, with 20,000 men, as 
became necessary when too late. 

6th. This truth, that no enlightened military man will contest, 
proves that the non-occupation of Quatre-Bras on the 16th, 
though unfortunate, would not have had, in fact, the consequences 
attributed to it, had orders been issued in time for the best possi- 
ble employment of the left, which was not done till three hours 
after mid-day. 

This is, Monsieur le Due, what seems to me to result, from 
all the minute investigations in which I have indulged. Conse- 
quently, I rest convinced, that if Marshal Ney received the verbal 
order of the evening of the 15th, and took upon himself to defer 
its execution, it was but a slight misfortune, very easily repaired 
the next morning. As to this day of the 16th June, I also believe 

of the two hostile armies ; but the contents of the letters borne by Fla- 
haut, or sent by Marshal Soult, really accord but slightly with this sup- 
position. 



222 APPENDIX. 

that no blame should attach to him, provided the formal injunc- 
tion to advance at day-break on Quatre-Bras, was not verbally 
reiterated in the night conference at Charleroi, an uncertain 
thing, quite impossible to establish, if it be true that Marshal Soult 
was not present at the interview.* 

Undoubtedly, Marshal Ney would have acted skilfully, by 
marching at all hazards on this important point, on the morning 
of the 16th; but a hesitation induced by a just prudence, and 
the non-execution of orders formally received, differ widely ; 
and to blame this prudence, it would be necessary still to know, 
whether at the night conference, the emperor gave him to under- 
stand that he would send him further instructions at day-break, a 
circumstance that would have shackled the marshal's movements. 

In all that has preceded, I have admitted the existence of the 
verbal order of the evening of the 15th. If you succeed in de- 
monstrating that the order written and borne by Flahaut, on the 
morning of the 16th, was the first and only one prescribing the 
occupation of Quatre-Bras, then the marshal would certainly be 
acquitted of all blame, and sheltered from all criticism. This 
frank and sincere expression will prove to you, to what extent I 
am disposed to render justice to your father, while preserving my 
impartiality as a historian. This impartiality is, I trust, suffi- 
ciently well established, for any one to dream of reproaching me 
with wishing to impair, in the slightest degree, the immense glory 
of Napoleon, as no one has proclaimed it louder than myself. A 
great captain may be induced, through false information, to make 
incorrect suppositions concerning the intentions of the enemy, and 
find himself led by it into committing actual faults, which would 
not be such had his suppositions been well founded. The emperor 
had, undoubtedly, powerful inducements for not taking a decisive 
course before three o'clock ; and these were probably the same 
that determined him not to dispatch Flahaut till nine, to pre- 

* The declaration of Marshal Soult, mentioned in your pamphlet, states 
that the emperor did not issue orders for the occupation of Quatre-Bras, 
ill after breakfast on the 16th ; but it does not positively deny, what may 
have been said verbally, and does not indicate that the major-general as- 
sisted at the night conference. 



APPENDIX. 233 

scribe a movement which at that hour should have been already 
executed. 

I have not considered it my duty to raise the charge made by 
many military men, on the marshal's recalling d'Erlon on the 
night of the 16th, though he perceived Reille's corps overwhelmed 
by superior forces : this was indeed an unfortunate incident, but 
most generals in his position would have undoubtedly acted in the 
same manner. Appreciating the importance of the route from 
Brussels to Charleroi, which was the line of the army's retreat, 
the marshal judged it necessary not to counterbalance, by a disas- 
ter at this point, the partial success the emperor might obtain at 
Ligny ; such a resolution is of that number, that may not be op- 
portune because of the turn of affairs, but which no enlightened 
military man would condemn. Besides, on the next day — June 
17th' — the emperor only blamed him for having divided the left ; 
he must have then wished, either that the two corps had come to 
Bry, or else had fought united at Quatre-Bras ; now, as they were 
already engaged at the latter point, by his orders, how could Reille 
be withdrawn from the fight, and sent with d'Erlon upon Bry % It 
will, then, be objected, that it was not necessary to detach the latter 
alone. But we are well aware that he received, through Labe- 
doyere, a direct order to march on Bry ; a movement that would 
have certainly obtained an immense victory, had it been car- 
ried out. 

I will terminate my long epistle with a few words on the battle 
\)f Waterloo, in which your father displayed such brilliant valor. 

What has been said or printed, relative to the premature em- 
ployment of cavalry, has appeared to me a puerile excuse ; the 
real misfortune was, in not having it properly supported by in- 
fantry. 

In my opinion, four principal causes led to this disaster: 

The first, and most influential, was the arrival, skilfully com- 
bined, of Blucher, and the false movement that favored this ar- 
rival ; 

The second, was the admirable firmness of the British infantry, 
joined to the sang-froid and aplomb of its chiefs ; 

The third, was the horrible weather, that had softened the 



224: APPENDIX. 

ground, and rendered the offensive movements so toilsome, and re- 
tarded till one o'clock the attack that should have been made in 
the morning ; 

The fourth, was the inconceivable formation of the first corps, 
in masses very much too deep for the first grand attack. 

The formation of masses, so unweildy and so exposed to the 

ravages of the enemy's fire, was an incontestable error 

To whom should it be imputed 1 This will remain a problem for 
a long time to come. 

Was it a mistake, caused by the double signification of the 
term columns by divisions, which applies indiscriminately, to the 
divisions of four regiments or to divisions of two platoons. A 
fatal confusion of terms, of which no one has yet dreamt of purging 
the military technology. 

On the contrary, was it the intention of the chiefs of the French 
army, to form the troops in such a manner, that the divisions of 
four regiments should form but a single column? It would be in- 
teresting to know this, but it will no doubt ever remain a mystery. 

However, these causes, as I have stated, were only secondary, 
and the most decisive was the arrival of Blucher with 65,000 
Prussians, on the flank and rear of the French line ; it was one 
of those events that human prudence cannot always avert. 

You will perhaps find my letter full of repetitions, they were 
indispensable to give more clearness to my reasoning : as to my 
conclusions, if tney are but eventual, it is, that far from pretend- 
ing to be the judge, I should be borne on the list of simple 
reporters. 

Accept the assurance of all my sentiments, 

General J * * # * 
Paris, September 1st, 1841. 

P. S. I send you here annexed, a printed copy of the letter I 
purpose adding, at the end of my Political and Military Summary 
of 1815. In attentively re- perusing this letter, I perceive that 
three essential observations have escaped me, and I think it my 
duty to notice them. 

The first, tends to fortify the opinion, that Napoleon should not 



APPENDIX. 225 

have attached any value to the isolated occupation of Quatre- 
Bras by the left wing, since the right could not press on as far 
as Sombref. In fact, it is evident that if the two points were 
occupied simultaneously, the position then offered the most bril- 
liant advantages, united to perfect security, because the right 
would be covered from the English, while the left remained with- 
out the slightest uneasiness from the Prussians, who could no 
longer reach it through Sombref. Thus the two masses of the 
army not only reciprocally supported each other, but were free 
from all anxiety of being taken in flank or in rear, and had, besides, 
a reserve of 40,000 of the elite to march in the intermediate 
space, and support both. 

On the contrary, let us suppose the left of these masses pushed 
alone on Quatre-Bras, Sombref not being strongly occupied ; then 
this body would be in manifest danger, thus venturing between 
two great armies, as it might be assailed on all sides ; from 
Brussels by the English, from Nivelles by the Belgians, and from 
Sombref by the whole Prussian army. 

It would be the same with the right wing, if pushed, on the 
evening of the 15th, as far as Sombref, the left not occupying 
Quatre-Bras. It is thus incontestable, that the simultaneous oc- 
cupation of the two points was necessary, in order to constitute a 
skilful manoeuvre, and prove important in its results. 

Another reflection has occurred to me, relative to the orders of 
the 15th June : it is, that on that day, Marshal Grouchy com- 
manded only the cavalry reserves, and had not an infantry soldier 
at his disposal, as it was only on the morning of the 16th, that 
the command of the right wing was conferred upon him. It could, 
then, be very possible, that Napoleon had ordered the chief of his 
cavalry to press forward with his numerous squadrons to Sombref, 
not in order to take up a position for battle, but solely as a strong 
reconnoitering party, with the double object of gathering reliable 
information, and annoying the movements of the allies, while 
concentrating their forces by this cross-road. Then on the morn- 
ing of the 16th, the two masses of infantry should have been re- 
quired to occupy, militarily and simultaneously, the two decisive 

10* 



226 APPENDIX. 

points of the whole operation, thus rendering the junction of the 
enemy's armies impossible. 

This circumstance of the cavalry command, to which I have 
not given sufficient attention, would authorize us in believing, that 
Napoleon might order Grouchy, during the 15th, to press forward 
to Sombref, without dreaming of advancing infantry masses 
separately on Quatre-Bras. The encumbrances existing at the 
different bridges on the Sambre, and the delays experienced by 
the infantry, still strengthen this opinion. Besides, I believe I 
have demonstrated, that it was more prudent, and at the same time 
sufficient, to take possession of Quatre-Bras on the morning of 
the 16th. 

The last observation I think it proper to make, relates to the 
resolution taken by General Reille, not to put his corps on the 
march at ten o'clock on the morning of the 16th, after General 
Flahaut had communicated to him the orders he was bearing to 
Marshal Ney. I do not think, that he is deserving of the least 
censure on this account: we must not forget, that General Reille 
had just sent — nine o'clock — the positive information of the pre- 
sence of the entire Prussian army towards Ligny : he must nave 
concluded from this, that the left would be called upon to take part 
in the attack of this army, and that it would be unfortunate if, after 
such information, he took the Genape route, when it would be ne- 
cessary to turn to the right towards Bry. This reasoning was 
more than logical, it was based on the laws of la grande tactique, 
and the emperor himself, had he been present at Gosselies, at the 
reception of the information given by General Girard, would not 
have acted differently from Reille. We must also add, that the 
emperor's orders were addressed to Marshal Ney, and that it was 
from him that he should expect the final decision, as to the move- 
ment to be made. 

However, this delay had little influence on the course of affairs ; 
nothing would have resulted from it, except at the commencement 
of the battle of Quatre-Bras, between two and foun o'clock. If 
Reille, followed later by d'Erlon had reached this point at mid- 
day, it is probable that the Prince of Orange would have been dis- 
lodged, before the arrival of Wellington, and of the English 



APPENDIX. 227 

coming from Brussels and Nivelles : Marshal Ney, instead of being 
repulsed and forced to retreat on Frasne, would have maintained 
his position, but this was all that could be expected from him, as 
towards evening he would have had over 40,000 men against him. 

He could not have even held this post, but under the supposition 
that d'Erlon had been with him ; so that this would not have given 
one man the more, to fight the Prussians : the marshal would 
have repulsed Wellington, instead of being repulsed by him — that 
is all. 

The battle of Ligny could not then have produced decisive re- 
sults, but with the co-operation of the whole or half of the left 
wing ; and to effect this, the surest means were to do what was 
undoubtedly Reille's wish : to halt the left in rear of the rivulet 
of Pont-a-Miqueloup, between Gosselies and Frasne, in order to 
detach from it a strong portion upon Bry, on the Prussian flank. 

I think, Monsieur le Due, that all learned military men will up- 
hold me in my opinion. 

Accept the renewed expressions of all my sentiments, 

General J # * * # * 

t/kRis, October 13//i, 1841. 



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